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Abstract 
 
Neoclassical conventions surrounding private equity investments by scholars and 
practitioners recognise the importance of private equity in capital markets as an 
alternative investment class. The complexities of private equity investments, including 
information asymmetries and informed trading, have led to continued regulatory debate 
over the stringency of existing legislation addressing private equity investments in the 
United States. Most recently, the issue of deregulation following the enactment of 
increased regulation following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has received increased 
attention in financial circles. Private equity investment waves mirror economic cycles but 
also encompass investor confidence that is believed to increase parallel with regulation 
that addresses information asymmetries and informed trading in the sector.  
 
This dissertation addresses the research gap by investigating whether information 
asymmetry exists around private equity takeovers compared to tender/merger takeovers 
through the analysis of cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. Next, 
the probability of informed trade around the announcement date due to deal specifics of 
takeover negotiations between takeover types is determined. Finally, an analysis of the 
complexities of private equity regulation in light of market efficiency and systematic risk 
is considered. Using a dataset of 1,750 private equity and tender/merger offer takeovers 
in the United States between 1994 and 2014, this study investigates prior and current 
theorem regarding the differences between financial and strategic takeovers across three 
key market concerns: information asymmetry, informed trading, and regulatory 
environment.  
 
The results suggest that, in line with the neoclassical view, private equity takeovers show 
higher cumulative returns immediately before and after the announcement day; however 
there is no omitted variables selection issue with acquirers emphasizing financial 
particulars of importance in takeover decisions. In addition, this study finds that there is 
informed trading around the announcement date. This is likely due to the nature of the 
private equity transactions, with transactions encompassing information sharing between 
the target and the acquirer pre-bid. Lastly, this study provides arguments for the 
deregulation of the private equity market from neoclassical capital market regulation. 
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Private equity transactions are complex, and by their nature, risk averse, thus making 
stringent reform following periods of crisis restrictive on market efficiency and growth.   
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
This thesis investigates the importance of information asymmetry in self-selection when 
evaluating target returns around an announcement date through consideration of the 
average abnormal returns of financial (private equity) versus strategic (tender/merger 
offer) takeover bids during a period of possible informed trading. A dataset of 1,750 
United States target firms consisting of 1,424 tender/merger offer targets and 326 private 
equity targets firm stock prices are used to examine equity market responses to determine 
if valuation effects convey asymmetric information through bid announcements, and in 
pre- and post- periods of trade. This study argues that both types of takeovers have strong 
incentive and ability to reduce agency costs and thus create stakeholder wealth; however, 
pre-announcement information asymmetries account for differences in post-
announcement valuation effects. This study provides evidence that takeover 
announcements are not randomised, as managers rationally determine whether to submit 
a bid, indicative of timed announcements. The findings show that private equity firms 
exhibit lower price impact post-announcement, but both investor group targets have a 
significant increase in average abnormal returns over the window [-1, +1].  While results 
indicate positive abnormal returns for both takeover platforms, this result is interpreted 
as investment strategy impacting the level of perceived information asymmetry and 
therefore degree of price impact pre and post-announcement. The long-term financial 
(rather than strategic acquisition position) of private equity takeovers, coupled with 
higher private information pre-announcement, leads to lower abnormal returns post-
announcement.    
 
Increased regulation imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to mitigate 
selective disclosure has led to a rise in private equity funds as an alternative to developed 
market investments. The extent of any informational advantage that participants gain 
through selective disclosure (due to the comparatively lower oversight of selective 
disclosure surrounding private equity transactions) remains contentious. This study tests 
whether private equity target firms exhibit differences in adverse selection costs due to 
informed trading pre- and post-announcement, relative to tender/merger target firms. The 
analysis employs the probability of informed trading derived from market bid-ask 
spreads. Private information may result in increased insider trading as investors seek to 
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maximise profits, acting on private company information. On the other hand, anticipated 
profit from insider trading may be negated due to the time taken to convert private 
information into monetizable assets. This study finds a significant decrease in the 
probability of informed trading in the post-announcement period for private equity bid 
targets relative to tender/merger offer targets. This result is interpreted as decreased 
information asymmetry post-announcement for private equity bid targets relative to 
tender/merger offer targets. 
 
Private equity has developed into a major player in the global economy. Regulatory 
reform of alternative asset classes continues to be a topic of misperception and 
apprehension among investors, fund managers and governments alike. There exists an 
efficient policy design problem, wherein having a self-regulatory market and explicit 
regulation with the potential to unnecessarily restrict trade creates market inefficiency 
and increases costs without achieving a reduction in systematic risks. This thesis seeks to 
fill the gap in the academic literature between regulatory reform and private equity 
investment. This thesis provides comparative arguments on both the regulation and 
deregulation of the private equity asset class in response to market changes including the 
financial crisis, political and government changes, and international trade, concluding that 
greater consultation is needed between regulators and industry. This study finds that 
greater regulation does not solely reduce systematic risk and increase efficiency. 
Similarly, deregulation does not lead to increased systematic risk and reduced efficiency. 
Rather, a range of external factors beyond industry self-regulation and law reform 
contributes to market changes.   
 
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter Two examines abnormal 
returns and investor preferences surrounding strategic and financial acquisitions. Chapter 
Three explores the asymmetric private information mask via a comparative analysis of 
private equity bids and tender/merger offers. Chapter Four assesses the cost of private 
equity regulation, and Chapter Five concludes. 
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Chapter 2 : Abnormal Returns And Investor Preferences 
Surrounding Strategic And Financial Acquisitions 
2.1  Introduction  
 
Alternative investments for corporate restructure and development in capital markets 
have seen private equity become forefront. This is, in part, due to its favourable growth 
and a 30-year record of success in creating wealth for underperforming firms. However, 
the empirical literature on wealth effects of corporate restructures is somewhat mixed. In 
much of the literature private equity transactions are pooled with tender/merger 
transactions, yet the motivation for each is distinctly different. Tender/merger offer 
takeovers are best characterized as strategic transactions as they acquire the target with 
the purpose of combining the target with one, or multiple, projects they manage (see 
Bargeron et al., 2008; Dittmar et al., 2012). In contrast, private equity transactions are 
financial in nature due to their perception of the target as a stand-alone project, and have 
better monitoring effects through governance and oversight strategies (see Hege et al., 
2012; Martos-Vila et al., 2014).  
 
Capital market merger and acquisition trends highlight fluctuations in deal numbers 
between financial (private equity) and strategic (tender/merger) bidders. Recent literature 
such as Bargeron et al. (2008) and Dittmar et al. (2012) consider the behaviour of bidders 
and target premiums between strategic and financial acquirers, finding that target 
shareholders receive a higher premium from a strategic acquisition, while strategic 
competition results in a lower premium but higher abnormal returns, respectively. Such 
studies assume both financial and strategic bidders have value maximising objectives, 
conditional on their respective information sets. Martos-Vila et al. (2014) argue that while 
equity markets experience misevaluation, so do debt markets, which results in periods of 
change between financial versus strategic buyer dominance. These findings suggest 
targets will self-select as a financial or strategic acquirer target based on market changes 
and perceived target returns.  
 
The economic magnitude of the growing leverages buyout market, coupled with increased 
interest by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in improving regulation 
of the capital market, particularly regarding private equity transactions, has led to 
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increased interest in the benefits of financial versus strategic takeovers. This interest is 
largely in terms of pre-acquisition information asymmetries and post-acquisition changes 
in ownership structure that result in different costs and benefits to society. Existing 
academic literature most commonly uses the event study methodology to estimate target 
returns surrounding acquisition announcements by regressing the abnormal returns of 
target firms on a set of commonly considered firm characteristics. This methodology 
inaccurately assumes that target firms making the bid announcement are a random sample 
of the population of all firms in the capital target market. Therefore, a sample selection 
problem arises leading to standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation being biased 
as applied on the assumption that target firms in the sample are a random sample of the 
population of all firms, when in fact they self-select as targets with rationally and 
informed timed announcements. Target management will start the takeover process and 
acquirers will announce a takeover bid after rational consideration of market reactions to 
past and perceived target performance, including internal and external factors. Therefore 
there is the potential for selection bias around systematically different takeover types.     
  
This study compares short-term returns surrounding announcements between financial 
(private equity bid) and strategic (tender/merger offer) takeovers utilising a sample of 
1,750 takeover announcements in the United States from 1994 to 2014. An event study 
methodology is adopted to determine the abnormal and cumulative returns, and builds on 
prior literature to account for sample selection bias in estimating the value effects around 
a private equity bid announcement. The problem of self-selection and information 
asymmetry surrounding stock prices is tested using Heckman’s (1979) two-step 
regression model to correct the effects of the omitted self-selection variable and test for 
private information effects on returns post-announcement. The sample consists of 326 
private equity targets and 1,424 tender/merger offer targets, allowing for the comparison 
of wealth effects between financial and strategic takeovers. Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) surrounding the bid announcements for various windows within a 41 day period 
surrounding the events are investigated to determine the effect on financial versus 
strategic information asymmetries after controlling for sample selection bias. Heckman’s 
(1979) two-step method is utilised to determine the announcement returns and correct for 
the systematic effect of the sample selection bias.  
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This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways. The primary contribution 
is a comparative analysis between the two foremost corporate restructure techniques on 
target returns, after controlling for sample selection bias. This combines two topical areas 
of the finance literature by considering both the financial versus strategic acquirer benefits 
to the target surrounding the announcement and the use of conditional models to capture 
asymmetric information in the estimation of CARs (Heckman, 1979; Acharya, 1988; 
Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Eckbo et al. 1990; Li and Prabhala, 2006; Barraclough et al., 
2013). Until recently, studies have assumed target selection was random based on a 
favourable set of target characteristics perceived to lead to future profitability; however 
more recent research shows an element of target self-selection through information 
asymmetrical characteristics. This chapter differs from the existing literature by providing 
a direct comparative analysis between two takeover types, while controlling for self-
selection bias in the world’s leading capital market, the United States. This is important 
in identifying how targets self-select and the level of asymmetric information leading to 
acquirer choice (financial versus strategic). Further, the results illustrate the significance 
of unobservable characteristics on target selection and the resultant effect on the target 
firm’s economic returns around the announcement date.    
 
Second, stock prices and target returns increase (decrease) relative to perceived good 
(bad) news during the weeks preceding a takeover bid. Acquirers utilise many sources of 
information on which to base their bid intention and thus there exists pre-announcement 
differences between financial and strategic target firms. These differences need to be 
controlled for to provide an accurate measure of abnormal returns in the announcement 
period. Prabhala (1997) finds Heckman’s two-step procedure superior in controlling for 
unobservable factors with a causal link between the probability of a target being the 
subject of a financial bid and the target firm’s abnormal returns. Heckman’s model 
simultaneously determines the probability that the target firm would be subject to a 
financial (private equity) bid and secondly determines the target’s abnormal returns using 
a probit model and cross-sectional regression, respectively. For robustness, this chapter 
utilises three performance benchmark models to determine and compare cumulative 
abnormal returns to the target firm shareholders: the traditional market model, the (0,1) 
market model, and the Fama-French three factor model.         
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 systematically reviews existing literature and 
critically analyses the methodologies leading to the view that private equity target firms 
exhibit higher levels of information asymmetry pre-announcement due to the nature of 
the transaction and proximity between bidders. Section 3 specifies the empirical model 
used including analysis of prior model appropriateness. Section 4 presents the data; 
Section 5 presents the results, including robustness of model specifications; and Section 
6 concludes.  
   
2.2  Theoretical Background 
  
Mergers and acquisitions involve both strategic and financial acquirers, with historical 
waves of such activity related to factors such as industry and geographic growth. Market 
reactions to new information continue to be examined through event studies; however the 
differences between financial and strategic investment from a target perspective remains 
limited. The private equity literature is still growing, with much of the literature 
investigating information effects on stock prices surrounding takeover announcements, 
for example, the reaction to the release of corporate information through acquisition 
announcements as determined using the acquirer and target firm’s common stock prices 
(Ball and Brown, 1968; Fama, 1965, 1970). Similar to takeovers, private equity involves 
transforming target firms into optimal performance organisations and has grown into a 
valuable asset class in capital markets. The first public announcement date contains 
important information as to investor and market perceptions of target firm prospects. The 
extent to which asymmetric information is incorporated into stock returns around the 
announcement of private equity acquisitions is scantly analysed with respect to the target 
self-selecting as an attractive financial target.  
 
Private equity bid target firms, according to prior literature, exhibit lower stock volatility 
and long-term growth prospects, are larger, and exhibit greater abnormal operating 
income relative to other acquisition techniques. Prior studies also consider the 
determinants of private equity acquisitions relative to other takeover techniques at the 
domestic and international level (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Bargeron et al., 2008; 
Achleitner et al., 2009; Boone and Mulherin, 2009; Chapple et al., 2010; Osborne et al., 
2012; Fidrmuc et al., 2012).  Chatterjee (2000) and Siriopoulos et al. (2006) provide 
evidence that acquirers prefer larger, mature targets with high productivity, while Singh 
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(1975), Kuehn (1975), Palepu (1986) and Alcade and Espitia (2003) find that smaller 
firms with poorer profitability and lower market to book ratios have a higher probability 
of bid occurrence. Chapple et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence regarding the link 
between private equity bids and accounting information within Australia, finding target 
firm characteristics are positively correlated to bid probability.  The findings of Chapple 
et al. (2010) are supported in the U.S. by Bargeron et al. (2008) and Boone and Mulherin 
(2009), and by Achleitner et al. (2009) for continental Europe. These studies show that 
information contained within reported financials is important, however corporate 
government mechanisms and agency perceptions are equally important in target selection 
and value creation.   
 
Private equity transactions tend to involve financial buyers, as the focus on value creation 
from leverage increases the impact of corporate debt tax shields. Therefore, private equity 
targets exhibit different characteristics to their strategic takeover counterparts. These 
firm-level differences need to be controlled for in determining the information effect on 
stock prices pre- and post-announcement. Private equity targets are expected to exhibit 
higher free cash flows and abnormal operating income, coupled with lower debt to equity, 
thereby facilitating lower stock volatility and higher borrowing capacity, making them 
ideal targets for financial buyers. Extensive literature emphasises the disciplinary and 
synergistic reasoning behind acquisitions and abnormal stock returns to targets. For 
example, Gort (1969) argues that mergers arise due to valuation differentials caused by 
economic shocks such as changes in technology, industry structure, and regulatory 
environment. Gompers and Lerner (2001) find that private equity investors collaborate 
with management in order to establish sound, strategic justifications for business 
transactions.  
 
In this respect, the recent boom in private equity investment can be attributed to investors 
and management exercising capital structure arbitrage. Private equity investors look for 
target firms with strong corporate balance sheets showing stable earnings and free cash 
flows. These firm characteristics are often indicative of underinvestment or reluctance on 
the part of the publicly traded company to undertake new investments and are ideal 
private equity targets as the acquirer can use the target firm’s financial position to service 
debt taken out for the acquisition and create post-acquisition returns for both the target 
and bidder. The investment horizon to develop, manage and harvest the investment 
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through private equity will depend on whether the investment is rapidly maturing or an 
emerging market, but ranges between three to five years. While it might be easier to 
market short-term returns through tender/merger offer acquisitions, sophisticated 
investors might recognise the complexity of a restructure, and prefer lower but certain 
returns from private equity investment. Accordingly, target firm characteristics motivate 
private equity investment and the level of post-announcement returns is a reflection of 
private and public information.  
 
The exact source of post-announcement returns is unresolved; however takeovers and 
private equity bids are viewed in a quid pro quo scenario, whereby acquirers and targets 
expect to benefit as a result of an acquisition categorised as either disciplinary or 
synergistic in nature. Traditionally takeovers occur for one of two reasons: either 
managers are not engaging in practices that are effectively maximising shareholder 
wealth, or the motivation of increased benefits such as market share or reduced 
operational costs post-acquisition. This holds true for private equity bids with inefficient 
managerial operations, prospective future wealth, and misuse of free cash flow incentives 
for target selection. Prior event studies show that takeover target firms in cash financed 
transactions when compared to stock financed acquisitions experience greater positive 
abnormal returns on the announcement day (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). This 
is attributable to completion time with stock financed acquisitions requiring greater 
regulatory support, thereby taking longer to finalise and creating uncertainty about 
whether the takeover will eventuate.  
 
When an acquisition such as a takeover or private equity bid is announced, a significant 
amount of information is revealed about the potential transaction that investors use to 
make investment decisions. This information can further be used to assess the stock 
market’s reaction to an acquisition announcement. MacKinlay (1997) shows 
announcement dates are not distinct event dates which provides evidence in support of 
CARs before and after the official announcement date as information leaks to the market. 
Consistent with the literature, this study predicts that both private equity and 
tender/merger offer targets will reject the null of zero target abnormal returns; however 
private equity target firms will evidence lower positive premiums (abnormal returns) 
relative to takeover targets. Takeover announcements reveal new information not only 
about the proposed valuation of the target but the bidder’s ability to manage the target 
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post-acquisition. Due to greater free cash flows exhibited by private equity target firms, 
there is greater financial freedom post-acquisition to restructure and create shareholder 
wealth within a short timeframe, making them an ideal investment for faster returns.   
 
Abnormal returns to the target measure the unanticipated component of the total 
economic effect of the bid-announcement. Prior studies have focused on the financial 
reasoning behind target firm selection. The extent to which asymmetric information is 
shared between investors both on a professional and private level is unobservable.  Prior 
studies have examined the level of observable information, including the number of 
bidders, as an indication of asymmetric information on the assumption that the greater the 
number of bidders, the higher the asymmetric information. Post-announcement 
information effects should theoretically take into consideration that a higher number of 
bidders result in greater asymmetric information and be reflected in stock prices as 
positive news. However, Cain et al. (2009) show no difference in shareholder wealth with 
the number of bidders. Under the Efficient Market Hypothesis, prices should reflect all 
publicly available information on an underlying asset (Fama, 1970). The market price of 
the target stock does not generally reflect private information such as the intention of the 
acquirer to bid for the control of the target firm until an event occurs that causes traders 
to infer that private information, for example through the acquisition of the target’s stock 
by the bidder. Empirical evidence in event studies shows that information inherent in the 
announcement results in the target firm’s stock price is positively affected. Prior studies 
show that the cumulative abnormal returns to targets are greater when the bidder is public 
than when the bidder is private, and further that the spread between the two is greatest 
from two days following the announcement.     
 
Prior studies (for example, Bargeron et al., 2008) focus on publicly available information, 
namely annual reports and media releases, as determinants of private equity bid targets. 
This methodology disregards information unobservable to the public but which is known 
to management, and forms an integral part of the acquirer’s decision of target firm. We 
use Heckman’s (1979) two-step model to account for unobservable information. Targets 
have certain characteristics that attract bidders both through public and private 
information and therefore self-select as targets. Targets are thereby not randomly selected 
but selected as targets for the characteristics they exhibit both financially and 
managerially, and in terms of future growth. Consequently, the OLS estimators are biased 
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due to a self-selection problem caused by the omittance of unobservable factors 
(Heckman, 1979). Heckman’s methodology controls for unobservables, such as private 
information, which account for the differences in post-announcement returns. This study 
predicts that private equity target firms will exhibit lower cumulative abnormal returns 
pre- and post-announcement comparative to tender/merger offer target firms due to 
increased information asymmetry surrounding private equity takeovers.   
 
In light of prior research, it should follow that there is an interaction between target firm 
characteristics and deal particulars, and cumulative abnormal returns during the 
announcement period. Although increased attention has been directed at bidder and target 
firm characteristics surrounding private equity bids (Osborne et al., 2012), little attention 
has been given to considering recent asset pricing effects of private equity bids, 
particularly from the target firm perspective. This research extends prior literature to 
provide empirical evidence on how asymmetric information surrounding private equity 
bids in the United States is reflected by the target firm’s cumulative abnormal returns. 
Specifically, this study examines whether private equity target firms experience 
significantly different abnormal returns relative to strategic takeover targets. We build on 
prior studies by accounting for decision effects (selection bias) commonly ignored in prior 
studies. We mitigate selection bias due to unobservable self-selection effects (self-
selection bias) through the Heckman inverse-Mills-ratio (Heckman’s lambda) (Heckman, 
1979). Private equity targets are selected by acquirers based on calculated projections and 
prospective managerial success. In that sense bids are not random; instead there is a 
sample selection bias present. This study investigates why private equity targets are more 
visible to acquirers than comparative takeover firms. This study suggests that it is not 
exclusively characteristic based but that there is an underlying unobservable factor 
attracting the acquirer to the target firms. The following hypothesis is tested:  
 
Do targets for financial (private equity bids) experience higher cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the bid announcement date 
compared to strategic (tender/merger offer) target firms – ceteris paribus? 
 
The empirical findings of this study will be of interest to academia, investors and 
regulators regarding the importance of whether private equity target firm characteristics 
can signal private information evidenced by post stock performance. That is, whether the 
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combination of firm and deal specific characteristics, in conjunction with the perceived 
success of the bid and information asymmetry effects can determine value creation 
surrounding the bid/offer announcement date.    
 
 
2.3   Empirical Model  
 
 
This section develops the model for testing the hypothesis developed in Section 2.2. As 
the notion of self-selection is central to this study, prior literature that offers solutions to 
self-selection bias is first discussed. Next, testable models within the context of this 
setting are developed. Given this research is based on observable outcome and observable 
managerial decisions through historical financial data, there is the potential for self-
selection bias to be present. A failure to control for selection bias leads to an endogeneity 
problem and inappropriate inferences about treatment effects. Self-selection occurs where 
companies at least partly determine whether they receive treatment or not, and their 
decision may be related to the benefit of the treatment, namely private equity bid 
selection, and leads to an omitted variable bias (unobservables). Since bid announcements 
are voluntary actions of bidding firms on a target it is arguable that firms self-select 
themselves as private equity targets due to their unique financial, managerial, and 
structural characteristics making them optimal restructure targets post-bid. Consequently, 
bids are not random as bidder decisions are based on calculated analysis of target 
characteristics. Li and Prabhala (2006) interpret the self-selection factor as private 
information known by management and suggest that Heckman’s two-step model can also 
be used to test private information effects. His approach estimates the choice model 
(private equity probability) in the first stage and adds a bias correction term (lambda) in 
the second-stage regression. If the slope coefficient of the self-selection factor (also 
known as ‘Heckman’s lambda’ or ‘the Inverse Mills’ ratio’) is statistically significantly 
different from zero, then private information is indicated. That is, if the private 
information has non-zero value, the value will be carried to the firm’s ex post stock 
performance. We test the problem of self-selection in private equity bid announcements 
using Heckman’s (1979) two-step regression model and consider the alternative 
explanations for CAR based on endogenous selection.   
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Targets have certain characteristics that attract bidders, which may be gleaned through 
public and private information, thus prompting target self-selection. Targets are thereby 
not randomly selected, but rather selected as targets for the characteristics they exhibit 
both financially and managerially in terms of future growth and profitability. These target 
characteristics are endogenous, and self-selection of targets through financial and 
managerial decisions as well as asymmetric information could lead to an incorrect 
inference as to variable influence on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) post-
announcement. This study adopts an event study methodology to determine the abnormal 
and cumulative returns, and builds on prior literature to account for sample selection bias 
in estimating the value effects around private equity bid announcements. In the first-stage 
a probit regression based on Osborne et al. (2012) is used to specify self-selection effects 
measured by Heckman’s lambda. The second stage investigates whether private equity 
target firms exhibit abnormal returns surrounding the bid announcement based on target 
specific characteristics unique to private equity bids that influence ex-post stock 
performance. A significant, and positive, cumulative abnormal return indicates that the 
bid announcement contains new positive information that the market had not anticipated.  
 
Firstly, it is necessary to determine an appropriate model to test the probability of any 
singular firm being a financial or strategic target. If firms self-select themselves through 
their characteristics and information asymmetry, then it could lead to misleading 
conclusions without controlling for endogeneity.  A binary response model based on 
Osborne et al. (2012) is developed to specify the functional relationship between firm-
specific characteristics and the probability of a private equity bid compared to takeover 
offers, where Yi is “1” if the target firm is subject to a private equity bid and “0” for firms 
subject to a takeover offer. 
 
P(Yi = 1|x) = P(y = 1|x1, x2, ..., xk) 
 
Independent variables (x) with explanatory power resultant in a firm being subject to a 
private equity bid, and  unknown parameters to be estimated through the probit 
regression:   
 
P(Yi = 1|x) = G(β0 + β1x1 + ... + βkxk) = G(β0 + xβ) 
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where G is a function taking on values between zero and one: 0 < G (z) < 1, for all real 
numbers z such that the estimated response probabilities are strictly between zero and 
one.  
G is expressed as;  
ࡳሺࢠሻ ൌ 	ɸሺࢠሻ ≡ ׬ ૖ሺ࢜ሻ܌࢜ܢିஶ 	, 
 
where ϕሺݖሻ is the standard normal density  ϕሺݖሻ ൌ ሺ2ߨሻିଵ/ଶexp	ሺെݖଶ/2ሻ. 
 
The effect of the explanatory variables (xj) on the response probability P(Yi = 1|x), a 
private equity bid relative to a takeover offer, is determined as:    
 
P(Yi = 1|x) = P(y* > 0|x) = P[e > -(β0 + xβ)|x] = 1 – G[-(β0 + xβ)] = G(β0 + xβ), 
 
where y* = β0 + xβ + e, Yi= private equity bid = 1 [y* > 0].      
                             
Target firm characteristics are regressed on the exogenous dependent variable to test the 
association between these explanatory factors relating to the bid, bid preferences and 
whether the bid was by a private equity acquirer. This regression generates the conditional 
probability that each firm observation will result in a private equity bid. Table 2.1 
specifies in full the regression variables. The regression variables (Equation 2.3.1) include 
a number of prior-influence and contemporaneous factor variables to prevent 
unhypothesised influence on the independent effect variables and increase the statistical 
validity of the analysis. The below regression captures the main variables identified to 
significantly influence target choice in prior literary work.   
 
The probit regression in this study is expressed as  
PRIV(Y=1|x) = Probit (0 + 1D/E + 2VOL + 3FCF+ 4M/B + 
5SIZE+6ABNORM + 7ROE + 8TURN + 9CR + 10EPS + 11DIST + 
12BC+εi)   
(2.3.1)                   
The results of this probit regression will indicate whether the choice of takeover is 
correlated with the identifiable firm characteristics.  
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The aforementioned probit regression is used as the first-stage control for endogenous 
self-selection in the treatment and Heckman (1979) second-stage regressions. Similar to 
Bris et al. (2006) the second-stage regressions entertain the same set of independent 
regressors in all regressions where CAR is the dependant variable. These independent 
regressors are different from the independent regressors used in the target firm selection 
probit and reflect factors influential to changes in CARs. Applying Bris et al. (2006) and 
Colak and Whited (2007), the OLS and treatment effects regressions are run on a pooled 
sample of private equity bid and tender/merger offer firms without matching.   
 
 
An event study methodology is utilised to empirically test the impact of private equity 
announcements using daily stock returns. The market model is run using CRSP value and 
equal-weighted returns for -110 days to +20 days surrounding the bid announcement, with 
an estimation period of -110 days to -30 days.     
 
ࡾ࢏࢚ ൌ ࢻ࢏ ൅ ࢼ࢏ࡾ࢓࢚ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢚                                       (2.3.2)                   
The adjusted (0,1) market model matching is used to account for possible over or under-
statement of Beta where the target firm has been doing abnormally well or poorly prior 
to the bid date (Simmonds, 2003). Prior to the announcement date the sample firms may 
perform abnormally well or poorly. Where firms perform abnormally well prior to the bid 
announcement this makes them a potential target as the acquisition provides funding via 
returns by which the bidder is able to restructure the company, ultimately turning it into 
a profitable acquisition. This would result in an overstated beta and negative post bid 
abnormal returns. In comparison, firms may be performing poorly pre-announcement due 
to poor operational due diligence. That is, the firm itself has the potential to be profitable, 
however managerial initiative is lacking. These firms would result in an understated beta 
and positive post bid abnormal returns.  
 
࡭ࡾ࢏࢚ ൌ ࡾ࢏࢚െࡾ࢓࢚                                           (2.3.3) 
where Rit is the continuously compounded return to the stock of the target firm i and Rmt 
is the continuously compounded return to the market portfolio measured by the CRSP 
value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolio of NYSE-listed stocks for day t.  
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Table 2.1 Regression Variables: Determinants of Private Equity Bids 
PRIV(Y=1|x) = Probit (0 + 1D/E + 2VOL + 3FCF+ 4M/B + 5SIZE+6ABNORM + 7ROE + 8TURN + 9CR + 10EPS + 11DIST + 12BC+ εi )   
      
Variable
 
  Description (source) 
PRIV   = a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for private equity bids and PRIV=0 for a takeover offer firm observations.  (SDC Platinum) 
D/E (-) = long-term debt (DLTT) divided by common/ordinary equity (CEQ). (COMPUSTAT)  
VOL (-) = Annvol = vol * (DLTT)annualised stock volatility (RET) 60 days prior to the bid/offer date. (CRISP)    
FCF  (+) = operating activities net cash flow minus capital expenditures (OANCF-CAPX) divided by total assets (AT). (COMPUSTAT)    
M/B (-) = market value of equity (PRC*SHROUT) divided by common/ordinary equity (CEQ). (COMPUSTAT) 
SIZE (+) = log of total assets (LogAT). (COMPUSTAT)  
ABNORM (+) = ROA (firm i) – ROA (control) = operating income (after depreciation) divided by average total assets (OIADP/[(LagAT+AT)/2]) minus control operating income. (COMPUSTAT)  
ROE  = net income (NI) divided by common/ordinary equity (CEQ). (COMPUSTAT) 
TURN   = sales/turnover (SALE) divided by average total assets (AvTA). (COMPUSTAT)   
CR  = current assets (ACT) divided current liabilities (LCT). (COMPUSTAT) 
EPS  = net income (NI) divided by common shares outstanding (CSHO). (COMPUSTAT) 
DIST (+) = distance between the bidder and target firm. (SDC Platinum – Target/ Acquirer State)    
BC (+) = a dichotomous variable set equal to one for a peak in economic activity and zero otherwise. (Economic Cycle Research Institute) 
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We run a simple ordinary least square (OLS) regression which ignores self-selection, but 
includes whether the target firm is subject to a private equity bid or tender/merger offer. 
This regression is run on a merged sample of private equity bid and tender/merger offer 
target firms without matching. The resultant coefficients measure the influence of 
whether the target was subject to a private equity bid or tender/merger offer, and the 
differences in CARs between the target firms – the self-sorting effect from unobservable 
information asymmetry.    
 
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 
6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 
13RND + 14M/B +15PEDummy + vi                (2.3.4) 
 
	
Secondly, the treatment effects regression uses both private equity bid and tender/merger 
offer targets, but this time the Inverse Mills Ratio is included to control for the effect that 
is due to intrinsic firm differences (self-selection via information asymmetry). In the 
treatment effects regression the coefficient on the private equity dummy measures the 
effect that is due to the difference in target itself.   
  
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 
6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 
13RND + 14M/B +15PEDummy +x λi + vi 
  (2.3.5) 
Lastly, the Heckman regression is run only among the private equity target firms 
(Equation 2.3.6 and Equation 2.3.7). Similar to the treatment effects regression, the 
Inverse Mills Ratio controls for the effect that is due to intrinsic firm differences (self-
selection via information asymmetry).  
 
CARi = α+βλi+εi                                            (2.3.6) 
 
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 
6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 
13RND + 14M/B + x λi +vi                                                                                                                 (2.3.7) 
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Table 2.2 Regression Variables: Information Asymmetry and Post-Announcement Returns   
 
OLS Regression:  
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 13RND + 14M/B 
+15PEDummy + vi 
Treatment Effects:  
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 13RND + 14M/B 
+15PEDummy +x Ei + vi 
Heckamn Self-Selection: 
CARi = α+βλi+λi     
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 13RND + 14M/B + x 
/i +vi 
 
       
CAR = 
 
[-t, +t] Cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date.  Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using the Beta-one model ARit = Rit-Rmt with 
the market portfolio measured by the daily value-weighted index and daily equal-weighted portfolio index of NYE-listed stocks for day t, and estimation 
windows ranging from [-60,+60] to [-0, +0]. (CRSP) 
IMR (λ) = corresponds to Heckman lambda, obtained from the Probit model of probability of being included in the private equity sample. (PRIV=1)  
PE Dummy = a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for private equity bids and PRIV=0 for takeover offer firm observations.  (SDC) 
 
Deal Characteristics 
 
Deal Value = value of the deal ($ millions). (SDC) 
BidPrem = percentage (%) 5 days before announcement. Price offered per target stock compared to target stock 5 days prior to announcement. (CRSP) 
Attitude = a dichotomous variable set to 1  if the bid is hostile, and zero otherwise. (SDC)   
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Success = a dichotomous variable set to 1  if the bid is successful, and zero otherwise. (SDC)   
Cash = a dichotomous variable set to 1 for cash-only offers, and zero otherwise. (SDC)  Robustness: percentage (%) of cash. (SDC)  
Diverse = a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the acquirer and target do not share the same 2-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. (SDC)   
%Shares = percentage (%) of target firm shares sought in deal. (SDC) 
HIH = Herfindahl Index, ∑i (ATi / ∑jATj2) for each 2-digit SIC code group. (COMPUSTAT) Robustness: dichotomous variable set to 1 if the target firm’s industry is in the top quartile of industries sorted by the Herfindahl Index, and zero otherwise.   
Bidders = number of bidders competing with the acquirer for the same target. (SDC)  
 
 
Firm Characteristics 
 
Size = firm size Ln(AT). (COMPUSTAT) 
Leverage = Total debt / (total debt + market value of equity), where total debt = total long-term debt (DLTT) + total debt in current liability (DLC), and market value of equity = common shares outstanding (CSHO) x Price (PRCC). (COMPUSTAT)  
FCF = operating activities net cash flow minus capital expenditures (OANCF-CAPX) divided by total assets (AT). (COMPUSTAT)    
ROE = net income (NI) divided by common/ordinary equity (CEQ). (COMPUSTAT) 
RND = research and development expense (XRD) as a proportion of sales (SALE).  (COMPUSTAT)  
M/B = market value of equity (PRC*SHROUT) divided by common/ordinary equity (CEQ). (COMPUSTAT) 
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2.4   Data Sample 
 
Following Osborne et al. (2012) and U.S. research by Bargeron et al. (2008) and Bonne 
and Mulherin (2009), the mergers and acquisitions database on Securities Data 
Corporation Platinum (SDC) is used to collect the primary term of interest, the private 
equity bid and tender/merger offers for U.S. target firms. The window of inclusion is the 
20-year period between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 2014. This yields a sample of 
503 private equity bid target firms and 2616 tender/merger offer target firms in the United 
States. The private equity targets and comparative acquisition firms are from the ‘going 
private’ and ‘tender/merger off’ tabs, respectively.  
 
Table 2.3 reports the frequency distribution of acquisitions by acquisitions type, and 
highlights that 87% of target firms come from four key industries, being consumer 
discretionary, information technology, industrial, and health care, with 32.82%, 23.01%, 
20.25% and 11.04% respectively. This is not unexpected, as consumer products and 
services including leisure, retail, entertainment and education have gained significant 
media attention and increased consumer spending in recent times.  
 
 
Table 2.3 Frequency Distribution by Industry (Strategic and Financial 
Acquisitions) 
  
GICS Sector  
GICS 
Code  
Financial 
Acquisition 
(Private Equity 
Bid)  
Strategic  
Acquisition 
(Tender/Merger Offer) 
Energy  10 5 62 
Materials  15 11 93 
Industrials  20 66 265 
Consumer Discretionary  25 107 287 
Consumer Staples  30 14 92 
Health Care  35 36 249 
Financials  40 8 24 
Information Technology  45 75 317 
Telecommunications  50 3 12 
Utilities  55 0 21 
No GICS Sector    1 2 
Total    326 1424 
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In particular, governments have focused on the need for quality education, driving up the 
number of private schools and enrolments. Information technology is second largest for 
financial investments but greatest for strategic investments. The greater number of 
information technology investments is unsurprising, with technological advances during 
the 2000-2009 period increasing consumer and investor confidence in this profitable, yet 
volatile, sector. At present, with up to 50% of U.S. buyouts for corporate and software 
providers, and with information technology becoming a staple of any business, it is 
expected that greater investment in this sector, with positive returns, is likely to continue.     
 
Table 2.4 reports the frequency distribution of acquisitions by acquisition type, and 
highlights higher financial investments (private equity) in years of economic prosperity. 
The period 2005 to 2007 preceding the financial crisis shows growth in the private equity 
investment sector. However, the financial crisis, in particular debt financing, meant 
private equity had a decline in bids over 2008 to 2009. A steady increase was seen 
between 2010 and 2012 with private equity investments regaining investor confidence. 
This may be attributable to favourable investment conditions including lowered interest 
rates, and the financial rather than strategic incentives behind private equity bids.    
 
A number of data selection criteria are imposed. First, only ‘Going Private’ transactions 
are included where the acquirer is a private equity firm as these firms target firms with 
different characteristics to those of individual investors and venture capitalists. The 
comparison takeover firm sample is reduced to include only firms not classified as a 
private equity acquirer, thus removing the possibility of duplication between the study 
and control target firm observations. Second, as SDC does not provide GVKEY, CUSIPS 
of target companies are used to match financial information and PERMNO to price 
information obtained from Compustat Global and CRSP, respectively. The financial data 
required for firm variables is obtained from the fiscal year financial information 
immediately preceding the private equity bid or takeover offer announcement date, to 
reflect accounting information relevant to the decision to make a bid/offer on the target 
firm. Firms without financial data on Compustat Global or price information on CRSP 
are excluded from the sample. Third, firms with missing financial and price information 
for independent variables are omitted from returns regressions.  
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Table 2.4 Frequency Distribution by Year and Acquisition Type  
 
 
Frequency Distribution by Year              
(Raw Data) 
Frequency Distribution by Year  
(COMPUSTAT) 
Frequency Distribution by Year               
(CRSP/Regression) 
Year  
Private 
Equity 
Bid  
Tender/Merger 
Offer 
Private 
Equity Bid 
Proportion 
Private 
Equity 
Bid  
Tender/Merger 
Offer 
Private 
Equity Bid 
Proportion 
Private 
Equity 
Bid  
Tender/Merger 
Offer 
Private 
Equity Bid 
Proportion 
1994 11 155 0.0132 4 89 0.0048 3 79 0.0036 
1995 6 152 0.0072 5 99 0.0060 5 94 0.0060 
1996 12 180 0.0144 6 105 0.0072 6 87 0.0072 
1997 20 198 0.0240 12 129 0.0144 11 111 0.0132 
1998 25 165 0.0300 14 130 0.0168 13 111 0.0156 
1999 34 211 0.0408 28 171 0.0336 26 145 0.0312 
2000 22 209 0.0264 19 145 0.0228 19 122 0.0228 
2001 9 142 0.0108 4 100 0.0048 4 79 0.0048 
2002 14 117 0.0168 8 73 0.0096 7 58 0.0084 
2003 26 91 0.0312 18 62 0.0216 18 48 0.0216 
2004 24 53 0.0288 13 29 0.0156 11 23 0.0132 
2005 34 85 0.0408 24 51 0.0288 24 46 0.0288 
2006 52 164 0.0624 36 54 0.0432 32 46 0.0384 
2007 59 151 0.0707 39 83 0.0468 32 67 0.0384 
2008 23 133 0.0276 19 71 0.0228 16 64 0.0192 
2009 21 101 0.0252 17 71 0.0204 17 62 0.0204 
2010 35 81 0.0420 22 57 0.0264 20 53 0.0240 
2011 26 88 0.0312 24 55 0.0288 24 47 0.0288 
2012 23 85 0.0276 17 53 0.0204 16 49 0.0192 
2013 26 48 0.0312 21 34 0.0252 21 30 0.0252 
2014 1 7 0.0012 1 6 0.0012 1 3 0.0012 
Total  503 2616 0.1923 351 1667 0.2106 326 1424 0.2289 
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After imposing the selection criteria, the final sample prior to each returns regression is 
1750 target firms consisting of 326 private equity bid and 1424 tender/merger offer target 
firms, determined by the intersection of the target firm samples and the availability of 
fiscal year data.  
	
	
2.5  Empirical Results  
 
The effect of private information asymmetry in the pre-announcement period on stock 
performance post-announcement between private equity bid targets versus tender/merger 
offer targets in the U.S. is examined as follows. Firstly, descriptive statistics including 
correlation coefficients are presented. Estimation of Equation (2.3.1) followed by 
information effects applying Equations (2.3.4), (2.3.5), (2.3.6) and (2.3.7), are detailed. 
These models control for the potential of self-selection bias via Heckman’s two-stage 
model and show the effect of information asymmetry differences pre-announcement on 
post-announcement returns for target firms.     
 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2.5 reports the correlation coefficients for the variables drawn upon in the 
regression model pertaining to determinants of private equity bids (Equitation 2.3.1); 
specifically, variables of significance in determining the likelihood that a firm is subject 
to a private equity bid or tender/merger offer. The coefficient correlation table shows 
strong correlations at the 1% significance level between variables indicative of strong 
financial earnings potential. Notably, abnormal returns have a strong correlation with free 
cash flows, market-to-book, market valuation, turnover, and earnings per share. Volatility 
has a negative and positively significant correlation with free cash flows, market 
valuation, abnormal returns, earnings per share and business cycle. The negative 
relationship shows the importance of volatility and public perception on firm financials. 
The information conveyed through a target firm’s financials conveys takeover success 
probability and thereby impacts pre- and post-announcement earnings and abnormal 
returns.  
Table 2.6 reports the descriptive statistics for the first stage of the Heckman regression, 
determining the probability of a financial takeover. Results show significant differences 
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Table 2.5 Private Equity Bid and Tender/Merger Offer Correlation Coefficients 
 
N = 1,750 
 DE VOL FCF MB MKVAL ABNORM ROE TURN CR EPS DIST BC 
DE 
Debt to Equity  
1.00000
VOL 
Annualised Volatility 
-0.00455
0.8492
1.00000
FCF 
Free Cash Flow 
-0.00863
0.7184
-0.33453
<.0001
1.00000
MB 
Market to Book 
0.14968
<.0001
0.04291
0.0727
-0.09095
0.0001
1.00000
MKVAL 
Market Valuation 
-0.00475
0.8425
-0.10627
<.0001
0.05257
0.0279
0.01990
0.4054
1.00000
ABNORM 
Abnormal Operating Income 
-0.00161
0.9463
-0.32618
<.0001
0.59886
<.0001
-0.12120
<.0001
0.10700
<.0001
1.00000
ROE 
Return on Equity 
-0.11013
<.0001
-0.06042
0.0115
-0.01442
0.5468
0.12430
<.0001
0.01589
0.5064
0.06289
0.0085
1.00000
TURN 
Asset Turnover 
-0.02338
0.3283
-0.03867
0.1059
0.16881
<.0001
-0.04597
0.0545
-0.05934
0.0130
0.11458
<.0001
0.02200
0.3577
1.00000
CR 
Current Ratio 
-0.04631
0.0528
0.02136
0.3719
-0.01457
0.5424
0.01115
0.6411
-0.04403
0.0656
0.01887
0.4303
0.01398
0.5590
-0.24364
<.0001
1.00000
EPS 
Earnings per Share 
-0.00222
0.9259
-0.28161
<.0001
0.20109
<.0001
-0.02210
0.3555
0.08407
0.0004
0.23161
<.0001
0.07796
0.0011
0.06189
0.0096
-0.01007
0.6737
1.00000
DIST 
Distance 
-0.02322
0.3317
0.09148
0.0001
-0.07711
0.0012
0.00341
0.8867
-0.01100
0.6458
-0.00213
0.9290
0.01685
0.4811
0.02024
0.3974
-0.00999
0.6763
-0.04414
0.0649
1.00000
BC 
Business Cycle 
0.04669
0.0509
-0.24379
<.0001
0.07356
0.0021
0.00837
0.7264
0.01660
0.4877
0.09147
0.0001
0.01405
0.5569
0.07690
0.0013
-0.08320
0.0005
0.05399
0.0239
-0.00086
0.9713
1.00000
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Table 2.6 Descriptive Statistics: Determinants of Private Equity Bids 
 
          
  Variable  n Mean StDev Min Max Q1 Median Q3 Q3 - Q1  
PE=1            
Private Equity Bid  DEq 326 1.5232 13.1240 -53.7903 199.6325 0 0.2004 0.8123 0.8123 
 VOL 326 0.5378 0.3831 0.1174 3.2021 0.3134 0.4424 0.6513 0.3379 
 FCF 326 0.0302 0.1214 -0.7625 0.8191 -0.0149 0.0370 0.0894 0.1043 
 MB 326 25.1735 82.1296 -311.9800 1213.9270 11.1837 19.0573 28.1029 16.9192 
 MKVAL 326 1070495.25 5070671.32 -63843.75 81961379.05 67068.75 207230.01 630500 563431.25 
 ABNORM 326 0.0447 0.1498 -0.6776 1.5006 -0.0217 0.0332 0.1034 0.1251 
 ROE 326 -0.0144 1.0104 -6.3899 7.3302 -0.0169 0.0723 0.1438 0.1607 
 TURN 326 1.3062 0.8697 0.0461 10.2281 0.7423 1.1671 1.6659 0.9236 
 CR 326 0.0228 0.0200 0.0019 0.1865 0.0119 0.0178 0.0265 0.0146 
 EPS 326 0.3653 2.3430 -22.3389 10.1347 -0.0167 0.4773 1.1505 1.1673 
 DIST 326 22.4222 23.2440 0 120.5361 3.7046 16.4553 35.5086 31.8039 
 BC 326 0.9172 0.2760 0 1 1 1 1 0 
           
PE=0  DEq 1424 0.5179 2.2413 -23.3863 31.9656 0 0.1455 0.6508 0.6508 
Tender/Merger Offer  VOL 1424 0.6188 0.4077 0.0670 3.4013 0.3452 0.5206 0.7651 0.4199 
 FCF 1424 -0.0210 0.2482 -4.8977 0.5917 -0.0437 0.0210 0.0755 0.1191 
 MB 1424 31.5360 157.5597 -3636.8750 2414.8558 12.0526 21.1095 35.5312 23.4786 
 MKVAL 1424 1425651.89 8110790.30 -383343.75 242091714.63 65730.47 206147.39 832230.84 766500.38 
 ABNORM 1424 0.0244 0.1989 -1.6736 1.5190 -0.0365 0.0351 0.0994 0.1359 
 ROE 1424 -0.0850 2.3820 -62.5083 23.0075 -0.0609 0.0691 0.1526 0.2134 
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 TURN 1424 1.2139 0.8036 -0.0846 7.0854 0.6574 1.0853 1.5659 0.9085 
CR 1424 0.0287 0.0283 0.0003 0.3903 0.0138 0.0213 0.0330 0.0191 
 EPS 1424 0.4110 2.7187 -44.9232 31.8210 -0.3088 0.4237 1.1825 1.4913 
 DIST 1424 22.6534 30.2422 0 151.5708 0 9.4992 38.0434 38.0434 
 BC 1424 0.8897 0.3133 0 1 1 1 1 0 
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in market valuations between private equity target firms and tender/merger offer target 
firms. Notably, both acquisition types show the average distance to be 22 kilometres. This 
is likely due to the managerial necessity of both acquisition types to strengthen business 
efficiency. The descriptive statistics also show the connection between financials and 
acquisition type. Financial target firms exhibit, on average, lower volatility (0.5378 vs 
0.6188), higher free cash flows (0.0302 vs -0.0210) and higher abnormal returns (0.0447 
vs 0.0244). These statistics are indicative of the target firms’ private equity entities target. 
They want low volatility firms with free cash flows they can use to generate short-term 
profitability for shareholders. Private equity target firms use takeover money to finance 
existing debt and gain tax benefits; therefore private equity targets (1.5232) are observed 
with a debt-to-equity ratio 3 times higher than tender/merger offer target firms (0.5179). 
Strategic acquisitions are often viewed as beneficial to shareholders resulting in higher 
market value, on average, compared to financial takeovers.    
Table 2.7 reports the descriptive statistics for the second stage of the Heckman regression, 
determining information asymmetry and unobservables in financial versus strategic 
acquisitions. Financial acquirers seek a higher percentage of ownership (95.5723), on 
average, than strategic acquirers (75.9368) to ensure maximum control, quick turnaround 
and profitability of the acquisition. Financial acquisitions also exhibit higher cash as 
payment (81.29% of the transaction), higher competition (on average 1.1166 bidders per 
target) and, as previously stated, higher free cash flow. Interestingly, strategic 
acquisitions target firms with higher research and development costs (0.9042), indicating 
that the target has been focusing on expanding the business to increase profitability. These 
descriptive statistics show the importance of target financials in determining whether a 
target is the subject of a financial or strategic acquisition.       
 
2.5.2  Regression Results  
 
This section presents the main regression results on information asymmetry in self-
selection for financial and strategic targets, and whether there is a resulting impact on the 
cumulative abnormal returns of target firms. Table 2.8 presents the probit regression 
results for investors’ target firm preferences; namely, stage one of the returns regressions 
(Equation 2.3.1). The results indicate that debt-to-equity, volatility, free cash flow, 
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Table 2.7 Descriptive Statistics: Information Asymmetry and Post-Announcement Returns   
 
        
           
  Variable  n Mean StDev Min Max Q1 Median Q3 Q3 - Q1  
PE=1  DealValue 315 0.8200 2.1486 0.0002 25.1017 0.0748 0.2590 0.6952 0.6204 
Private Equity Bid  BidPrem 294 1.2012 0.5832 -1.7021 3.4014 1.1148 1.2454 1.3883 0.2735 
 Attitude 326 0.0061 0.0782 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 Success 326 0.7178 0.4508 0 1 0 1 1 1 
 Cash 326 0.8129 0.3906 0 1 1 1 1 0 
 %Shares 325 95.5723 14.3491 11.6 100 100 100 100 0 
 HHI 326 0.0884 0.0810 0.0135 0.5064 0.0413 0.0615 0.0990 0.0576 
 Bidders 326 1.1166 0.3576 1 3 1 1 1 0 
 Size 326 5.6177 1.4771 2.1834 10.7693 4.5423 5.4986 6.5248 1.9825 
 Leverage 326 0.2525 0.4291 -2.7041 4.1859 0.0077 0.1602 0.3920 0.3843 
 FCF 326 0.0302 0.1214 -0.7625 0.8191 -0.0149 0.0370 0.0894 0.1043 
 ROE 326 -0.0144 1.0104 -6.3899 7.3302 -0.0169 0.0723 0.1438 0.1607 
 RND 187 0.0594 0.0914 0 0.5851 0 0.0185 0.0897 0.0897 
 M/B 326 25.1735 82.1296 -311.9800 1213.9270 11.1837 19.0573 28.1029 16.9192 
           
PE=0  DealValue 1377 0.7103 2.0160 0.0001 46.6948 0.0442 0.1614 0.5729 0.5287 
Tender/Merger Offer  BidPrem 1310 1.2964 0.6196 -3.4503 4.0667 1.1491 1.3057 1.4938 0.3448 
 Attitude 1424 0.0576 0.2330 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 Success 1424 0.8539 0.3533 0 1 1 1 1 0 
 Cash 1424 0.7416 0.4379 0 1 0 1 1 1 
 %Shares 1355 75.9368 35.8766 0 100 41.3 100 100 58.7 
HHI 1423 0.0775 0.0839 0.0126 1 0.0398 0.0482 0.0883 0.0485 
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 Bidders 1424 1.0709 0.3021 1 4 1 1 1 0 
 Size 1424 5.4108 1.6471 1.2149 12.0401 4.2262 5.1948 6.4661 2.2399 
 Leverage 1424 0.2170 1.6691 -4.1505 62.3333 0.0026 0.1006 0.2863 0.2836 
 FCF 1424 -0.0210 0.2482 -4.8977 0.5917 -0.0437 0.0210 0.0755 0.1191 
 ROE 1424 -0.0850 2.3820 -62.5083 23.0075 -0.0609 0.0691 0.1526 0.2134 
 RND 877 0.9042 9.3832 -2.3460 183.6154 0.0079 0.0505 0.1601 0.1522 
 M/B 1424 31.5360 157.5597 -3636.8750 2414.8558 12.0526 21.1095 35.5312 23.4786 
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Table 2.8 Regression Results: Determinants of Private Equity Bids 
 
This table presents the summary probit regression and robustness results from the following model:  
PRIV= Probit (0 + 1D/E + 2VOL + 3FCF+ 4M/B + 5MKVAL+ 6ABNORM + 7ROE + 8TURN + 9CR + 
10EPS + 11DIST + 12BC +εi) 
 
Variable  Sign Probit Regression 
Intercept -0.64887*** 
<.0001 
D/E
Debt to 
Equity
(-) 0.01567* 
0.0701 
VOL
Annualised 
Volatility
(-) -0.24084** 
0.0273 
FCF
Free Cash 
Flows
(+) 1.03794*** 
0.0010 
M/B
Market to 
Book
 (-) -0.00033 
0.3331 
MKVAL
Market 
Valuation
(-) 
-0.08795 
0.2507 
ABNORM
Operating 
Income
(+) -0.20590 
0.4205 
ROE
Return on 
Equity
 0.02150 
0.3216 
TURN
Asset 
Turnover
 0.01714 
0.6968 
CR
Current 
Ratio
 -5.78965*** 
0.0012 
EPS
Earnings per 
Share
(-) -0.02389* 
0.0805 
DIST
Distance
(+) 0.00057 
0.6515 
BC
Business 
Cycle
(+) 0.03163 
0.8024 
 Pseudo R2  0.0478 
N  1,750 
                        
 
***, **, and * denote a statistically significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
where PRIV is a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for private equity bids and PRIV=0 for takeover offer firms 
observations from SDC Platinum. D/E is long-term debt (total) divided by common/ordinary equity (total), VOL is 
stock volatility 60 days prior to the bid/offer date, FCF is (operating activities net cash flow minus capital expenditures), 
M/B is market value of equity divided by common/ordinary equity (total), MKVAL is price (bid/ask average) times 
shares outstanding, ABNORM is (operating income (after depreciation) divided by average total assets) minus control 
operating income, ROE is net income divided by common/ordinary equity (total), TURN is sales/turnover(net) divided 
by average total assets, CR is current assets (total) divided by current liabilities, EPS is net income (loss) divided by 
common shares outstanding. DIST is the geographic distance calculated by SAS between the target and the bidder 
(SDC Platinum), and BC is a dichotomous variable set equal to one for a peak in economic activity and zero otherwise 
(Economic Cycle Research Institute). All financials data is for the fiscal year preceding the private equity bid or 
takeover offer from COMPUSTAT and stock volatility and price from CRSP. The comparative analysis given target 
characteristics between the probability of a private equity bid relative to a takeover offer is calculated on a pooled 
sample of n=1750 where n=326 private equity bids (PRIV = 1) and n=1424 takeovers (tender/merger offers).   
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current ratio, and earnings-per-share are all significant determinants of target choice for 
a private equity acquirer. Debt to equity (0.01567) and earnings per share (-0.02389) are 
significant at the 10% level. These results indicate that private equity target firms have 
lower earnings per share and higher debt to equity. This is consistent with private equity 
theorem that target firms are start-ups with high growth potential or firms restructuring 
through new ventures. There is a negatively significant relationship between volatility (-
0.24084) and financial acquisition targets. This is consistent with the prior literature and 
post-acquisition goals of financial versus strategic acquirers, to acquirer targets with 
strong immediate growth potential. Further, there is a significant relationship at the 1% 
level between the current ratio (-5.78965) and acquisition type, indicating a lower current 
ratio for financial targets over strategic targets. Free cash flow is also significant at the 
1% level (1.03794) affirming financial acquirers target firms with higher free cash flow 
to use for restructuring business operations immediately after the acquisition in addition 
to paying off debt used to finance the acquisition. Finally, distance (0.00057/0.6515) and 
business cycle (0.03163/0.8024) are insignificant suggesting that management of both 
acquisition types prefer a close proximity target, and business cycles driving the overall 
takeover market.  
 
Figure 2.1 represents the average abnormal returns (AARs) for financial (private equity 
bid) and strategic (tender/merger offer) target firms for the period 20 days before and 20 
days after the announcement day (41 days) surrounding the announcement date. Both 
groups of target firms experience significant increase in AARs immediately pre (2 days 
prior) and post (2 days after) the announcement date (t=0). Private equity targets exhibit 
higher AARs immediately before the announcement date, most likely due to the positive 
anticipation of the acquisition. The Fama-French model has a slightly higher spread 
between AARs for financial and strategic acquisitions before the announcement date. 
Post-acquisition, both financial and strategic target firms exhibit an immediate increase 
in AARs; however financial targets then experience slightly increasing AARs while 
strategic target firms on average experience negative abnormal returns. This can be 
explained by the uncertainly surrounding strategic acquisitions that are often hostile in 
nature compared to financial acquisitions. 
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Figure 2.1 Financial and Strategic Acquisitions Average Abnormal Returns 
(AARs) 
  
This table presents the Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) plots around the event day 
(t=0) for; market model, (0,1) market model and Fama-French using value weighted and 
equally weighted returns for both financial and strategic takeovers.  
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Table 2.9 OLS Regression Results: Information Asymmetry and Post-Announcement Returns  
This table presents the results for the following OLS regression results to determine the impact on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of differences between financial and strategic 
target firms.  
 
 CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 13RND + 
14M/B +15PEDummy + vi 
 
Where CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date for financial and strategic target firms, IMR () corresponds to Heckman’s lambda, obtained from the 
Probit model of probability of being included in the financial (private equity) sample, PEDummy is a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for financial (private equity bids) and 
PRIV=0 for strategic (tender/merger offer) firm observations, Deal Value is the value of the deal ($ millions), BidPrem is the percentage (%) 5 days before the announcement day 
being the price offered per target stock compared to target stock 5 days prior to the announcement day, Attitude is a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the bid is hostile, and zero otherwise, 
Success is a dichotomous variable set to1 if the bid is successful, and zero otherwise, Cash is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for cash-only offers, and zero otherwise,  % Shares is the 
percentage (%) of target firm shares sought in the deal, HIH is the Herfindahl Index for each 2-digit SIC code group, Bidders is the number of bidders competing with the acquirer for 
the same target, Size is the firm size measured as Ln(AT), Leverage is total debt/(total debt + market value of equity), FCF is operating activities net cash flow minus capital 
expenditures, ROE is net income divided by common/ordinary equity, RND is research and development expense as a proportion of sales and M/B is the market value of equity divided 
by common/ordinary equity. 
 
  Sample Size: 1 750    Sample Size: 1 750   
  Value Weighted    Equally Weighted    
Event 
windows  Variable name   Coefficent
Standard 
Error t‐stat    Coefficent
Standard 
Error t‐stat   
Panel A ‐ Market Model            
(0, +1)  Intercept   ‐0.0854 0.0677 ‐1.26   ‐0.0849 0.0678 ‐1.25 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0757 0.0245 ‐3.08 ***  ‐0.0748 0.0246 ‐3.05  *** 
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.0855 0.0642 ‐1.33   ‐0.0832 0.0642 ‐1.29 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0792 0.0234 ‐3.40 ***  ‐0.0782 0.0233 ‐3.36  *** 
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   ‐0.0788 0.0668 ‐1.18   ‐0.0768 0.0669 ‐1.15 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0859 0.0242 ‐3.55 ***  ‐0.0846 0.0242 ‐3.49  *** 
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.1077 0.0682 ‐1.58   ‐0.1111 0.0687 ‐1.62 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1090 0.0247 ‐4.41 ***  ‐0.1090 0.0249 ‐4.38  *** 
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(‐10, +10)   Intercept   ‐0.0492 0.0736 ‐0.67   ‐0.0497 0.0745 ‐0.67 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1214 0.0267 ‐4.55 ***  ‐0.1213 0.0270 ‐4.49  *** 
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.0593 0.0913 ‐0.65   ‐0.0655 0.0936 ‐0.70 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1515 0.0331 ‐4.58 ***  ‐0.1568 0.0339 ‐4.62  *** 
   
Panel B ‐ (0,1) Market Model           
(0, +1)  Intercept   ‐0.0840 0.0672 ‐1.25   ‐0.0829 0.0670 ‐1.24 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0747 0.0243 ‐3.07 ***  ‐0.0745 0.0243 ‐3.07  *** 
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.0808 0.0639 ‐1.26   ‐0.0803 0.0638 ‐1.26 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0797 0.0232 ‐3.44 ***  ‐0.0790 0.0231 ‐3.42  *** 
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   ‐0.0734 0.0656 ‐1.12   ‐0.0723 0.0655 ‐1.10 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0861 0.0238 ‐3.62 ***  ‐0.0854 0.0237 ‐3.60  *** 
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.0847 0.0661 ‐1.28   ‐0.1009 0.0660 ‐1.53 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1119 0.0240 ‐4.67 ***  ‐0.1113 0.0239 ‐4.65  *** 
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   ‐0.0123 0.0694 ‐0.18   ‐0.0362 0.0694 ‐0.52 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1250 0.0251 ‐4.97 ***  ‐0.1242 0.0251 ‐4.94  *** 
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   0.0262 0.0773 0.03   ‐0.0188 0.0775 ‐0.24 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1622 0.0280 ‐5.79 ***  ‐0.1607 0.0281 ‐5.72  *** 
   
Panel C ‐ Farma French (3 Factor)           
(0, +1)  Intercept   ‐0.0820 0.0677 ‐1.21   ‐0.0820 0.0677 ‐1.21 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0758 0.0245 ‐3.09 ***  ‐0.0758 0.0245 ‐3.09  *** 
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.0736 0.0645 ‐1.14   ‐0.0736 0.0645 ‐1.14 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0788 0.0234 ‐3.37 ***  ‐0.0788 0.0234 ‐3.37  *** 
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   ‐0.0700 0.0671 ‐1.04   ‐0.0700 0.0671 ‐1.04 
 Private Equity   ‐0.0855 0.0243 ‐3.52 ***  ‐0.0855 0.0243 ‐3.52  *** 
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.0974 0.0698 ‐1.39   ‐0.0974 0.0698 ‐1.39 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1096 0.0253 ‐4.33 ***  ‐0.1096 0.0253 ‐4.33  *** 
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(‐10, +10)   Intercept   ‐0.0394 0.0767 ‐0.05   ‐0.0394 0.0767 ‐0.51 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1274 0.0278 ‐4.59 ***  ‐0.1274 0.0278 ‐4.59  *** 
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.0353 0.0978 ‐0.36   ‐0.0353 0.0978 ‐0.36 
 Private Equity   ‐0.1709 0.0354 ‐4.82 ***  ‐0.1709 0.0354 ‐4.82  *** 
 
***, **, and * denote a statistically significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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The OLS regression results in Table 2.9 show whether information asymmetry 
contributes to CARs based on acquisition type (Equation 2.3.4): financial or strategic. 
The results show that the private equity dichotomous variable is significantly different  
from 0 at the 1% level for all windows and both market models (Panel A and Panel B). 
For example, the window [-1,0] shows a negative relationship of -0.0792 and -0.0797 for 
the value weighted market model and (0,1) market model respectively. That is, private 
equity target firms will have a negative impact on CARs within this window relative to 
tender/merger target firms. Results for the market model (Panel A) indicate that there is 
a bigger shock in CARs, possibly due to information asymmetries, during the 11-day 
window [-5, +5] with private equity indicator variable significant at the 1% level. The 
(0,1) market model affirms the previous model results with all windows showing a 
significantly negative relationship between acquisition type and CARs (Panel B).     
  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) introduced propensity score matching as a simple method 
to reduce bias due to a lack of randomisation. This accounts for observable differences 
between private equity bid and tender/merger offer target firms. First, the propensity score 
is estimated where the response probability for treatment is the probability of a private 
equity bid using the logistic function of the observed independent variables, including 
control variables, from the above first-stage probit regression for each firm observation.  
 
The estimated propensity score [e(xi)] for subject i is defined to be: 
Propensity Score = e = e(xi) = Pr (z* = 1|X=xi) 
and  
Pr (xi, z*|e) = Pr (xi|e) Pr (z*|e) 
Where: Pr is a probability function of the firm being a private equity target when X=xi is 
a vector of observed target firm covariates for the ith firm, and z* is the observed treatment 
selection.  Table 2.10 presents the regression results for Equation 2.3.5, which includes 
both an acquisition target dummy and propensity score for each target firm to account for 
target selection. Results indicate that the propensity score (inverse mills ratio) is 
positively significant across the three specified models at the 1% level for all windows 
except for [-1, 0] which is not significantly different from zero. This result indicates that 
there are no unspecified variables that explain the change in CARs over the 2-day 
window, however all other windows exhibit unobserved variables that are positively 
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increasing CARs in line with the probability of being a private equity target. This could 
be attributable to the reliance on financial determinants immediately before the 
announcement day. The (0,1) market model supports the conclusions of the market 
model. For example, Table 2.10 shows an inverse mills coefficient of 0.0704 for [-1, 0] 
and 0.0690 for [-1, 0] for value weighted Panel A and Panel B respectively. These results 
indicate a small insignificant positive increase to CARs from a higher probability of being 
a financial target firm. In contrast, [-20, +20] shows a significantly positive value 
weighted  inverse mills coefficient of 0.2604 and 0.2136 for Panel A and Panel B 
respectively, indicating the perceived probability of being a private equity target increases 
the target firms CARs which can be interpreted as favourable takeover news. Results in 
Table 2.10 (Panel A and Panel B) also show the private equity dummy variable and 
intercept to be negatively different from zero at the 1% significance level.   
 
OLS regression results indicate that all factors contributing to the cumulative abnormal 
returns for financial strategic targets are explained by the regression variables. Analysis 
of the independent variables show bid premium, success, percentage sought, size, 
leverage, and research and development to be significant at the 1% level in determining 
cumulative abnormal return differences between takeover types. This is consistent with 
the takeover type and acquisition goals. For example, private equity target firms are 
financial takeovers in nature, where emphasis is placed on acquiring firms with higher 
leverage and research and development expenditure that they can quickly turn around. 
Further, these deals tend to include higher bid premiums due to the higher confidence 
placed on the deal resulting in a higher level of success compared to strategic takeover 
targets.  
 
Heckman’s two-step regression is run to determine if there are any unobservable factors 
accounting for target firm. Once the probability of acquisition type (inverse mills ratio) 
is determined, the second stage is run including deal specific factors. The results are 
presented in Table 2.11 and Table 2.12. Table 2.11 presents the basic two-step Heckman 
where the inverse mills ratio is regressed on CARs to determine in the first instance if 
there are any factors explaining CARs of target firms (Equation 2.3.6). This model 
reduced the collinearity problems associated with OLS models. All windows for both the 
market model and (0,1) market model have insignificant results with the exception of [-
10, +10] and [-20, +20] which show a positively significant lambda at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.10 OLS Treatment Effects Regression Results: Information Asymmetry and Post-Announcement Returns   
This table presents the results for the following OLS treatment effects regression results to determine the impact on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of differences between 
financial and strategic target firms accounting for unobservables.   
 
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 13RND + 14M/B 
+15PEDummy +x λi + vi 
 
Where CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date for financial and strategic target firms, IMR () corresponds to Heckman’s lambda, obtained from the 
Probit model of probability of being included in the financial (private equity) sample, PEDummy is a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for financial (private equity bids) and 
PRIV=0 for strategic (tender/merger offer) firm observations, Deal Value is the value of the deal ($ millions), BidPrem is the percentage (%) 5 days before the announcement day 
being the price offered per target stock compared to target stock 5 days prior to the announcement day, Attitude is a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the bid is hostile, and zero otherwise, 
Success is a dichotomous variable set to1 if the bid is successful, and zero otherwise, Cash is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for cash-only offers, and zero otherwise,  % Shares is the 
percentage (%) of target firm shares sought in the deal, HIH is the Herfindahl Index for each 2-digit SIC code group, Bidders is the number of bidders competing with the acquirer for 
the same target, Size is the firm size measured as Ln(AT), Leverage is total debt/(total debt + market value of equity), FCF is operating activities net cash flow minus capital 
expenditures, ROE is net income divided by common/ordinary equity, RND is research and development expense as a proportion of sales and M/B is the market value of equity divided 
by common/ordinary equity.  
 
 
 
  Sample Size: 1 750    Sample Size: 1 750   
  Value Weighted    Equally Weighted    
Event 
windows  Variable name  Coefficent
Standard 
Error t‐stat    Coefficent 
Standard 
Error t‐stat  
Panel A ‐ Market Model            
(0, +1)  Intercept   ‐0.2941 0.1076 ‐2.73 ***  ‐0.2926  0.1077 ‐2.72 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.0695 0.0246 ‐2.83 ***  ‐0.0687  0.0246 ‐2.79 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1270 0.0510 2.49 **  0.1264  0.0510 2.48 ** 
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.2012 0.1025 ‐1.96 *  ‐0.1982  0.1025 ‐1.93 * 
  Private Equity   ‐0.0758 0.0234 ‐3.24 ***  ‐0.0748  0.0234 ‐3.20 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.0704 0.0486 1.45   0.0700  0.0486 1.44
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   ‐0.2863 0.1064 ‐2.69 ***  ‐0.2831  0.1064 ‐2.66 ***
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  Private Equity   ‐0.0799 0.0243 ‐3.29 ***  ‐0.0785  0.0243 ‐3.23 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1262 0.0505 2.50 **  0.1255  0.0505 2.49 ** 
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.3614 0.1085 ‐3.33 ***  ‐0.3584  0.1092 ‐3.28 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.1016 0.0247 ‐4.11 ***  ‐0.1017  0.0249 ‐4.08 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1543 0.0514 3.00 ***  0.1505  0.0518 2.90 ***
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   ‐0.3149 0.1170 ‐2.69 ***  ‐0.2965  0.1186 ‐2.50 ** 
  Private Equity   ‐0.1136 0.0267 ‐4.26 ***  ‐0.1140  0.0271 ‐4.21 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1616 0.0555 2.91 ***  0.1502  0.0562 2.67 ***
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.4873 0.1448 ‐3.36 ***  ‐0.4590  0.1486 ‐3.09 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.1390 0.0330 ‐4.21 ***  ‐0.1452  0.0339 ‐4.28 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.2604 0.0687 3.79 ***  0.2394  0.0705 3.40 ***
 
   
 
 
Panel B ‐ (0,1) Market Model           
(0, +1)  Intercept   ‐0.2898 0.1067 ‐2.71 ***  ‐0.2879  0.1064 ‐2.07 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.0686 0.0244 ‐2.81 ***  ‐0.0685  0.0243 ‐2.81 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1253 0.0506 2.48 **  0.1247  0.0504 2.47 ** 
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.1942 0.1020 ‐1.90 *  ‐0.1911  0.1019 ‐1.88 * 
  Private Equity   ‐0.0764 0.0233 ‐3.28 ***  ‐0.0758  0.0232 ‐3.26 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.0690 0.0484 1.43   0.0674  0.0483 1.39
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   ‐0.2732 0.1044 ‐2.62 ***  ‐0.2697  0.1043 ‐2.58 ** 
  Private Equity   ‐0.0802 0.0238 ‐3.37 ***  ‐0.0796  0.0238 ‐3.34 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1216 0.0495 2.46 **  0.1201  0.0495 2.43 ** 
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.3095 0.1052 ‐2.94 ***  ‐0.3218  0.1051 ‐3.06 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.1053 0.0240 ‐4.39 ***  ‐0.1048  0.0240 ‐4.37 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1367 0.0499 2.74 ***  0.1344  0.0498 2.70 ***
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   ‐0.2481 0.1104 ‐2.25 **  ‐0.2680  0.1104 ‐2.43 ** 
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  Private Equity   ‐0.1181 0.0252 ‐4.69 ***  ‐0.1174  0.0252 ‐4.66 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1435 0.0523 2.74 ***  0.1411  0.0523 2.69 ***
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.3249 0.1226 ‐2.65 ***  ‐0.3688  0.1229 ‐3.00 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.1519 0.0280 ‐5.43 ***  ‐0.1504  0.0280 ‐5.36 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.2136 0.0582 3.67 ***  0.2130  0.0583 3.65 ***
 
   
 
Panel C ‐ Farma French (3 Factor)           
(0, +1)  Intercept   ‐0.2952 0.1076 ‐2.74 ***  ‐0.2952  0.1076 ‐2.74 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.0695 0.0246 ‐2.82 ***  ‐0.0695  0.0246 ‐2.82 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1297 0.0510 2.54 **  0.1297  0.0510 2.54 ** 
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.2080 0.1029 ‐2.02 **  ‐2.0797  0.1029 ‐2.02 ** 
  Private Equity   ‐0.0749 0.0235 ‐3.19 ***  ‐0.0749  0.0235 ‐3.19 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.0817 0.1029 1.67 *  0.0817  0.0488 1.67 * 
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   ‐0.2959 0.1068 ‐2.77 ***  ‐0.2959  0.1068 ‐2.77 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.0789 0.0244 ‐3.24 ***  ‐0.0789  0.0243 ‐3.24 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1374 0.0507 2.71 ***  0.1374  0.0507 2.71 ***
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.3560 0.1110 ‐3.21 ***  ‐0.3560  0.1110 ‐3.21 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.1020 0.0253 ‐4.03 ***  ‐0.1020  0.0253 ‐4.03 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1573 0.0527 2.99 ***  0.1573  0.0527 2.99 ***
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   ‐0.2892 0.1220 ‐2.37 **  ‐0.2892  0.1220 ‐2.37 ** 
  Private Equity   ‐0.1200 0.0278 ‐4.31 ***  ‐0.1200  0.0278 ‐4.31 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.1519 0.0579 2.63 ***  0.1519  0.0579 2.63 ***
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.4532 0.1552 ‐2.92 ***  ‐0.4515  0.1552 ‐2.92 ***
  Private Equity   ‐0.1587 0.0354 ‐4.48 ***  ‐0.1587  0.0354 ‐4.48 ***
  Inverse Mills  0.2542 0.0736 3.45 ***  0.2542  0.0736 3.45 ***
 
***, **, and * denote a statistically significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 2.11 Heckman Regression Results: Information Asymmetry and Post-Announcement Returns   
 
This table presents the results for the following Heckman two-step regression results to determine the impact on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of differences between 
financial and strategic target firms accounting for unobservables.   
CARi = α+βλi+λi      
 
Where CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date for financial and strategic target firms, IMR () corresponds to Heckman’s lambda, obtained from the 
Probit model of probability of being included in the financial (private equity) sample, PEDummy is a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for financial (private equity bids) and 
PRIV=0 for strategic (tender/merger offer) firm observations, Deal Value is the value of the deal ($ millions), BidPrem is the percentage (%) 5 days before the announcement day 
being the price offered per target stock compared to target stock 5 days prior to the announcement day, Attitude is a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the bid is hostile, and zero otherwise, 
Success is a dichotomous variable set to1 if the bid is successful, and zero otherwise, Cash is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for cash-only offers, and zero otherwise,  % Shares is the 
percentage (%) of target firm shares sought in the deal, HIH is the Herfindahl Index for each 2-digit SIC code group, Bidders is the number of bidders competing with the acquirer for 
the same target, Size is the firm size measured as Ln(AT), Leverage is total debt/(total debt + market value of equity), FcF is operating activities net cash flow minus capital expenditures, 
ROE is net income divided by common/ordinary equity, RND is research and development expense as a proportion of sales and M/B is the market value of equity divided by 
common/ordinary equity. 
  
  Sample Size: 1 750     Sample Size: 1 750   
  Value Weighted     Equally Weighted    
Event 
windows 
Variable 
name   Coefficent
Standard 
Error p Value        Coefficent
Standard 
Error p Value   
Panel A ‐ Market Model             
(0, +1)  Intercept   0.0698 0.1035 0.500    0.0707 0.1037 0.496
 Lambda   0.0949 0.0733 0.195    0.0949 0.0734 0.196
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   0.2089 0.1015 0.040 **    0.2092 0.1016 0.039 ** 
  Lambda   ‐0.0281 0.0720 0.696    ‐0.0278 0.0721 0.700
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   0.0934 0.1049 0.373    0.0946 0.1050 0.367
 Lambda   0.0788 0.0744 0.289    0.0789 0.0744 0.289
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   0.1308 0.1124 0.244    0.1251 0.1131 0.268
 Lambda   0.0605 0.0798 0.448    0.0650 0.0802 0.418
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   ‐0.0162 0.1486 0.913    ‐0.0141 0.1490 0.924
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 Lambda   0.1743 0.1053 0.098 *    0.1739 0.1056 0.100
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.0976 0.1740 0.575    ‐0.0900 0.1752 0.608
 Lambda   0.2315 0.1233 0.060 *    0.2258 0.1242 0.069 * 
    
Panel B ‐ (0,1) Market Model            
(0, +1)  Intercept   0.0825 0.1021 0.419    0.0862 0.1020 0.398
 Lambda   0.0861 0.0723 0.233    0.0835 0.0722 0.247
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   0.2145 0.1008 0.033 **    0.2200 0.1007 0.029
 Lambda   ‐0.0318 0.0715 0.657    ‐0.0362 0.0714 0.613
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   0.1088 0.1029 0.290    0.1144 0.1025 0.264
 Lambda   0.0686 0.0730 0.348    0.0642 0.0727 0.377
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   0.1714 0.1049 0.102    0.1662 0.1047 0.112
 Lambda   0.0328 0.0745 0.659    0.0342 0.0743 0.645
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   0.0182 0.1318 0.890    0.0140 0.1319 0.916
 Lambda   0.1534 0.0934 0.101    0.1520 0.0935 0.104
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.0270 0.1373 0.844    ‐0.0155 0.1357 0.909
 Lambda   0.1882 0.0973 0.053 *    0.1713 0.0962 0.075 * 
    
 
Panel C ‐ Farma French (3 Factor)            
(0, +1)  Intercept   0.5954 0.1040 0.567    0.0595 0.1040 0.567
 Lambda   0.1028 0.0736 0.162    0.1028 0.0736 0.162
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   0.1960 0.1012 0.053 *    0.1960 0.1012 0.053 * 
  Lambda   ‐0.0187 0.0718 0.795    ‐0.0187 0.0718 0.795
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   0.0756 0.1059 0.475    0.0756 0.1059 0.475
 Lambda   0.0926 0.0751 0.217    0.0926 0.0751 0.217
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   0.1058 0.1159 0.361    0.1058 0.1159 0.361
 Lambda   0.0786 0.0822 0.339    0.0786 0.0822 0.339
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(‐10, +10)   Intercept   ‐0.0143 0.1513 0.925    ‐0.0143 0.1513 0.925
 Lambda   0.1740 0.1073 0.105    0.1740 0.1073 0.150
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.0490 0.1792 0.784    ‐0.0490 0.1792 0.784
 Lambda   0.1899 0.1270 0.135    0.1899 0.1270 0.135
 
***, **, and * denote a statistically significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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These results show there are no unobserved factors explaining the changes in CARs. 
Results do show a positive relationship between the inverse mills ratio and CARs, 
indicating that a possible increase in market information leads to increased CARs. Table 
2.12 shows the results for the regression model including additional independent variables 
for deal specific variables (Equation 2.3.7). 
 
Results in Table 2.12 support previous conclusions that there are no omitted variables 
from the specific regression that contribute to higher CARs for private equity targets 
compared to tender/merger target firms, with the exception of the window [-1, 0] for both 
market models which shows a significant lambda at the 10% level. Lambda is positive 
for all windows, indicating that any increase in information asymmetry would increase 
CARs for that window surrounding the announcement day. There remains a question of 
informed trading around the announcement date due to the significant differences 
between cumulative abnormal returns between takeover types as presented in Figure 1 
(Average Abnormal Returns). Results indicate that once allowing for unobservable 
factors there is no significant impact on cumulative abnormal returns, however they do 
not account for the probability of informed trade and increased information sharing, 
particularly in private equity acquisitions.    
 
2.5.3  Robustness  
 
To test the robustness of the self-selection specification, the Fama-French (1996) three 
factor model is used to test for factors not supported by the market model methods. 
Further, prior literature is taken into account, including the Barber and Lyon (1997) size 
and book-to-market or size and industry approach. In consideration of conventional 
robustness testing using Barber and Lyon (1997), the Fama-French model is used as it 
accounts for the anomalies found in traditional CAPM models.  
Ri – Rf = i + 1 (Rm – Rf) + 2SMB + 3HML + i 
  (2.5.3.1) 
where: expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (Ri – Rf) is explained 
by three factors: the excess return on a broad market portfolio (Rm – Rf), the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large 
stocks (SMB), and the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to- 
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Table 2.12 Heckman Regression Results (including Abnormal Return Variables): Information Asymmetry and Post-Announcement Returns   
This table presents the results for the following Hackman two-step regression results to determine the impact on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of differences between 
financial and strategic target firms accounting for unobservables.   
 
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 13RND + 14M/B 
+ x λi +vi 
 
Where CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date for financial and strategic target firms, IMR () corresponds to Heckman’s lambda, obtained from the 
Probit model of probability of being included in the financial (private equity) sample, PEDummy is a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for financial (private equity bids) and 
PRIV=0 for strategic (tender/merger offer) firm observations, Deal Value is the value of the deal ($ millions), BidPrem is the percentage (%) 5 days before the announcement day 
being the price offered per target stock compared to target stock 5 days prior to the announcement day, Attitude is a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the bid is hostile, and zero otherwise, 
Success is a dichotomous variable set to1 if the bid is successful, and zero otherwise, Cash is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for cash-only offers, and zero otherwise,  % Shares is the 
percentage (%) of target firm shares sought in the deal, HIH is the Herfindahl Index for each 2-digit SIC code group, Bidders is the number of bidders competing with the acquirer for 
the same target, Size is the firm size measured as Ln(AT), Leverage is total debt/(total debt + market value of equity), FCF is operating activities net cash flow minus capital 
expenditures, ROE is net income divided by common/ordinary equity, RND is research and development expense as a proportion of sales and M/B is the market value of equity divided 
by common/ordinary equity.  
 
 
  Sample Size: 1 750     Sample Size: 1 750   
  Value Weighted     Equally Weighted    
Event 
windows 
Variable 
name   Coefficent
Standard 
Error p Value       Coefficent
Standard 
Error p Value   
Panel A ‐ Market Model             
(0, +1)  Intercept   0.1225 0.2263 0.588  0.1085 0.2272 0.633
 Lambda   0.0542 0.0934 0.562  0.0581 0.0938 0.536
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.3006 0.2222 0.176  ‐0.3050 0.2222 0.170
 Lambda   0.1620 0.0960 0.091 *    0.1663 0.0960 0.083 * 
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   0.1216 0.2172 0.576  0.1079 0.2177 0.620
 Lambda   0.0628 0.0925 0.497  0.0682 0.0927 0.462
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.0662 0.2193 0.763  ‐0.0888 0.2249 0.693
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 Lambda   0.1092 0.0939 0.245  0.1111 0.0963 0.249
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   0.0447 0.2505 0.858  0.0932 0.2540 0.714
 Lambda   0.1123 0.1071 0.294  0.0827 0.1082 0.445
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.1015 0.3410 0.766  ‐0.0347 0.3460 0.920
 Lambda   0.2310 0.1470 0.116  0.1826 0.1482 0.218
    
Panel B ‐ (0,1) Market Model            
(0, +1)  Intercept   0.0898 0.2271 0.692  0.0841 0.2274 0.711
 Lambda   0.0741 0.0940 0.430  0.0707 0.0941 0.452
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.3223 0.2246 0.151  ‐0.3293 0.2242 0.142
 Lambda   0.1741 0.0972 0.073 *    0.1756 0.0971 0.070 * 
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   0.0626 0.2178 0.774  0.0582 0.2174 0.789
 Lambda   0.0921 0.0930 0.322  0.0897 0.0928 0.334
(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.1400 0.2168 0.518  ‐0.1590 0.2194 0.469
 Lambda   0.1336 0.0932 0.152  0.1320 0.0943 0.161
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   0.0710 0.2272 0.755  0.0729 0.2299 0.751
 Lambda   0.0921 0.0970 0.342  0.0750 0.0980 0.444
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   0.0051 0.2598 0.984  ‐0.0010 0.2598 0.997
 Lambda   0.1236 0.1111 0.266  0.0976 0.1108 0.379
    
 
Panel C ‐ Farma French (3 Factor)            
(0, +1)  Intercept   0.1458 0.2318 0.530  0.1458 0.2318 0.530
 Lambda   0.0485 0.0956 0.612  0.0485 0.0956 0.612
(‐1, 0)  Intercept   ‐0.2399 0.2229 0.282  ‐0.2399 0.2229 0.282
 Lambda   0.1460 0.0960 0.128  0.1460 0.0960 0.128
(‐1, +1)   Intercept   0.1893 0.2238 0.397  0.1893 0.2238 0.397
 Lambda   0.0445 0.0951 0.640  0.0445 0.0951 0.640
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(‐5, +5)   Intercept   ‐0.0027 0.2344 0.991  ‐0.0027 0.2344 0.991
 Lambda   0.0833 0.0999 0.404  0.0833 0.0999 0.404
(‐10, +10)   Intercept   0.0406 0.2770 0.884  0.0406 0.2770 0.884
 Lambda   0.1198 0.1183 0.311  0.1198 0.1183 0.311
(‐20, +20)   Intercept   ‐0.1156 0.3820 0.762  ‐0.1156 0.3820 0.762
 Lambda   0.2709 0.1648 0.100  0.2709 0.1648 0.100
 
***, **, and * denote a statistically significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.    
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market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML). The 
abnormal return is calculated per day between each individual firm’s return and the 
expected return generated by the above model. Table 2.9 (Panel C) shows the acquisition 
type, private equity, and variable to be significantly different from zero at the 1% 
significant level for all windows, for example -0.0788.  
 
Table 2.10 (Panel C) provides contradictory results to the market model and (0,1) market 
model results. Fama-French shows the intercept, acquisition type and inverse mills ratio 
to be significant across all windows at the 1% level with the exception of lambda which 
is significant at the 10% level for value weighted [-1, 0] 2-day window and significant at 
the 5% level for value weighted [0, -1] window. Specifically, the window [-1, 0] shows 
an inverse mills coefficient of 0.0817 positively significant at 1%. Results show, 
regardless of all other factors in the model, that the intercept is negatively significant from 
zero. Further, as the probability of being a private equity target firm increases (inverse 
mills), CARs of the target increase between 0.0817 and 0.2542.  
 
This is interpreted as positive asymmetric information in the market.  That is, it is 
concluded that there is greater information asymmetry between the private equity bid 
targets and acquirers as the private equity target is expected to go back to the market 
through IPO for significant financial gain. Tender/merger offers by comparison are more 
strategic in nature and less information is likely shared due to the desire to gain the upper 
hand in the transaction. The results in Table 2.11 (Panel C) and Table 2.12 (Panel C) 
support the prior conclusions that once unobservable factors are accounted for, there are 
no omitted variables contributing to CARs of target firms, with only the intercept being 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level for [-1, 0] (0.1960) in Table 2.11 (Panel 
C). In addition, results show a negative intercept the larger the window, and hence further 
from the takeover announcement day. For example, the value weighted intercept for [-10, 
+10] and [-20, +20] are -0.0143 and -0.0490 respectively. Once accounting for 
unobservable factors and deal specific characteristics, results show the [-1,0] window 
intercept is negative and insignificant (-0.2399).    
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2.6  Conclusions  
 
This chapter tests whether there is higher information asymmetry and self-selection bias 
surrounding private equity bids versus tender/merger offers. Prior theoretical and 
empirical research affirms that higher information asymmetry surrounding takeover bids 
leads to increased confidence surrounding the bid announcement and therefore a greater 
bid premium and increased returns. Abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date 
are an indication of acquisition certainty. With this in mind, private equity bid acquisitions 
should, in theory, due to their financial nature, have greater information asymmetry when 
compared to tender/merger offers which are strategic in nature. Prior research has omitted 
to account for self-selection bias through greater information asymmetry when comparing 
takeover acquisition types. To address this, this chapter considers the determinants of 
private equity bids, finding financial stability to be a significant target characteristic. 
Next, utilising the significant determinants of target choice in addition to takeover 
characteristics, Heckman’s two-step model is applied to analyse unobservable omitted 
variable bias – information asymmetry. The above indicates that consistent with the 
hypothesised outcome there is greater information asymmetry surrounding private equity 
bid takeovers when compared to the more strategic tender/merger offers 
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Chapter 3 : The Asymmetric Private Information Mask - A 
Comparative Analysis Of Private Equity Bids And 
Tender/Merger Offers 
3.1  Introduction  
Inside information is a particularly guarded and valuable commodity in the takeover 
market. Nevertheless, without information asymmetries the existence of private equity 
would be negated, with firms raising capital from banks and other debt financing sources. 
Stock prices thereby show information leakage evidencing superior information can lead 
to superior returns. This chapter estimates the informational asymmetry cost and 
probability of informed trading surrounding the announcement of private equity bids and 
tender/merger offers by examining the cost components of market maker bid-ask spreads. 
This chapter focuses on private equity bid and tender/merger offer announcements 
targeting firms in the United States (the U.S.) from the 1st January 1994 to 31st December 
2013. A significant decrease is found in the probability of informed trading in the post-
announcement period for private equity bid targets relative to tender/merger offer targets. 
This finding is interpreted as decreased information asymmetry post-announcement for 
private equity bid targets relative to tender/merger offer targets.    
 
Market microstructure studies are fundamental in understanding the trading behaviour of 
market makers and investors in asymmetric information rich environments distinctive 
from market anticipation. The literature on insider trading and its influence on market 
prices has been evidenced through abnormal volume and price increase studies during 
periods of perceived or known insider trading where information-based trading is inferred 
from patterns in price and volume. Takeover announcements are associated with target 
stock price increases reflective of positive news. Traders with prior knowledge are 
therefore likely to trade on such information to maximize profits. Acharya and Johnson 
(2010) find that increased insiders in private-equity buyouts increases the level of insider 
activity. That is, a larger number of equity participants fosters higher information 
exploitation and a greater level of suspicious stock and option activity in a cross-section 
of buyout deals during the period 2000 to 2006. Kedia and Zhou (2014) consider the 
corporate bond markets and informed trading prior to takeovers, finding significant pre-
announcement trading activities and price movements in target bonds consistent with 
information asymmetry. Analysing bid-ask spreads of options 30 days prior to 
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acquisitions announcements, Augustin et al. (2016) find a statistically significant increase 
in average abnormal trading volume in equity options markets prior to announcement of 
merger or takeover, interpreted as informed trading. In addition, Lowry et al. (2016) show 
an increase in option positions by advisor banks before mergers. If no increase was 
expected in target stock prices, then abnormal options activity would not be observed. 
The evidence is therefore consistent with market makers adjusting prices to protect 
against asymmetric information trading.  
 
These studies have considered the bid-ask spread implications on investor returns, market 
maker profitability, and subsequently market liquidity (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988), 
providing an explanation of privately expected increases in target stock prices. Market 
makers may price adjust to entice uninformed trades by reducing the bid-ask spread, or 
conversely an increase in the spread may be attributed to increased information 
asymmetry or reduced trading volume (Liu and Wang, 2016). A narrow bid-ask spread 
encourages market participation by investors in the market leading to increased trade and 
liquidity. In contrast, a high bid-ask spread discourages trade as it implies a supply-
demand imbalance and lower liquidity leading to high transaction costs for the investor. 
The bid-ask spread is a reflection of the market maker’s perception of asymmetric 
information for stocks; hence examining the bid-ask spread is useful as a measure of 
informed trading surrounding private equity bid and tender/merger offer transactions. 
This chapter tests whether private equity bid target firms exhibit differences in adverse 
selection costs caused by informed trading pre- and post-announcement, and relative to 
tender/merger offer target firms.          
 
Stoll (1978) developed a theoretical model for the bid-ask spread by identifying three cost 
components: order processing costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse selection costs. 
This has since been extended by Bollen et al. (2004) and Sidhu et al. (2008), who adopt 
a decomposed market maker’s spread to overcome the assumption that time-series 
variation in the spread is limited to information asymmetry. In contrast to prior 
microstructure studies, Bollen et al. (2004) use theoretical options to determine the 
probability of informed trading through the decomposition of the bid-ask spread, testing 
the model using NASDAQ stocks.  Bollen et al. (2004) introduce the Inventory Holding 
Premium (IHP) as a proxy for inventory holding costs and adverse selection costs in 
modeling the market maker’s bid-ask spread. IHP is the premium required by market 
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makers to compensate for the costs associated with holding inventory until the position is 
reversed out. This decomposition of bid-ask spread costs allows for the examination of 
the effect of insider trading and information asymmetry through adverse selection. 
Examining the bid-ask spread, in particular IHP, reveals how asymmetric information 
costs affect private equity bid and tender/merger offer transactions which is of interest to 
regulators, investors and lenders.      
 
The last three decades have seen an increase in developed market regulation for 
corporations in an effort to mitigate the effects of investment market participants with 
access to private information holding a trading advantage relative to the wider investing 
public. Regulation includes increased accounting requirements and statutory acts imposed 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Going private transactions are free 
from increased public company regulation and have a reputation for transforming under-
performing companies into powerful and efficient entities that provide financing and tax 
advantages and increased investment value. This has been an attributing factor in the rise 
of private equity funds as an alternative to developed markets. Private equity deals include 
a great deal of information, of which parties are either privy to none, some, or all. The 
SEC adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 for public markets to mitigate selective 
disclosure and stop exclusive sessions between CEOs and shareholders which had the 
potential for an unfair trading edge over smaller investors not privy to company 
performance insights. Currently the private equity realm, although acknowledged to have 
information asymmetry, has less oversight comparative to its public market counterpart, 
a potential problem now within the SEC’s sights. The SEC has identified the increased 
potential for insider trading and information asymmetry advantage in going-private 
transactions with critics arguing an inherent conflict between shareholders’ interests and 
the principal of the acquiring entity.   
 
Whether the existence of private information in private equity transactions through 
selective disclosure is unfair or harmful to trade, however, is still contentious. Arguably, 
selective disclosure in private equity deals leads to the unequal treatment of limited 
partners with their information base reflective of the limited partner’s commitment. 
Asymmetric information can be transferred through serving on a committee, or being 
privy to additional or greater frequency of company information not shared with other 
investors including operational performance and projections of deals including target 
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value. On the other hand, the value of inside information is negated due to the time it 
takes to process information into monetisable assets.       
 
The increased value of going-private targets post-acquisition coupled with the promising 
long-term prospects of private equity deals, has resulted in increased insider trading 
involving going private transactions as investors seek to maximise profits. For example, 
the SEC charged Vitamin Company’s former board member and brother with insider 
trading for purchasing NBTM Inc. shares as a result of being privy to confidential 
information surrounding the private equity acquisition, and a stockbroker who used 
nonpublic information from a client to engage in insider trading involving the acquisition 
of Burger King by New York private equity firm 3G Capital Partners Ltd. These 
convictions support the need for exploration of informed trading in going-private 
transactions comparative to public market takeovers that are generally hostile in nature. 
The reduced post-acquisition regulation of privatised entities through going-private 
transactions increases the probability of informed trade as market participants share inside 
information in a friendly environment for monetary gain.      
 
Given the increased number and frequency of market transactions coupled with 
technological increases over the last thirty years, the risk of the market makers 
encountering informed traders in the takeover market has also increased as entrepreneurs, 
individuals, venture capitalists and private equity institutions face different sets of 
information regarding market development and market forces ex ante. Due to its high 
explanatory power of the bid-ask spread, the model in Bollen et al. (2004) was applied in 
Sidhu et al. (2008), which examined the effect of informed trading through adverse 
selection costs following the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure. Although the 
SEC argued that the Regulation Fair Disclosure would improve information flow to the 
entire market, Sidhu et al. (2008) find that due to an information chilling effect adverse 
selection costs increased and there was a greater probability of a market maker 
encountering a trader possessing valuable private information. According to Sidhu et al. 
(2008), the effect of Fair Disclosure was to constrain the distribution of private 
information by firms to analysts and hence the market, thereby resulting in more valuable 
and longer lived private information; however, such an argument is more prevalent in the 
public takeover domain. This chapter extends this prior research to consider the effect of 
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asymmetric information on going-private transactions where information has a limited 
post-announcement life due to privatisation.    
 
Since the private equity sphere is an environment within which pre and post-takeover 
financial reporting has minimal disclosure regulation comparative to public markets, 
there exists the increased potential for the market maker to encounter a trader with private 
information pre-announcement. Due to structural differences in the post-takeover entity, 
these results are not generalised to the private equity market, but any takeover transaction 
that results in privatisation of the target. Sidhu et al. (2008) fail to consider the effect of 
private information in transactions where the acquisition is a going-private transaction 
and the post-acquisition entity is subject to limited legal and market regulation. The value 
of private information pre-announcement date to informed traders is increased based on 
the perceived post-announcement takeover price, thus increasing the adverse selection 
cost of the bid-ask spread and probability of informed trade. This chapter tests this 
premise in a going-private context, where the expected monetary gain from inside 
information will increase the adverse selection costs component of the bid-ask spread. 
That is, valuable asymmetric information will increase the probability of informed trade.   
 
The objective of this research is to evaluate the probability of informed trade surrounding 
takeover announcements, thereby encompassing information asymmetry, as an 
explanation for price variation and spread both before and after the announcement date, 
and between takeover transaction types. It is expected that private equity bid takeovers 
will exhibit greater asymmetric information pre-announcement to post-announcement, 
resultant in a greater bid-ask spread and probability of informed trade comparative to 
tender/merger offer takeovers. Such asymmetries can create the perception of unfairness 
that investors, market makers and regulators such as the SEC alike are concerned will 
lead to reduced investments, higher bid-ask spreads and a requirement for increased 
regulation to reduce further prejudice. This research is thereby important in providing 
insight to the perceived need for greater regulation of private equity acquisitions.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 details the components of the bid-ask 
spread: order processing costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse selection costs. 
Section 2 provides the derivation of the inventory holding premium and the adverse 
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selection measure for informed trades. Sections 3 and 4 specify the empirical model and 
data respectively. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.  
   
3.2  Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread  
Information asymmetry measures play an important role in empirical finance analysis of 
merger and acquisition phenomena. Prior literature applies probability of information-
based trading, price impact measures, or spread-based decomposition measures to infer 
the likelihood of illicit trade around announcement dates. Easley and O’Hara (1987) 
introduced the probability of information-based trading (PIN) to empirical finance 
research. This measure has subsequently been applied in later studies that have 
determined PIN should be cautiously applied as it fails to incorporate volume dimensions 
and reflects noise surrounding private information (Aktas et al., 2007). Pirim et al. (2010) 
examine the performance of the spread decomposition models estimating the inventory 
holding component of the bid-ask spread used in Stoll (1989), Huang and Stoll (1997), 
and Bollen et al. (2004). They use Bessembinder (2002) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(2004) order imbalance metrics as benchmarks. Bollen et al. (2004) exhibits the largest 
number of predicted relations with the proxies of inventory holding cost and the spread. 
This research uses the Bollen et al. (2004) methodology to measure probability of 
informed trade between two merger and acquisition types due to its superiority exhibited 
in prior studies for predicting informed trade through its combined inventory holding and 
adverse selection costs expressed as the inventory holding premium. This methodology 
decomposes the spread into fundamental and structural cost components. The following 
paragraphs outline the determination of spread components to measure informed trade.  
 
Information asymmetry continues to be a source of adverse selection, moral hazards, and 
market failure, thereby making the relationship between information transparency and the 
bid-ask spread of continued research focus and interest in finance. Stoll (1978) present 
the costs incurred by the market maker in three categories: order-processing costs (OPC), 
the inventory holding costs (IHC), and the cost of adverse selection (ASC).  
 
SPRD = 0 +1OPC + 2IHC+3ASC + i                                                               (3.2.1) 
 
Bollen et al. (2004) expand on this model to include price competition (COMP) caused 
by the involvement of multiple market makers in the spread.  
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SPRD = 0 +1OPC + 2IHC+3ASC + 4COMP + i                                 (3.2.2) 
 
Since the market maker will set the spread at a level reflective of the risk and costs 
associated with completing the trade and closing out the position, the bid-ask spread is 
affected by both the fixed cost component of conducting the trade and the additional risk 
factors requiring a higher return such as the probability of dealing with an informed trader. 
Previous research has considered a number of proxy variables for each component of the 
spread, which are now discussed.  
 
3.2.1 Order Processing Costs  
Order-processing costs are those costs directly associated with facilitating and executing 
the market maker service, and include the cost of acquiring the exchange seat, labour 
costs, trading equipment, and information services. Prior empirical studies proxy order 
processing costs based on trading volume in shares (Branch and Freed, 1977), and 
variants including log of trading volume in shares (Tinic, 1972; Tinic and West, 1972, 
1974) and log of trading volume in dollars (Stoll, 1978; Harris, 1994). Following these 
studies, Bollen et al. (2004) argue that due to the largely fixed nature of order-processing 
costs, the impact on the bid-ask spread is inversely related to the market maker’s activity 
(trading volume). That is, as trading activity increases the contribution of these fixed costs 
to the bid-ask spread for each transaction is reduced, ceteris paribus. Order-processing 
costs are thereby proxied by the inverse of trading volume in shares. Arguably, the 
relationship between volume and bid-ask spread may not hold due to high-frequency 
trading, however the activity or liquidity of the stock is readily available as investors will 
maximize utility by actively limiting orders in a continuous auction market. An increase 
in volume due to high frequency trading would decrease the spread even more. An 
electronic market still applies in the absence of a market maker. Based on the premise 
that the order-processing costs contribution to the spread decreases inversely with trading 
volume coupled with the negative and significant relationship found in the prior literature, 
a negative sign is expected for this relationship with the inverse measure predicted to be 
positive.   
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3.2.2 Competition Costs  
As competition increases the associated costs reflected in the market maker’s bid-ask 
spread approaches zero. Market makers competitively adjust their bid-ask spread to 
attract investors, resulting in increased competition among market makers that causes the 
competition component of the spread to contract. Bollen et al. (2004) proxy the 
competition among traders using a modified version of the Herfindahl index of 
concentration introduced in Tinic (1972). Liu (2004) find the bid-ask spread is almost 
exogenous when market makers have near perfect competition. Extending their earlier 
model with multiple market makers, Liu and Wang (2016) consider a model with 
oligopolistic competition. Their results show competition among market makers does not 
change an expected reduction in the bid-ask spread with decreased information 
asymmetry. The existence of technological advances in trading, “high-frequency traders”, 
coupled with the increased volume of market makers means the competition cost 
component is expected to have little impact on the bid-ask spread. The US market is a 
highly competitive and technologically advanced trading environment and therefore 
competition costs are excluded from the model.1 
 
3.2.3  The Inventory Holding Premium: Adverse Selection Costs and 
Estimating the Probability of Informed Trade 
	
Inventory-holding costs are the costs, such as price volatility risk, borne by the market 
makers in providing the liquidity until the position is closed out. The market maker 
therefore prices this risk into the bid-ask spread. Longer held inventory is expected to 
have a greater impact on the spread due to increased opportunity costs of funds tied up in 
stock purchases and potential adverse movements decreasing stock value. Empirical 
research has previously captured these costs using proxies for the transaction rate and 
expected volatility during the holding period. Transaction rate proxies return a negative 
and significant relation between the proxy and bid-ask spread (for example, Demsetz 
(1968) and Benston and Hagerman (1974) both use number of shares; Demsetz (1968) 
number of trades; and Tinic (1972) number of institutional shareholders and percent of 
trading days with at least one trade). Expected volatility proxies, in contrast, yield positive 
and significant relationships with the bid-ask spread (for example, Demsetz (1968), Tinic 
																																																								
1 Affleck-Graves et al. (1994) affirm competition costs should only be included in testing the bid-ask 
spread if using NASDAQ data due to its multiple dealer setup.  
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(1972), Tinic and West (1972, 1974), and Branch and Freed (1977) all use proxies 
measured by share price, while Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Harris (1994) proxy 
inventory holding costs by idiosyncratic risk and standard deviation of return, 
respectively). Firms experiencing high volatility pre-merger announcement are likely 
tender/merger offer targets due to managerial practice changes required post-merger and 
the acquirer’s reliance on public information. However, private equity target firms 
encompass a lower level of price volatility risk due to perceived post-takeover valuation 
increases and managerial communication pre-takeover between the target and acquirer. 
This reduces the uncertainty around asymmetric information ‘worth’ increasing its insider 
value (Osborne et al., 2012).  
 
The existence of private information in the market prior to a bid/offer announcement will 
adversely affect the value of any inventory held by a market maker. That is, the market 
maker will lose on any trade with an informed investor (Bollen et al., 2004). The adverse 
selection cost is the loss resultant from trading with an informed trader, making it a good 
indicator of asymmetric information and informed trade reflected by changes in the 
market maker’s bid-ask spread (Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986).  Prior empirical studies 
have used different proxies to measure adverse selection costs reflected by the firm’s 
information environment (information asymmetry). Tinic (1972) and Branch and Freed 
(1977) use number of specialist stocks, while Stoll (1978) and Harris (1994) use dollar 
trading volume/market capitalisation and market capitalisation respectively, with all 
adverse selection cost proxies having a positive and significant relation with the spread. 
Bollen et al. (2004) construct the IHP to measure inventory holding costs and adverse 
selection costs together using option based pricing measured by a hypothetical call option 
(Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973). Arguably, any reduction in the level of 
information asymmetry will have a positive and significant influence (reduction) on the 
bid-ask spread.  
 
Private equity target firms are generally smaller in size to tender/merger offer targets, 
establishing a link between takeover transaction type and the bid-ask spread. Harris 
(1994) suggests that larger firms, measured by market capitalisation, will have greater 
information distributed to the market thereby lowering the probability of adverse 
selection. Further, Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) find adverse selection is lower in 
developed markets. It is predicted that private equity target firms will exhibit higher levels 
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of asymmetric private information and a larger pre-announcement bid-ask spread due to 
informed trading and increased adverse selection costs. Consequently the market maker 
will set a higher ask, and a lower bid price, to compensate for the risk of encountering an 
informed trader pre-announcement. In an environment where the market maker has 
significant market power and their current holdings of uninformed trades are small, 
increased information asymmetry will lead the market maker to offer a better price 
(decrease the ask price or increase the bid price) to induce uninformed traders to take 
some of the market maker’s trades with informed traders, thereby transferring risk and 
narrowing the bid-ask spread. Based on the above arguments, firms operating in 
information rich environments should present investors with a lower risk of adverse 
selection effect, decreased information asymmetry, and a reduction in the bid-ask spread.  
 
Changes in the bid-ask spread have been commonly used as estimates for information 
asymmetry, assuming market makers adjust for asymmetric trading risk of holding 
inventory of stock. Asymmetric trading on private information has long been at the 
foreground of market microstructure research with previous studies evaluating the effects 
of market makers being adversely selected by informed traders (Kyle, 1985; Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988). Such studies consider the market maker’s raw bid-ask spread, wrongly 
attributing increases and decreases to changes in informed trading, thereby failing to 
account for changes in liquidity costs. Easley et al. (2012) expand on the earlier work of 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) which introduced the probability of informed trading (PIN) as 
a measure of informed trading, to volume-based probability of informed trading (VPIN) 
expressed by order flows. Informed traders possess private information reflecting the true 
price of a stock that they can advantageously use to trade against uninformed market 
participants such as a market maker.  
 
An extensive empirical literature estimating information asymmetry in asset pricing and 
private equity assumes the informed status of traders through the price impact of trades 
(Acharya and Johnson, 2010) and adverse selection measures assuming they capture 
information asymmetry. These measures fail to account for a critical difference in 
transactors: informed and uninformed (Treynor, 1971; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012). Since 
informed traders will only trade on their information if they perceive it to be not yet 
publicly known, the Bollen et al. (2004) model estimates the probability of informed trade 
(PI) for the market over the given period separating informed from uninformed traders 
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measured through the bid-ask spread. Bollen et al. (2004) introduce the inventory holding 
premium (IHP) as a measure of the two bid-ask spread components - inventory holding 
costs and adverse selection costs - and model inventory holding premium on the 
assumption that the market maker purchases options to hedge the risk of adverse 
selection. The first component, inventory holding costs, is common to all trades and 
relates to the risk of holding shares in inventory. The second is an incremental cost 
associated with the adverse selection costs of providing immediacy to an informed trader 
weighted by the probability that a given trade will be with an informed trader. The IHP is 
modelled as an at-the-money call option (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) which 
is further decomposed into two parts to measure adverse selection costs.  
 
Firstly, the IHP of a transaction with an informed trader (IHPI) is modelled as an in-the-
money (ITM) call option, where the informed trader observes the true price with a 
premium over the trading price. Secondly, the IHP of a transaction with an uninformed 
trader (IHPU) is modelled as a slightly out-of-the-money (OTM) call option, where the 
uninformed trader observes the quoted bid and ask prices in the market. Prior studies have 
found the level of information disclosure to investors is higher in private equity funds 
involving financial institutions comparative to individuals in public markets. We apply 
the event analysis of Bollen et al. (2004) to public and private takeover types to examine 
whether the PI is higher for pre- or post-announcement periods for private equity bid 
target firms and tender/merger offer target firms, and relative to each takeover type. We 
expect that PI will be greater for private equity target firms pre-announcement 
comparative to tender/merger offer target firms due to greater asymmetric information.      
 
3.3   Model Development  
This section develops the model to evaluate the effect of asymmetric information on 
stocks pre- and post-takeover announcement and between takeover types. This study 
utilises the empirical model presented in Bollen et al. (2004) to measure the bid-ask 
spread as it performs well with a cross-section of shares on a daily basis at tick sizes 1/8th, 
1/16th and 1 cent. The bid-ask spread is determined by the market maker’s order 
processing costs, competition costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse selection costs. 
The Bollen et al. (2004) model proxies these costs as the inverse of trading volume and 
inventory holding premium, respectively. This model is simplified as:  
	
	
	
60
 
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2IHPk + k                                         (3.3.1) 
 
where SPRDk is the bid-ask spread for stock k, InvTVk  is the inverse of trading volume 
for stock k, and IHPk is the inventory holding premium (inventory holding costs and 
adverse selection costs) for stock k.  
The inventory holding premium is an at-the-money call option given by the option pricing 
model in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973):  
 
ܫܪܲ ൌ ܵܰ ቆ௟௡ቀ
ೄ
೉ቁ
ఙ√௧ ൅ 0.5ߪ√ݐቇ െ ܺܰቆ
௟௡ቀೄ೉ቁ
ఙ√௧ െ 0.5ߪ√ݐቇ                       (3.3.2) 
 
where S is the true price of stock k, X is the option exercise price, N(.) is a cumulative 
standard normal density function,  is the standard deviation of returns of stock k, and 
ܧ൫√ݐ൯ is the expected time from initial trade to when the position is closed for stock k. 
The inventory holding premium for stock k is given as:  
 
ܫܪܲ ൌ ܵሾ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪܧ൫√ݐ൯ቁ െ 1ሿ                                                 (3.3.3) 
 
where S is the stock’s average daily share price averaged over the month,  is the expected 
annualised return volatility of the stock over the 60 trading days before the sample month, 
and ܧ൫√ݐ൯ is the expected value of the square root of the average time (in minutes) 
between trades each trading day.  
 
Since informed trading is implied via adverse selection costs, IHP is decomposed into a 
transaction with an informed trader (IHPI) and a transaction with an uninformed trader 
(IHPU) where PI is the probability of informed trading:  
 
ܫܪܲ ൌ ܲܫ	 ൈ 	ܫܪ ூܲ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܲܫሻ ൈ ܫܪ ௎ܲ                                    (3.3.4) 
 
IHP is modelled as an at-the-money call option representative of inventory holding costs 
and adverse selection costs.  IHPI and IHPU are modelled using a call option with the 
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exercise price ‘X’ equal to the ask price and the stock price ‘S’ equal to the price observed 
by the informed or uninformed trader respectively.  
 
Since informed traders are able to infer the true value of a stock, IHPI can be measured 
as an in-the-money call option with the stock price equal to the observed true price and 
the exercise price equal to the ask price (ASK). If the true price is slightly above the ask 
price the probability of an informed trade is high; however as the price moves further in-
the-money the probability of informed trade is lower. Bollen et al. (2004) and Sidhu et al. 
(2008) assume the true price of the stock is above the ask price as a proxy for informed 
trading and set true stock price to the exercise price plus a premium between 1% and 10%. 
These studies conclude the premium set for the out-of-the money call option does not 
result in a difference in the probability of informed trading ceteris paribus and the R2 
reaches its maximum, therefore the premium is set at 6% (ASK x 1.06).  
 
ܫܪ ூܲ ൌ ሺܣܵܭ ൈ 1.06ሻܰ ቆ௟௡ቀ
ಲೄ಼ൈభ.బల
ಲೄ಼ ቁ
ఙ√௧ ൅ 0.5ߪ√ݐቇ െ ሺܣܵܭሻܰ ቆ
௟௡ቀಲೄ಼ൈభ.బలಲೄ಼ ቁ
ఙ√௧ െ 0.5ߪ√ݐቇ           (3.3.5) 
 
Uninformed traders observe the market price of the stock, therefore IHPI is a slightly out-
of -the money call option with the stock price the mid-quote price2 (MID) and the exercise 
price the ask price (ASK).    
 
ܫܪ ௎ܲ ൌ ሺܯܫܦሻܰ ቆ௟௡ቀ
ಾ಺ವ
ಲೄ಼ቁ
ఙ√௧ ൅ 0.5ߪ√ݐቇ െ ሺܣܵܭሻܰ ቆ
௟௡ቀಾ಺ವಲೄ಼ቁ
ఙ√௧ െ 0.5ߪ√ݐቇ                         (3.3.6) 
 
After accounting for the aforementioned limitations of using raw changes in the bid-ask 
spread as an estimation of information asymmetry and informed trade, partitioning 
inventory holding costs, and then substituting IHPI  and IHPU, the Bollen et al. (2004) 
model becomes:  
 
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2IHPU,k (k) + 3[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + k    (3.3.7) 
 
																																																								
2 Bollen et al. (2004) and Sidhu et al. (2008); ܯ݅݀ݍݑ݋ݐ݁௞ ൌ ሺ஻௜ௗ	௣௥௜௖௘ೖ	ା	஺௦௞	௣௥௜௖௘ೖሻଶ 	
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where IHPU,k is the expected inventory holding premium for trades in stock k with 
uninformed traders, IHPI,k is the expected inventory holding premium for trades in stock 
k with informed traders, and k is the length of holding period in stock k.  
 
Bollen et al. (2004) note that if a security is traded in a highly competitive market then 
all explanatory variables in the model will be at or near zero leaving the intercept term to 
represent the bid-ask spread, which would equal the minimum price tick. Assuming a 
highly competitive market within which the market makers lower their bid-ask spread to 
attract order flow, the following model is applied to extract the probability of informed 
trading (3) from the bid-ask spread:    
 
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2 IHPU,k (k) +3[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + k              (3.3.8) 
 
where SPRDk is the bid-ask spread of stock k in which informed trading occurs, 0 
represents the exchange mandated minimum tick size and 1InvTVk  (the inverse of 
trading volume for stock k) represents fixed order processing costs. Total inventory 
holding premium consists of a common expected cost across uninformed trades (IHPU), 
plus the incremental costs associated with the probability of trading with an informed 
trader (PI*IHPI) over the inventory holding period (k), where PI*IHPI is the market 
maker’s compensation for the adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread.  
 
Time-stamped trades from Trade and Quote (TAQ) data files are matched to the quotes 
immediately before each trade. Seven summary statistics for each stock day are computed 
from the matched file including: the end-of-day share price set as the last bid-ask midpoint 
prior to 4:00pm EST (S), the trading volume (TV), the expected value of the square root 
of the average time in minutes between trades each day (ܧ൫√ݐ൯), the equal-weighted 
quoted spread (EWQS), the volume-weighted quoted spread (VWQS), the equal-
weighted effective spread (EWES), and the volume-weighted effective spread (VWES). 
Four measures of spread are computed to assess the robustness of the results as outlined 
below. Using the seven summary statistics compiled for each stock each day, the average 
values for each stock across all days in the month are computed. The monthly average for 
each stock is computed due to limited trading on target firms. The bid-ask spread 
measures are appended to each monthly stock record to calculate the coefficient (3) that 
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represented the PI for each private equity bid target firm and tender/merger offer target 
firm. This allows for a comparative analysis of the PI pre- and post-announcement for 
each takeover target type, and relative to each other.    
 
3.4   Data Sample  
The sample consists of private equity bid and tender/merger offer target firm 
announcements over a 20-year period from the 1st January 1994 to 31st December 2013. 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Andrade et al. (2001) discuss the distribution of 
mergers and acquisition over time, in particular merger wave activity over time. Table 
3.1 provides a frequency count by year for private equity bid and tender/merger offer 
target firms in the sample. Consistent with prior literature (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009) 
there is an increase in private equity bid target firms between 2003 and 2007; in particular 
2006 shows a spike in private equity bid target firms relative to tender/merger offer 
targets.    
 
Data are obtained from four different sources:  
(i) Private equity bid target firms and tender/merger offer target firms are collected from 
the mergers and acquisitions database on Securities Data Corporation Platinum (SDC 
Platinum) for the sample period 1st January 1994 to 31st December 2013. The initial 
private equity bid target firm sample consists of firms categorised under the acquisition 
technique ‘leveraged buyout’ flag, exclusive of government and government controlled 
entities. Tender/merger offer target firms are categorised under the acquisition technique 
‘tender/merger’ flag indicative of a tender offer to acquire control of the target 
subsequently followed by a merger agreement.  
 
(ii) The intraday trade and quotation data are collected from TAQ on Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS). The data contains time stamped transaction records with 
available price information. The square root of time between trades	ܧሺ√ݐሻ, in minutes, is 
calculated as the expected value of the square root of the average time between trades 
each day per target firm.  
The four measures of spread are computed as follows:   
An equal-weighted and volume-weighted quoted spread (EWQS and VWQS):   
ܳݑ݋ݐ݁݀	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௞ ൌ 	ܣݏ݇	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௞ െ	ܤ݅݀	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௞                          (3.4.1) 
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Table 3.1 Private Equity Bid and Tender/Merger Offer distribution between 1 
January 1994 and 31 December 2013 
 
This table presents the distribution of private equity bid and tender/merger offers between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 2013.  
 
Year  
Private 
Equity Bid  
Tender/Merger 
Offer 
Private Equity 
Bid Proportion 
1994 3 76 0.0395 
1995 4 93 0.0430 
1996 6 85 0.0706 
1997 11 110 0.1000 
1998 13 110 0.1182 
1999 26 145 0.1793 
2000 19 120 0.1583 
2001 3 79 0.0380 
2002 7 57 0.1228 
2003 18 48 0.3750 
2004 11 23 0.4783 
2005 24 46 0.5217 
2006 30 46 0.6522 
2007 32 65 0.4923 
2008 16 64 0.2500 
2009 17 62 0.2742 
2010 20 53 0.3774 
2011 24 46 0.5217 
2012 16 49 0.3265 
2013 21 30 0.7000 
Total  321 1407 0.2281 
 
 
where k represents the k-th transaction of a particular stock during the trading day. The 
quoted spread is the arithmetic average of the prevailing quoted spreads at the time of 
each transaction k.    
An equal-weighted and volume-weighted effective spread (EWES and VWES):  
ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ݅ݒ݁	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௞ ൌ 2|ܶݎܽ݀݁	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௞ െ	ܯ݅݀ݍݑ݋ݐ݁௞|                   (3.4.2) 
where k represents the k-th transaction of a particular stock. The effective spread is the 
average of the effective spreads of the trades occurring throughout the day, incurred twice 
on a round-trip basis. Assuming that the trade is only costly to the investor if the trade 
price deviates from the true price estimated by the bid-ask price midpoint:  
ܯ݅݀ݍݑ݋ݐ݁௞ ൌ ሺ஻௜ௗ	௣௥௜௖௘ೖ	ା	஺௦௞	௣௥௜௖௘ೖሻଶ                                      (3.4.3) 
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(iii) The returns are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
daily return file on WRDS, in addition to the bid and ask prices quoted by the market 
makers, trading volume and shares outstanding. The expected rate of return volatility for 
each stock () is computed using the daily returns over the 60 trading days prior to the 
sample month. (iv) Variables used in the estimation of the probit specification for self-
selection correction, expressed as the inverse Mills’ ratio (), are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP.   
 
Prior studies (Sidhu et al., 2008) remove any firm with insufficient data to form 5 pre-FD 
firm-months and 5 post-FD firm-month observations; however, this is not appropriate 
here due to the nature of private equity deals (fast privatisation) being resultant in less 
post-announcement firm-months. We therefore include all firm-months including private 
equity bid target firms with less than 5 post firm-months. Based on these filters the initial 
sample includes 13,706 firm-month observations from 1,728 firms across 321 private 
equity bid (2,740 firm-month observations) and 1,407 tender/merger offer target firms 
(10,966 firm-month observations).  
 
3.5  Results  
A significant decrease in the probability of informed trading is found, measured as 
adverse selection costs, in the post-announcement period for private equity bid targets to 
tender/merger offer targets. This is interpreted as good news for ‘mum and pop investors’ 
who are less likely to suffer losses due to information asymmetry. The effect of a takeover 
announcement on the cost of adverse selection is analysed herein. Firstly, the data is 
presented by private equity bid targets and tender/merger offer targets with descriptive 
statistics on the inventory-holding premium (IHP) and its components presented (Table 
3.2, Panel A and Panel B). Second, a linear model is estimated by regressing the bid-ask 
spread per spread measure on each of the IHP cost components to enable the isolation of 
the probability of informed trade. The probability of informed versus uninformed trades 
across stocks is estimated by scaling each individual stock’s average square root of time 
between trades by a constant factor. This time between trades is then used in the 
estimation of IHP to isolate the adverse selection cost and associated probability of 
informed trade.    
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3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.2 contains the summary statistics of the bid-ask spread and its determinants. The 
top panel, Panel A, reports the descriptive statistics for private equity bid target firm 
observations (N = 2,740 stock-month observations). The bottom panel, Panel B, reports 
the descriptive statistics for tender/merger offer firm observations (N = 10,966 stock-
month observations).  As expected, there appears to be variation across private equity 
versus tender/merger target firm observations. Tender/merger offer trading volume 
(487,229) exhibits a slightly greater spread than the average trading volume for private 
equity bids (436,470). Tender/merger offer target firms exhibit marginally higher spreads 
(in cents) relative to private equity bid target firms between 0.026 (VWES) and 0.052 
(EWQS), respectively. As expected, a large number of trades occur at prices between the 
bid-ask quotes, so the effective spread is lower for both equal-weighted and volume-
weighted spreads. The spread measures are relative to average stock price, which show 
less variation between private equity target firm price (17.006). The average share price 
is $16.06 for private equity firms and $17.61 for tender/merger firms. Both takeover types 
exhibit similar stock volatility at 2.096 and 2.505. IHP ranges in magnitude between 8.780 
for private equity bid target firms and 12.379 for tender/merger offer target firms.  
 
Table 3.3 contains the summary of cross-correlations for variables of interest from which 
the following conclusions can be drawn. Panel A and Panel B present the private equity 
bid and tender/merger offer target firm cross-correlations, respectively. The correlation 
between the four spread measures, EWQS and EWES, VWQS and VWES, ranges 
between 0.9733 and 0.9901 for private equity bid target firms and 0.9593 and 0.9896 for 
tender/merger offer target firms, respectively. Thus, models explaining the variation in 
EWQS also explain the variation in the other spread models, with private equity 
exhibiting lower variation. The correlations between the spread measures and the inverse 
of trading volume, InvTV, are stronger than those between the spread measures and 
trading volume, TV. As expected, the inverse of trading volume (InvTV) is highly 
correlated negatively with the number of trades (NT) and positively with the square root 
of the time between trades in minutes E(t) for both takeover types.  
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics by Takeover Type (Private Equity Bid or Tender/Merger Offer) 
 
This table presents the summary descriptive statistics of variables for private equity bid targets (Panel A) and tender/merger offer targets (Panel B). EWQS is the equal-weighted quoted 
bid-ask spread; EWES is the equal-weighted effective bid-ask spread; VWQS is the volume-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; VWES is the volume-weighted effective bid-ask spread; 
S is the average stock price in each interval; InvS is the inverse of the average stock price in each interval; TV is the number of shares traded in each interval; InvTV is the inverse of 
the number of shares traded in each interval; NT is the number of transactions in each interval; ܧ൫√ݐ൯ is the expected value of the square root of time between transactions, proxied 
for by √ݐതതത, the average of the square root of the number of minutes between trades; σ is the expected volatility rate proxied for by the return volatility of the stock computed over the 
most recent 60 trading days prior to the estimation month;  λ is the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR); and IHP is the expected inventory-holding premium defined by                   
ܫܪܲ ൌ ܵ ቂ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪܧ൫√ݐ൯ቁ െ 1ቃ. 
Each variable in the sample is an average of the daily values of the variable across the days in the month. The sample period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2013. 
 
 
  
Panel A: Private Equity Bids  
 
Variable n Mean StDev Min Max Q1 Median  Q3 Q3-Q1 
Spread Measures          
EWQS 2,740 0.099 0.156 0.003 2.678 0.017 0.038 0.132 0.115 
EWES 2,740 0.089 0.495 0.004 24.246 0.015 0.033 0.103 0.088 
VWQS 2,740 0.095 0.141 0.003 2.808 0.019 0.042 0.128 0.108 
VWES 2,740 0.082 0.320 0.002 15.958 0.019 0.039 0.102 0.084 
          
Determinants of Spread         
S 2,740 16.060 17.006 0.053 172.338 5.352 11.699 20.408 15.056 
InvS 2,740 0.229 0.619 0.006 18.817 0.049 0.086 0.187 0.138 
TV 2,740 436470.85 1774674.78 128.57 43109864 18440.48 85382.13 322431.85 303991.37 
InvTV 2,740 0 0 0 0.008 0 0 0 0 
NT 2,740 1245.15 4154.38 1.29 101733.80 22.23 151.38 914.38 892.15 
E(√t) 2,740 2.656 2.287 0.071 12.557 0.691 1.819 4.339 3.648 
σ 2,740 2.096 5.172 0.011 116.328 0.460 1.006 2.116 1.656 
IHP 2,740 8.780 13.068 0.006 172.338 1.692 5.023 11.047 9.355 
λ 2,740 1.394 0.194 0.037 2.384 1.304 1.373 1.449 0.146 
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Panel B: Tender/Merger Offers 
 
Variable n Mean StDev Min Max Q1 Median  Q3 Q3-Q1 
Spread Measures          
EWQS 10,966 0.151 0.224 0.001 6.059 0.028 0.106 0.189 0.162 
EWES 10,966 0.116 0.183 0.001 7.406 0.024 0.083 0.136 0.112 
VWQS 10,966 0.137 0.189 0.001 5.613 0.031 0.101 0.177 0.146 
VWES 10,966 0.108 0.155 0.002 6.149 0.029 0.084 0.133 0.104 
          
Determinants of Spread         
S 10,966 17.611 18.819 0.101 339.456 5.231 12.175 23.822 18.591 
InvS 10,966 0.203 0.448 0.003 9.871 0.042 0.082 0.191 0.149 
TV 10,966 487229.57 2426580.16 207.14 97451348 16921.43 70970.47 303913.60 286992.17 
InvTV 10,966 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 
NT 10,966 1287.26 5071.51 1.30 107187.10 16.00 68.13 512.10 496.10 
E(√t) 10,966 3.137 2.397 0.062 12.223 0.938 2.663 4.965 4.027 
σ 10,966 2.505 4.471 0 139.193 0.607 1.256 2.709 2.102 
IHP 10,966 12.379 17.030 0 339.456 2.349 6.960 15.998 13.649 
λ 10,966 1.492 0.287 0.687 5.452 1.349 1.423 1.531 0.182 
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Table 3.3 Summary of Pairwise Cross-Correlations among Regression Variables for Takeovers  
 
This table presents the cross-correlations between variables for private equity bid targets (Panel A) and tender/merger offer targets (Panel B). EWQS is the equal-weighted quoted bid-
ask spread; EWES is the equal-weighted effective bid-ask spread; VWQS is the volume-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; VWES is the volume-weighted effective bid-ask spread; S is 
the average stock price in each interval, measured as the closing bid-ask price midpoint; InvS is the inverse of the average stock price in each interval; TV is the number of shares 
traded in each interval; InvTV is the inverse of the number of shares traded in each interval; NT is the number of transactions in each interval; ܧ൫√ݐ൯ is the expected value of the square 
root of time between transactions, proxied for by √ݐതതത, the average of the square root of the number of minutes between trades; σ is the expected volatility rate proxied for by the return 
volatility of the stock computed over the most recent 60 trading days prior to the estimation month;  λ is the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR); and IHP is the expected inventory-holding 
premium defined by  
ܫܪܲ ൌ ܵ ቂ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪܧ൫√ݐ൯ቁ െ 1ቃ. 
 
Each variable in the sample is computed as an average of the daily values of the variable across each trading day during the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement 
and the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement. The sample period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2013. 
   
                            
PANEL A: Private Equity Bid Cross-Correlation           
(No. of observations = 2,740 firm-month observations across 321 firms)  
        
Variables EWQS EWES VWQS VWES S InvS TV InvTV NT E(√t) Σ IHP λ 
EWQS 1             
EWES 0.9901 1            
VWQS 0.9864 0.9737 1           
VWES 0.9733 0.9848 0.9680 1          
S 0.0299 0.0222 0.0675 0.0696 1         
InvS -0.0299 -0.0222 -0.0675 -0.0696 -1 1        
TV -0.7301 -0.7260 -0.6977 -0.6886 0.3405 -0.3405 1       
InvTV 0.7301 0.7260 0.6977 0.6886 -0.3405 0.3405 -1 1      
NT -0.7544 -0.7420 -0.7168 -0.6924 0.3986 -0.3986 0.9185 -0.9185 1     
E(√t) 0.7487 0.7366 0.7099 0.6866 -0.4022 0.4022 -0.9068 0.9068 -0.9880 1    
σ 0.4363 0.4357 0.4509 0.4508 0.4581 -0.4581 -0.2066 0.2066 -0.1962 0.1782 1   
IHP 0.5236 0.5089 0.5415 0.5294 0.7335 -0.7335 -0.1827 0.1827 -0.1765 0.1729 0.7708 1  
λ 0.0876 0.0970 0.0879 0.0840 -0.1366 0.1366 -0.0861 0.0861 -0.1179 0.1186 0.0256 -0.0582 1 
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PANEL B: Tender/Merger Offer Cross-Correlation          
(No. of observations = 10,966 firm-month observations across 1,407 firms)  
        
Variables EWQS EWES VWQS VWES S InvS TV InvTV NT E(√t) Σ IHP λ 
EWQS 1             
EWES 0.9809 1            
VWQS 0.9896 0.9698 1           
VWES 0.9593 0.9777 0.9671 1          
S 0.1382 0.1301 0.1778 0.1859 1         
InvS -0.1382 -0.1301 -0.1778 -0.1859 -1.0000 1        
TV -0.6011 -0.5858 -0.5732 -0.5421 0.3344 -0.3344 1       
InvTV 0.6011 0.5858 0.5732 0.5421 -0.3344 0.3344 -1 1      
NT -0.7011 -0.6778 -0.6667 -0.6228 0.3203 -0.3203 0.9144 -0.9144 1     
E(√t) 0.6901 0.6673 0.6531 0.6090 -0.3194 0.3194 -0.8951 0.8951 -0.9804 1    
σ 0.3939 0.4020 0.4082 0.4182 0.5107 -0.5107 -0.1290 0.1290 -0.1684 0.1392 1   
IHP 0.5212 0.5063 0.5448 0.5405 0.8205 -0.8205 -0.0672 0.0672 -0.1334 0.1333 0.7021 1  
λ -0.0994 -0.0725 -0.1132 -0.0879 -0.2443 0.2443 0.0913 -0.0913 0.0791 -0.0785 -0.1046 -0.2326 1 
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IHP is highly positively correlated to stock price, which is consistent with Bollen et al. 
(2004). There is a positive correlation between IHP and E(t), and IHP is negatively 
correlated with trade volume (TV) for private equity bid target firms and tender/merger 
offer target firms. Lastly, the spread measures are positively correlated with the 
inventory-holding premium variable IHP. Private equity bid target firms four spread 
measures correlations with IHP are on par with the tender/merger offer target firm’s 
correlations. The inverse Mills ratio is oppositely correlated to all variables for private 
equity targets comparative to tender/merger targets, with the exception of the average 
stock price (S) in each interval (including the inverse invS) and the inventory-holding 
premium (IHP).          
 
3.5.2  Regression Results  
The Bollen et al. (2004) regression model is used to measure the adverse selection cost 
component of the bid-ask spread.   
 
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2IHPk + k                                                     (3.5.2.1) 
 
where SPRDk is the bid-ask spread for stock k, InvTVk is the inverse of trading volume 
for stock k, and IHPk is the inventory holding premium (inventory holding costs and 
adverse selection costs) for stock k. The model expressed in Equation 3.5.2.1 includes 
proxies for order-processing costs, inventory-holding risk, and adverse selection. In this 
model, 0 is the minimum tick size; 1InvTVk is order-processing cost; and 2IHPk is the 
sum of the inventory holding and informational asymmetry components of the spread.  
 
Table 3.4 reports the coefficient estimation and t-ratios, presented below the parameter 
estimates, for the above model. Panel A contains the estimation using the four spread 
measures as the dependant variable for private equity bid target firms. Panel B contains 
the estimation using the four spread measures as the dependant variable for tender/merger 
offer target firms. Within each panel, the model is estimated separately for pre- and post-
announcement periods. The estimation results show that IHP is an important explanatory 
variable. The coefficient on IHP is positive and significant across all pre- and post-
announcement spread measures per takeover type, as predicted by past literature 
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including Bollen et al. (2004), with the exception of the equal-weighted and volume-
weighted effective spreads post-bid for private equity targets. These results fail to 
consider the magnitude of informed and uninformed trades, suggesting increased 
probability of informed trade particularly in the pre-announcement period.  
 
All coefficients are positive and insignificant for private equity target effective spreads 
post-bid. The coefficient on InvTV is also positive and significant across all 
specifications, except private equity target firm post-bid effective spreads. The inverse of 
trading volume magnitude is smaller in the pre-bid period for private equity bid target 
firms, with the exception of the EWES measure, compared to the post-offer period for 
tender/merger offer target firms, indicating a potential increase and decrease in the fixed 
cost per share, respectively. The estimate of the intercept term coefficient 0, minimum 
tick size, shows a reduction in revenue per share for the market marker dealing with an 
active stock between the pre- and post- periods for both takeover types. The Adjusted R-
Squared ranges between 0.0019 post-bid (EWES) and 0.3921 pre-bid (VWQS) for private 
equity target firms, and 0.1710 pre-offer (EWES) and 0.2672 pre-offer (VWQS) for 
tender/merger target firms. 
 
To isolate the effect of informed trading on the bid-ask spread, this study focuses on the 
components of the inventory-holding premium and considers the scenario where the 
informed trader IHPI changes in one direction and the uninformed trader IHPU changes 
in the other. This is tested in the model:  
 
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2 IHPU,k (k) +3[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + k.              
(3.5.2.2) 
 
Table 3.5 reports the coefficient estimation results and t-ratios below. The results provide 
preliminary evidence on the probability of informed trade surrounding the announcement 
period. Once informed and uninformed trade is isolated, the probability of informed trade 
(PI) is negative for private equity targets and positive for tender/merger offer targets. PI 
is determined by the coefficient 3. Panel A results pertaining to private equity target firms 
show insignificant and negative coefficients on the adverse selection cost component (3), 
with the exception of post-EWES, pre-VWQS, and post-VWES, which show positive 
coefficients, suggesting the probability of informed trade is not reflected in the SPRD for 
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private equity trades. This estimate of the probability of an informed trade (3) is 
insignificant and negative with a value less than 1%. These results suggest that as private 
equity bids are friendly transactions with greater information shared ex-ante, identical 
information is shared amongst multiple informed traders and incorporated immediately 
into the share price resultant in no insider trading profits.  
 
 
Conversely, Panel B results show the coefficients (3) across all pre- and post-
announcement SPRD for tender/merger target firms are significantly positive and have a 
value less than 2% with the exception of pre-offer EWES, which is insignificant. This 
result suggests increased probability of informed trade and adverse selection costs for 
tender/merger trades. One explanation is that there is less information sharing 
surrounding tender/merger offers resultant in the only likely trader being the CEO. Less 
information sharing therefore increases the probability of informed trade and informed 
profits. The inverse of trading volume magnitude is smaller for both private equity and 
tender/merger target firms in the pre-announcement period, indicating an increase in the 
fixed cost per share component in the post-announcement period. Results show positive 
and insignificant coefficient estimates for all variables in the private equity post-bid 
EWES and post-bid VWES estimations, with low Adjusted R-Squared values at 0.0009 
and 0.0010, respectively.      
 
Next the probability of informed trade is estimated incorporating a dummy variable (D) 
to isolate the effect of adverse selection between private equity bid and tender/merger 
offer target firms.   
 
 SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2 IHPU,k (k) +3[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)]  
+ 4InvTVk (D) + 5 IHPU,k (k) (D) + 6[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D) + k       (3.5.2.3) 
 
 
D is a dummy variable set to 1 for the private equity bid target firms and 0 for the 
tender/merger offer target firms. The results presented in Table 3.6 show a significant and 
negative coefficient (4) for private equity bid target firms relative to tender/merger offer 
target firms in both the pre- and post-announcement period, suggesting private equity 
transactions exhibit increased confidence resultant in a smaller bid-ask spread.
	
	
	
74	
Table 3.4 Regression Results Pre and Post-Announcement by Bid-Ask Spread Measure  
 
This table presents the summary of regression results of private equity (Panel A) and tender/merger offer (Panel B) takeovers pre and post-announcement and by bid-ask spread 
measure.  
EWQSk is the equal-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; EWESk is the equal-weighted effective bid-ask spread; VWQSk is the volume-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; VWESk is the 
volume-weighted effective bid-ask spread; Sk is the average stock price in each interval, measured as the closing bid-ask price midpoint; InvSk is the inverse of the average stock price 
in each interval; TVk is the number of shares traded in each interval; InvTVk is the inverse of the number of shares traded in each interval; NTk is the number of transactions in each 
interval; ܧ൫√ݐ௞൯ is the expected value of the square root of time between transactions, proxied for by ඥݐ௞തതതതത, the average of the square root of the number of minutes between trades; σk 
is the expected volatility rate proxied for by the return volatility of the stock computed over the most recent 60 trading days prior to the estimation month; and IHPk is the expected 
inventory-holding premium defined by  
 
ܫܪ ௞ܲ ൌ ܵ௞ ቂ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪ௞ܧ൫ඥݐ௞൯ቁ െ 1ቃ. 
 
Each variable in the sample is computed as an average of the daily values of the variable across each trading day during the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement 
and the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement. The sample period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2013. The regression model is  
 
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2IHPk + k 
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    Coefficent Estimates/ t-Ratios       Coefficent Estimates/ t-Ratios  
Announcement 
Period  SPRDk 
No. of. 
Obs.  
Adjusted     
R-Squared  a0 / t (a0) a1 / t (a1) a2 / t (a2)   
Announcement 
Period  SPRDk  
No. of. 
Obs.  
Adjusted    
R-
Squared  a0 / t (a0) a1 / t (a1) 
a2 / t 
(a2) 
Panel A: Private Equity Bids        Panel B: Tender/Merger Offers    
Pre-Bid  EWQS 1,569 0.3251 0.0469 205.8691 0.0077  Pre-Offer  EWQS 6,791 0.2266 0.0820 478.3426 0.0052 
    9.86 12.62 22.11      25.16 31.21 30.36 
Post-Bid  EWQS 1,171 0.2555 0.0394 271.2037 0.0016  Post-Offer EWQS 4,175 0.2182 0.0544 424.8491 0.0024 
    13.68 14.05 9.67      15.37 29.19 18.04 
Pre-Bid  EWES 1,569 0.0816 0.0551 141.1345 0.0046  Pre-Offer  EWES 6,791 0.1710 0.0666 355.8081 0.0036 
    8.09 6.05 9.13      23.88 27.14 24.49 
Post-Bid  EWES 1,171 0.0019 0.0449 137.1442 0.0022  Post-Offer EWES 4,175 0.2036 0.0446 339.4458 0.0017 
    1.77 0.81 1.56      15.54 28.78 15.79 
Pre-Bid  VWQS 1,569 0.3921 0.0413 194.0309 0.0079  Pre-Offer  VWQS 6,791 0.2672 0.0732 413.6386 0.0049 
    10.09 13.81 26.09      27.68 33.27 35.40 
Post-Bid  VWQS 1,171 0.2927 0.0370 243.0824 0.0017  Post-Offer VWQS 4,175 0.2375 0.0489 373.5312 0.0024 
    14.80 14.52 11.67      16.14 30.02 20.30 
Pre-Bid  VWES 1,569 0.3078 0.0468 133.1857 0.0048  Pre-Offer  VWES 6,791 0.2134 0.0618 309.2144 0.0035 
    14.98 12.44 21.04      27.74 29.54 29.73 
Post-Bid  VWES 1,171 0.0047 0.0409 144.0333 0.0018  Post-Offer VWES 4,175 0.2131 0.0411 306.9513 0.0018 
     2.45 1.29 1.93           15.79 28.68 17.87 
 
	
	
	
76
Table 3.5 Regression Results Pre and Post-Announcement by Bid-Ask Spread 
Measure  
 
This table presents the summary of cross-sectional regression results of absolute effective bid-ask spreads 
for private equity (Panel A) and tender/merger offer (Panel B) takeovers partitioned on pre and post-
announcement date, and by bid-ask spread measure. 
EWQSk is the equal-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; EWESk is the equal-weighted effective bid-ask 
spread; VWQSk is the volume-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; VWESk is the volume-weighted effective 
bid-ask spread; Sk is the average stock price in each interval, measured as the closing bid-ask price 
midpoint; InvSk is the inverse of the average stock price in each interval; TVk is the number of shares traded 
in each interval; InvTVk is the inverse of the number of shares traded in each interval; NTk is the number 
of transactions in each interval; ܧ൫√ݐ௞൯  is the expected value of the square root of time between 
transactions, proxied for by ඥݐ௞തതതതത, the average of the square root of the number of minutes between trades; 
σk is the expected volatility rate proxied for by the return volatility of the stock computed over the most 
recent 60 trading days prior to the estimation month;  and IHPk is the expected inventory-holding premium 
defined by  
ܫܪ ௞ܲ ൌ ܵ௞ ቂ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪ௞ܧ൫ඥݐ௞൯ቁ െ 1ቃ. 
 
Each variable in the sample is computed as an average of the daily values of the variable across each trading 
day during the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement and the five-month period 
preceding the takeover announcement. The sample period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2013. 
The regression model is  
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2 IHPU,k (k) +3[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + k               
 
 
where IHPU,k is the expected inventory-holding premium for trades with uninformed traders and IHPI,k  is 
the expected inventory-holding premium for trades with informed traders. The value of the expected 
inventory-holding premium for uninformed and informed traders are calculated as follows with IHPU,k 
valued as an out-of-the-money call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price and a stock price 
equal to the bid-ask midpoint, and IHPI,k  valued as a 6% in-the-money (ITM) call option with an exercise 
price equal to the ask price respectively.  
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    Coefficent Estimates/ t-Ratios       Coefficent Estimates/ t-Ratios  
 
Announcement 
Period  SPRDk 
No. of. 
Obs.  
Adjusted     
R-Squared  a0 / t (a0) a1 / t (a1) a2 / t (a2) a3 / t (a3)   
Announcement 
Period  SPRDk  
No. of. 
Obs.  
Adjusted     
R-Squared  a0 / t (a0) a1 / t (a1) a2 / t (a2) a3 / t (a3) 
Panel A: Private Equity Bids               Panel B: Tender/Merger Offers           
Pre-Bid  EWQS 1,569 0.2578 0.1030 194.7170 0.0392 -0.0033  Pre-Offer  EWQS 6,791 0.2606 0.1206 302.8376 0.0819 0.0155 
    16.90 11.16 16.63 -0.62      31.16 18.18 31.12 5.04 
Post-Bid  EWQS 1,171 0.2385 0.0622 238.7305 0.0047 -0.0074  Post-Offer EWQS 4,175 0.2362 0.0705 383.8013 0.0303 0.0135 
    16.64 11.10 8.07 -2.79      16.90 25.70 17.10 4.94 
Pre-Bid  EWES 1,569 0.0627 0.0933 134.8212 0.0305 -0.0078  Pre-Offer  EWES 6,791 0.2113 0.0966 216.8663 0.0668 0.0070 
    11.14 5.61 7.05 -1.09      29.28 15.26 28.09 2.67 
Post-Bid  EWES 1,171 0.0009 0.0604 185.4616 0.0081 0.0040  Post-Offer EWES 4,175 0.2163 0.0559 311.0468 0.0216 0.0097 
    1.87 1.00 0.32 0.19      16.48 25.62 14.71 4.38 
Pre-Bid  VWQS 1,569 0.3110 0.0937 184.1887 0.0381 0.0023  Pre-Offer  VWQS 6,791 0.3121 0.1066 252.0949 0.0724 0.0181 
    17.57 12.07 19.08 0.48      34.20 18.81 35.95 7.28 
Post-Bid  VWQS 1,171 0.2679 0.0579 211.6463 0.0046 -0.0048  Post-Offer VWQS 4,175 0.2546 0.0612 339.4190 0.0261 0.0161 
    17.73 11.28 9.30 -2.05      17.15 26.58 17.82 6.84 
Pre-Bid  VWES 1,569 0.2387 0.0819 127.0165 0.0214 -0.0021  Pre-Offer  VWES 6,791 0.2684 0.0877 179.8675 0.0580 0.0102 
    20.44 11.08 15.39 -0.60      33.61 16.02 33.49 4.89 
Post-Bid  VWES 1,171 0.0010 0.0539 174.6823 0.0067 0.0032  Post-Offer VWES 4,175 0.2291 0.0497 281.5824 0.0205 0.0128 
        2.53 1.43 0.54 0.22           16.16 25.61 15.78 6.37 
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Probability of informed trade after controlling for takeover type (6) indicates lower 
informed trade for private equity targets relative to tender/merger targets with a slightly 
higher difference in the pre-announcement period. That is, an increase in the 6 
coefficient reduces the bid-ask spread. Remaining coefficient estimations are consistent 
with prior models herein.     
 
3.5.3  Robustness  
To test whether asymmetric information is encompassed into trades surrounding takeover 
announcements thereby increasing the probability of informed trade, a dummy variable 
assuming a value of 0 in the pre-announcement period and 1 in the post-announcement 
period is added to the model specification. It is predicted that the coefficient on terms 
incorporating the dummy (D2) will be negative as the event, announcement date, triggers 
a reduction in the adverse selection component of the spread. Hence, the empirical model 
becomes:  
 
 SPRDk = 0 + 1IHPU,k (k) +2[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)]  
                                    + 3(D1) +4[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D1)  
                                    + 5(D2) + 6[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D1)(D2) + k          (3.5.3.1) 
 
where D1 is set to 0 for tender/merger offers and 1 for private equity bids.  
 
Table 3.7 presents the results for the above specification. These results show a 
significantly positive coefficient (1) for uninformed trades across all spread measures, 
and a positive and significant probability of informed trade (4) across spread measures 
EWQS, VWQS and VWES. Once controlling for takeover type, only EWQS and VWES 
are significant, with negative coefficients showing less informed trade for private equity 
targets relative to tender/merger targets. The coefficient on the announcement period 
dummy (5) indicates that the spread is reduced in the post-announcement period. This is 
interpreted as being due to increased transparency between the trader and market maker’s 
information base. After controlling for announcement period, private equity bid targets 
relative to tender/merger offer targets have negative and significant probability of 
informed trade (6) on quoted-spread measures meaning private equity targets exhibit 
less informed trade in the post-announcement period. 
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Table 3.6 Regression Results Pre and Post-Announcement by Bid-Ask Spread 
Measure  
 
This table presents the summary of cross-sectional regression results of absolute effective bid-ask spreads 
partitioned on pre and post-announcement date, and by bid-ask spread measure. EWQSk is the equal-weighted 
quoted bid-ask spread; EWESk is the equal-weighted effective bid-ask spread; VWQSk is the volume-weighted 
quoted bid-ask spread; VWESk is the volume-weighted effective bid-ask spread; Sk is the average stock price in 
each interval, measured as the closing bid-ask price midpoint; InvSk is the inverse of the average stock price in 
each interval; TVk is the number of shares traded in each interval; InvTVk is the inverse of the number of shares 
traded in each interval; NTk is the number of transactions in each interval; ܧ൫√ݐ௞൯ is the expected value of the 
square root of time between transactions, proxied for by ඥݐ௞തതതതത, the average of the square root of the number of 
minutes between trades; σk is the expected volatility rate proxied for by the annalised return volatility of the stock 
computed over the most recent 60 trading days prior to the estimation month; D is a dummy variable set to 1 for 
private equity bid target firms and 0 for tender/merger offer target firms; and IHPk is the expected inventory-
holding premium defined by  ܫܪ ௞ܲ ൌ ܵ௞ ቂ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪ௞ܧ൫ඥݐ௞൯ቁ െ 1ቃ. 
Each variable in the sample is computed as an average of the daily values of the variable across each trading day 
during the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement and the five-month period preceding the 
takeover announcement. The sample period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2013. The regression model 
is  
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2 IHPU,k (k) +3[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + 4InvTVk (D) + 5 IHPU,k (k) (D) + 6[IHPI,k (k) – 
IHPU,k (k)](D) + k 
where IHPU,k is the expected inventory-holding premium for trades with uninformed traders and IHPI,k  is the 
expected inventory-holding premium for trades with informed traders. The value of the expected inventory-
holding premium for uninformed and informed traders are calculated as follows with IHPU,k valued as an out-of-
the-money call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price and a stock price equal to the bid-ask midpoint, 
and IHPI,k  valued as a 6% in-the-money (ITM) call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price 
respectively.  
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        Coefficent Estimates/ t-Ratios  
Announcement 
Period  SPRDk 
No. of. 
Obs.  
Adjusted     
R-Squared  a0 / t (a0) a1 / t (a1) a2 / t (a2) a3 / t (a3) a4 / t (a4) a5/ t (a5) a6 / t (a6) 
           
Pre EWQS 8,360 0.2646 0.1171 308.9243 0.0813 0.0175 -125.2216 -0.0410 -0.0297 
    35.09 19.56 32.27 6.24 -4.91 -10.92 -5.95 
Post EWQS 5,346 0.2476 0.0687 386.2556 0.0302 0.0144 -161.7848 -0.0251 -0.0251 
    20.47 28.80 18.74 6.15 -4.05 -13.26 -6.50 
Pre EWES 8,360 0.1784 0.0960 218.0112 0.0666 0.0073 -85.2482 -0.0358 -0.0168 
    30.81 14.78 26.75 2.82 -3.58 -8.35 -3.66 
Post EWES 5,346 0.0330 0.0569 309.7153 0.0217 0.0092 -116.8797 -0.0145 -0.0036 
    7.46 10.15 5.81 1.74 -1.29 -1.14 -0.43 
Pre VWQS 8,360 0.3154 0.1040 256.5408 0.0720 0.0196 -80.3906 -0.0331 -0.0239 
    38.28 19.97 36.93 8.54 -3.87 -11.29 -5.86 
Post VWQS 5,346 0.2663 0.0605 340.4107 0.0261 0.0164 -134.5284 -0.0213 -0.0225 
    21.04 29.65 19.56 8.16 -3.93 -13.65 -6.79 
Pre VWES 8,360 0.2679 0.0866 181.8707 0.0578 0.0108 -58.4871 -0.0360 -0.0159 
    38.58 17.15 34.99 5.73 -3.41 -15.30 -4.71 
Post VWES 5,346 0.0604 0.0506 280.3194 0.0206 0.0124 -98.5903 -0.0145 -0.0077 
        9.57 13.25 8.14 3.35 -1.57 -2.16 -1.32 
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Table 3.7 Regression Results by Bid-Ask Spread Measure  
 
This table presents the summary of cross-sectional regression results of absolute effective bid-ask spreads 
partitioned by bid-ask spread measure. EWQSk is the equal-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; EWESk is the equal-
weighted effective bid-ask spread; VWQSk is the volume-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; VWESk is the volume-
weighted effective bid-ask spread; Sk is the average stock price in each interval, measured as the closing bid-ask 
price midpoint; InvSk is the inverse of the average stock price in each interval; TVk is the number of shares traded 
in each interval; InvTVk is the inverse of the number of shares traded in each interval; NTk is the number of 
transactions in each interval; ܧ൫√ݐ௞൯ is the expected value of the square root of time between transactions, 
proxied for by ඥݐ௞തതതതത, the average of the square root of the number of minutes between trades; σk is the expected 
volatility rate proxied for by the annalised return volatility of the stock computed over the most recent 60 trading 
days prior to the estimation month; D1 is a dummy variable set to 1 for private equity bid target firms and 0 for 
tender/merger offer target firms; D2 is a dummy variable set to 0 for the pre-announcement period and 1 for the 
post-announcement period; and IHPk is the expected inventory-holding premium defined by 
ܫܪ ௞ܲ ൌ ܵ௞ ቂ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪ௞ܧ൫ඥݐ௞൯ቁ െ 1ቃ. 
Each variable in the sample is computed as an average of the daily values of the variable across each trading day 
during the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement and the five-month period preceding the 
takeover announcement. The sample period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2013. The regression model 
is  
SPRDk = 0 +1IHPU,k (k) +2[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + 3(D1) +4[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D1) + 5(D2) +6[IHPI,k (k) – 
IHPU,k (k)](D1)(D2) + k 
where IHPU,k is the expected inventory-holding premium for trades with uninformed traders and IHPI,k  is the 
expected inventory-holding premium for trades with informed traders. The value of the expected inventory-
holding premium for uninformed and informed traders are calculated as follows with IHPU,k valued as an out-of-
the-money call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price and a stock price equal to the bid-ask midpoint, 
and IHPI,k  valued as a 6% in-the-money (ITM) call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price 
respectively.  
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      Coefficent Estimates/ t-Ratios  
SPRDk  
No. of. 
Obs.  
Adjusted     
R-Squared  a0 / t (a0) a1 / t (a1) a2 / t (a2) a3 / t (a3) a4 / t (a4) a5/ t (a5) a6 / t (a6) 
          
EWQS 13,706 0.1202 0.1465 0.0326 0.0164 -0.0073 -0.0317 -0.0481 -0.0372 
   49.18 35.92 7.95 -1.19 -5.26 -12.94 -5.79 
EWES 13,706 0.0517 0.1200 0.0478 0.0003 -0.0073 -0.0207 -0.0385 0.0149 
   29.86 25.10 0.10 -0.89 -2.59 -7.69 1.78 
VWQS 13,706 0.2090 0.1325 0.0526 0.0082 -0.0197 0.0018 -0.0410 -0.0419 
   55.56 52.68 4.80 -3.99 0.44 -14.35 -33.83 
VWES 13,706 0.0896 0.1066 0.0392 0.0061 -0.0032 -0.0265 -0.0345 0.0123 
      37.44 32.96 3.02 -0.54 -4.58 -9.71 2.04 
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To further investigate the robustness of these conclusions, firstly, the inverse Mills ratio3 
(IMR,) is included as an additional regressor estimate of the omitted variables 
(Heckman, 1979) with the expectation it will result in a reduction in the probability of 
informed trade level (albeit still significant). Results are reported in Table 3.8. 
   
SPRDk = 0 +1IHPU,k (k) +2[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)]  
                   + 3(D1) +4[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D1)  
                   + 5(D2) +6[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D1)(D2) + 7  + k 
                (3.5.3.2) 
The results presented in Table 3.8 show the probability of informed trade is higher for 
uninformed trades for EWES comparative to the remaining spread measures. After 
inclusion of the IMR, results remain robust to previous specifications. Inclusion of factors 
that contribute to asymmetric information in the IMR is negative and significant to the 
bid-ask spread. Secondly, a difference-in-difference specification is considered to reduce 
the bias from potential differences in time trends (Katselas et al., 2017). This specification 
increases the precision of estimates both between pre and post-acquisition trends and 
differences between private equity bid and tender/merger offer target firms. The results 
are presented in Table 3.9.  
 
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2IHPU,k (k) +3[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + 4(D1) + 
5(D2) + 
 6InvTVk (D1) +7 IHPU,k (k)(D1) +8[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D1) + 
 9InvTVk (D2) + 10 IHPU,k (k)(D2) +11[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D2) + 
 12InvTVk (D1)(D2) +13IHPU,k (k) (D1)(D2) + 
 14[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] (D1)(D2) + k    
                      (3.5.3.3) 
 
 
	
	
																																																								
3	The inverse Mills ratio is generated based on the following model formulated on well-known 
proxies that influence the market makers’ probability assessment that a counter trader is transacting 
on price sensitive asymmetric information, by dividing the probability density function of private 
equity target firms by its cumulative density function:  
PRIV(Y=1|x) = Probit (0 + 1D/E + 2VOL + 3FCF+ 4M/B + 5SIZE+6ABNORM + 7ROE + 
8TURN + 9CR + 10EPS + 11DIST + 12BC+εi).  
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Table 3.8 Regression Results by Bid-Ask Spread Measure including Self-Selection   
 
This table presents the summary of cross-sectional regression results of absolute effective bid-ask spreads 
partitioned by bid-ask spread measure. EWQSk is the equal-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; EWESk is the equal-
weighted effective bid-ask spread; VWQSk is the volume-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; VWESk is the volume-
weighted effective bid-ask spread; Sk is the average stock price in each interval, measured as the closing bid-ask 
price midpoint; InvSk is the inverse of the average stock price in each interval; TVk is the number of shares traded 
in each interval; InvTVk is the inverse of the number of shares traded in each interval; NTk is the number of 
transactions in each interval; ܧ൫√ݐ௞൯ is the expected value of the square root of time between transactions, 
proxied for by ඥݐ௞തതതതത, the average of the square root of the number of minutes between trades; σk is the expected 
volatility rate proxied for by the annalised return volatility of the stock computed over the most recent 60 trading 
days prior to the estimation month; D1 is a dummy variable set to 1 for private equity bid target firms and 0 for 
tender/merger offer target firms; D2 is a dummy variable set to 0 for the pre-announcement period and 1 for the 
post-announcement period;  is the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR, self-selection); and IHPk is the expected inventory-
holding premium defined by 
ܫܪ ௞ܲ ൌ ܵ௞ ቂ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪ௞ܧ൫ඥݐ௞൯ቁ െ 1ቃ. 
Each variable in the sample is computed as an average of the daily values of the variable across each trading day 
during the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement and the five-month period preceding the 
takeover announcement. The sample period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2013. The regression model 
is  
SPRDk = 0 +1IHPU,k (k) +2[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + 3(D1) +4[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D1) + 5(D2) +6[IHPI,k (k) – 
IHPU,k (k)](D1)(D2) + 7  + k 
where IHPU,k is the expected inventory-holding premium for trades with uninformed traders and IHPI,k  is the 
expected inventory-holding premium for trades with informed traders. The value of the expected inventory-
holding premium for uninformed and informed traders are calculated as follows with IHPU,k valued as an out-of-
the-money call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price and a stock price equal to the bid-ask midpoint, 
and IHPI,k  valued as a 6% in-the-money (ITM) call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price 
respectively.  
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      Coefficent Estimates/ t-Ratios  
SPRDk  
No. of. 
Obs.  
Adjusted    
R-Squared a0 / t (a0) a1 / t (a1) a2 / t (a2) a3 / t (a3) a4 / t (a4) a5/ t (a5) a6 / t (a6) a7 / t (a7) 
           
EWQS 13,706 0.1229 0.2099 0.0327 0.0151 -0.0119 -0.0314 -0.0484 -0.0369 -0.0415 
   20.76 36.16 7.26 -1.93 -5.22 -13.03 -5.76 -6.56 
EWES 13,706 0.0521 0.1512 0.0479 -0.0004 -0.0096 -0.0205 -0.0386 0.0151 -0.0205 
   11.10 25.17 -0.14 -1.16 -2.57 -7.72 1.81 -2.40 
VWQS 13,706 0.2123 0.1915 0.0528 0.0069 -0.0240 0.0024 -0.0411 -0.0420 -0.0387 
   23.53 52.99 4.01 -4.85 0.57 -14.44 -33.98 -7.58 
VWES 13,706 0.0903 0.1364 0.0393 0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0263 -0.0346 0.0125 -0.0195 
      14.13 33.06 2.67 -0.91 -4.56 -9.75 2.08 -3.23 
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The coefficient (14) presented in Table 3.9 measures the difference in the change of 
probability of informed trade before and after announcements between private equity bid 
and tender/merger offer target firms. That is, it shows the difference in groups resultant 
from information asymmetry due to anticipated announcements are controlling for initial 
between target differences. The coefficient suggests no difference in probability of 
informed trade between private equity bid and tender/merger offer target firms after 
controlling for pre-announcement differences.   
 
 
3.6 Conclusions  
 
Asymmetric information-based trading has received much attention from academia, 
practitioners, and regulators. Increased regulation by the SEC has contributed to increased 
private equity led investments as an alternative to public market investments. In an effort 
to mitigate disclosure of material private information to select market participants, the 
SEC continues to impose increased regulatory measures. However, these measures have 
thus far failed to capture private equity transactions, thus creating a contentious issue on 
the impact of asymmetric information on private equity trades, insider trading, and 
expected gains. The integrity of competing market structures and market makers’ rent has 
augmented the need to understand and measure the cost components of the market maker 
bid-ask spread. This research applies the decomposed model presented in Bollen et al. 
(2004) to evaluate minimum tick size, the inverse of trading volume, and expected 
inventory-holding premium, isolating the market maker’s order-processing costs, and 
inventory price risk and adverse selection, respectively. The inventory-holding and 
adverse selection cost components of the spread determine the probability of an informed 
trade for private equity bid and tender/merger offer target firms in the pre- and post-
announcement periods, and relative to each takeover type.  
 
It is hypothesised that information asymmetry is higher before private equity bids for 
publicly listed companies are announced relative to non-private equity mergers and 
acquisitions proxied by tender/merger offers. The model is tested using monthly firm-
observations for 5-months pre- and post-announcement for private equity bid and 
tender/merger offer target firms over the period from 1st January 1994 to 31st December 
2013. In implementing the bid-ask spread cost components, any perceived investment 
advantage arising from asymmetric information and selective disclosure is determined.  
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Table 3.9 Regression Results by Bid-Ask Spread Measure (Difference-in-Difference)    
 
This table presents the summary of cross-sectional regression results of absolute effective bid-ask spreads 
partitioned by bid-ask spread measure. EWQSk is the equal-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; EWESk is the equal-
weighted effective bid-ask spread; VWQSk is the volume-weighted quoted bid-ask spread; VWESk is the volume-
weighted effective bid-ask spread; Sk is the average stock price in each interval, measured as the closing bid-ask 
price midpoint; InvSk is the inverse of the average stock price in each interval; TVk is the number of shares traded 
in each interval; InvTVk is the inverse of the number of shares traded in each interval; NTk is the number of 
transactions in each interval; ܧ൫√ݐ௞൯ is the expected value of the square root of time between transactions, 
proxied for by ඥݐ௞തതതതത, the average of the square root of the number of minutes between trades; σk is the expected 
volatility rate proxied for by the annalised return volatility of the stock computed over the most recent 60 trading 
days prior to the estimation month; D1 is a dummy variable set to 1 for private equity bid target firms and 0 for 
tender/merger offer target firms; D2 is a dummy variable set to 0 for the pre-announcement period and 1 for the 
post-announcement period; and IHPk is the expected inventory-holding premium defined by 
 
ܫܪ ௞ܲ ൌ ܵ௞ ቂ2ܰ ቀ0.5ߪ௞ܧ൫ඥݐ௞൯ቁ െ 1ቃ. 
 
Each variable in the sample is computed as an average of the daily values of the variable across each trading day 
during the five-month period preceding the takeover announcement and the five-month period preceding the 
takeover announcement. The sample period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2013. The regression model 
is  
 
SPRDk = 0 +1InvTVk + 2IHPU,k (k) +3[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] + 4(D1) + 5(D2) + 6InvTVk (D1) +7 IHPU,k 
(k)(D1) +8[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D1) +9InvTVk (D2) +10 IHPU,k (k)(D2) +11[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)](D2) 
+12InvTVk (D1)(D2) +13IHPU,k (k) (D1)(D2) +14[IHPI,k (k) – IHPU,k (k)] (D1)(D2) + k 
 
where IHPU,k is the expected inventory-holding premium for trades with uninformed traders and IHPI,k  is the 
expected inventory-holding premium for trades with informed traders. The value of the expected inventory-
holding premium for uninformed and informed traders are calculated as follows with IHPU,k valued as an out-of-
the-money call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price and a stock price equal to the bid-ask midpoint, 
and IHPI,k  valued as a 6% in-the-money (ITM) call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price 
respectively.  
 
ܫܪ ௎ܲ,௞ ൌ ሺܯܫܦሻܰቌ
݈݊ ቀܯܫܦܣܵܭቁ
ߪ√ݐ ൅ 0.5ߪ√ݐቍ െ ሺܣܵܭሻܰቌ
݈݊ ቀܯܫܦܣܵܭቁ
ߪ√ݐ െ 0.5ߪ√ݐቍ 
 
ܫܪ ூܲ,௞ ൌ ሺܣܵܭ ൈ 1.06ሻܰ ቌ
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ߪ√ݐ ൅ 0.5ߪ√ݐቍ െ ሺܣܵܭሻܰቌ
݈݊ ቀܣܵܭ ൈ 1.06ܣܵܭ ቁ
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   Coefficent Estimates/ t-Ratios  
SPRDk  
No. of. 
Obs.  
Adjusted     
R-Squared  
a0 / 
 t (a0) 
a1 / 
 t (a1) 
a2 / 
 t (a2) 
a3 /  
t (a3) 
a4 / 
 t (a4) 
a5/ 
 t (a5) 
a6 /  
t (a6) 
a7 /  
t (a7) 
a8 / 
 t (a8) 
a9 /  
t (a9) 
a10 /  
t (a10) 
a11 / 
 t (a11) 
a12/  
t (a12) 
a13 /  
t (a13) 
a14 /  
t (a14) 
                  
EWQS   13,706  0.2697 0.1199 304.1267 0.0818 0.0159 -0.0139 -0.0481 -111.7427 -0.0424 -0.0211 78.0255 -0.0514 -0.0030 -22.0974 0.0164 0.0030 
   36.28 20.65 35.01 5.94 -2.32 -9.63 -4.60 -12.05 -3.57 3.64 -17.15 -0.79 -0.42 3.99 0.47 
EWES   13,706  0.0844 0.0960 217.9481 0.0666 0.0073 -0.0002 -0.0391 -85.0717 -0.0359 -0.0167 91.7129 -0.0450 0.0019 -31.4527 0.0213 0.0132 
   20.08 10.22 18.61 1.90 -0.02 -5.41 -2.42 -5.75 -1.99 2.96 -9.93 0.35 -0.41 1.89 1.45 
VWQS   13,706  0.3113 0.1058 253.4117 0.0723 0.0186 -0.0091 -0.0433 -71.6041 -0.0340 -0.0182 84.3241 -0.0461 -0.0031 -44.7035 0.0121 0.0003 
   38.75 20.83 39.39 8.34 -1.83 -10.50 -3.57 -12.18 -3.72 4.77 -19.45 -1.00 -1.03 3.69 0.06 
VWES   13,706  0.1413 0.0869 181.2650 0.0578 0.0106 -0.0018 -0.0359 -56.7829 -0.0362 -0.0148 98.5310 -0.0372 0.0016 -38.3635 0.0214 0.0080 
      25.88 12.11 24.97 3.89 -0.29 -7.08 -2.30 -10.83 -2.45 4.53 -12.43 0.41 -0.72 3.54 1.24 
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Evidence within suggests information asymmetry declines by a greater amount for private 
equity bids paralleled by a greater decline in the probability of informed trading for 
private equity bids. A significant decrease in the probability of informed trading, 
measured as adverse selection costs, is found in the post-announcement period for private 
equity bid targets relative to tender/merger offer targets. 
 
It is hypothesised that information asymmetry is higher before private equity bids for 
publicly listed companies are announced relative to non-private equity mergers and 
acquisitions proxied by tender/merger offers. The model is tested using monthly firm-
observations for 5-months pre- and post-announcement for private equity bid and 
tender/merger offer target firms over the period from 1st January 1994 to 31st December 
2013. In implementing the bid-ask spread cost components, any perceived investment 
advantage arising from asymmetric information and selective disclosure is determined. 
Evidence within suggests information asymmetry declines by a greater amount for private 
equity bids paralleled by a greater decline in the probability of informed trading for 
private equity bids. A significant decrease in the probability of informed trading, 
measured as adverse selection costs, is found in the post-announcement period for private 
equity bid targets relative to tender/merger offer targets.  
 
This finding is interpreted as decreased information asymmetry post-announcement for 
private equity bid targets relative to tender/merger offer targets across all specified 
models. This is good news and an advantage for ‘mum and pop investors’ as they are less 
likely to suffer losses after a private equity announcement due to lower probability of 
informed trade. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily negate the need for increased 
regulation in the private equity realm, with arguments made that where multiple insiders 
receive identical information, any action to trade on the information would reduce its 
expected payoff to zero. Further research examining adverse selection, measured by the 
inventory-holding premium, could determine the success of a takeover given the 
probability of informed trading, or the probability of informed trading given the 
timeframe between the last public financial report and the takeover announcement date, 
providing greater understanding of information value surrounding takeovers.       
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Chapter 4 : Riding The Regulation Wave: The Cost Of 
Private Equity Regulation  
4.1  Introduction  
 
Like economic boom and bust cycles, private equity regulation has come in waves as it 
attempts to maintain investment within this important alternative asset class. Financial 
regulation and corporate law encompass challenges regarding cost-benefits and the 
statistical probability of undesirable outcomes due to the complexity and nonlinearities 
of the alternative investment industry. The informational imbalance between private 
equity managers and the market has been the subject of much debate regarding the 
allocation of regulatory resources, justice mechanisms, and equitable regulation in the 
securities market. Private equity provides an important role in alternative markets as a 
source of funding distinct to predominately debt from banks. The strong investment focus 
behind private equity transactions means investors focus on strong growth strategies and 
high return opportunities. 
 
Private equity is behind some of the largest capital market deals to date. For example, 
KKR’s 1989 LBO of RJR Nabisco for $31.1 billion (Burrough and Helyar, 2010), the 
Bain Capital, KKR and Merrill Lynch privatisation of Hospital Corp. of America for 
$32.7 billion, and Goldman Sach’s and TPG Capital’s quick flip of Alltel for $27 billion 
in 2007 before selling in 2008 and returning profit to investors. The function of law 
reform has received increased attention particularly around financial downturns such as 
the Great Depression and Global Financial Crisis. Indeed the 2008 financial crisis 
changed the way the business sector, in particular secondary investment markets, are 
viewed by greater society. Investors became more risk adverse, investments slowed, and 
the efficiency of the economy took a significant hit. These outcomes from the crisis led 
regulators such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) to focus on 
developing law reforms that encourage the growth of, and recognise the importance of, 
private equity in the finance sector.    
 
Law and economics seem analogous with each other in preventing financial downturns 
and financial distress; however, policy makers and scholars focus on the short-term 
impact of such downturns, turning to regulation as a quick fix to perceived causational 
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effects of poor institutional investments. The assumption that behavioural economics 
drives the efficiency of any policy and legal regulation changes is unfounded. Regulators 
need to focus on implementing long-term reforms with the goal of avoiding systematic 
risks while maintaining economic opportunities (Driesen, 2014). They should also draw 
upon the economic knowledge of industry experts to create policy with a long-term focus 
that aims to influence the financial decisions of investors but not control their resource 
allocation in a restrictive nature, thereby providing a regulatory framework at a national 
level and self-regulation at a transaction level.   
 
The prior neoclassical approach to analysing corporate finance has prompted to the 
misalignment of economics and legal regulation. There is no doubt that the financial crisis 
has changed the way the investment sector is viewed by society, which in turn has led 
regulators such as the SEC to focus on maintaining credibility and the valuable 
contribution private equity adds to the financial sector. The perception is that increasing 
regulation serves to create confidence and an ordered financial market; however, one 
should question whether legal reform’s efficiency maintains the benefits of economic free 
financial trade comparative to the cost. The 2015 Preqin Global Private Equity & Venture 
Capital Report has 21% of respondents citing regulation as a challenge for investors, 
behind fees (39%) and the economic environment (24%). Further, private equity funds 
reported 47% has been subject to audits and examinations over the previous two years, 
an increase from 38% in 2013 (Ernst and Young, 2016). The SEC is not in a position to 
ascertain the exact monetary benefits of any regulatory changes primarily because of the 
subjectiveness of investor and management transaction choices in light of market factors. 
It is therefore argued that the protection and efficiency argument of regulatory changes is 
desirable, in a cost-benefit sense (Driesen, 2014).  
 
Emerging markets with stringent rules and regulations are associated with weak legal 
protection for investors and shareholders (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al., 2002). This 
chapter synthesises prior arguments both for and against law reform within the private 
equity space, concluding that law reform should not focus on governing the allocation of 
resources, but on mitigating systematic risk. By mitigating systematic risk law reforms 
facilitate competition and market efficiency through investors and institutional decisions 
that incorporate informational asymmetries rather than dictating the efficiency of the 
financial markets themselves. In addition, this chapter considers the past, present, and 
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future of private equity as an alternative investment class and the role political influences 
have over the regulation of this financial market. This chapter identifies the two sides of 
the regulatory coin, namely that stock market shocks, financial crises, political power 
shifts, and economic contractions lead to political stances with increased regulation, 
whereas lower levels of insider trading, economic growth, and technological advances 
lead to instilled market confidence and deregulation, or at the very least flexibility in 
investment choices.       
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 details the regulation conundrum 
surrounding the private equity sector including the justifications and consequential results 
of increased regulation. Section 3 argues for the self-regulation of private equity. Section 
4 presents the overall conclusions.  
   
4.2  Regulation Conundrum: To Regulate…  
 
The so-called golden era of private equity investments between 2002 and 2007, ended 
with the bursting of the housing bubble, credit crunch, and the renegotiation of 
acquisitions (Bruner, 1988; Gompers et al., 2008; De Maeseneire, 2012). While the 
financial crisis increased support for regulation, or at least changes to regulation in the 
private equity sector, many scholars argued that self-regulation was the answer, however 
this only works in so far as individuals and institutions act rationally and possess perfect 
information. This assumption poses a conundrum where the processing of information is 
highly subjective based on past investment habits, favoured investment models, and their 
public perception. Further, where investors and institutions do not have perfect 
information, risk increases, and they may engage in risky behaviour due to misinformed 
risk and information alignment. US economist Joseph Stiglitz (2010) drew links between 
neoclassical economics and the reliance on the efficient market hypothesis as a leading 
cause for the Global Financial Crisis. His rationale was that the overreliance and 
excessive confidence instilled in financial institutions as rational players acting on perfect 
information in an efficient market led to reregulation that ultimately led to the financial 
crisis by the removal of regulatory policy and law enacted following the Great 
Depression.  
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The 1980s saw a period of growth for financial markets including the increased 
interaction between banks and private equity investments. Banks pressured regulators to 
loosen the regulations put in place after the Great Depression, including The Glass-
Steagall Act (Bank Act of 1933) that governed the securitisation of loans; separating 
commercial and investment banking. But why would regulators agree to loosen laws 
intended to prevent a repeat of the Great Depression? Many economic and law scholars 
have argued that markets by their nature are efficient. If markets were not efficient then 
there would be no market participants. For example, banks would not participate in 
mergers where they perceive the market to be inefficient and the prominent relationship 
between the two would not exist. Regulatory systems are believed to impede natural 
market forces that encourage efficient trade; where efficiency is not present and economic 
conditions are not favourable, then the market will slow and market participants will 
correct their strategies and self-correct to encourage favourable market conditions. These 
arguments proved convincing to policymakers, placing reliance on theories such as the 
efficient market hypothesis and asset pricing models, and advocates accomplished 
deregulation. In 1999, President Bill Clinton deemed The Glass-Steagall Act (1933) 
irrelevant, and the provisions of the Act were loosened. Arguably, this then fed the 
explosion in securitisation, and ultimately the Global Financial Crisis.    
 
Financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, Citibank and Goldman Sachs were key 
actors in persuading the Federal Reserve Bank to permit bank holding companies to 
securitise mortgages. This securitisation of poor quality loans ultimately led them to hit 
the headlines as some of the key players in the Global Financial Crisis (Karmel, 2011). 
The financial crisis did not hit the securitisation market until 2008, with the first signs of 
crisis evident in 2007 with high default rates in the subprime lending sector causing it to 
collapse as the banking market was deemed an “unsafe” investment. This resulted in risk 
being transferred to the securitisation market, including leading financial institutions 
globally, causing the 2008 financial crisis. The demise of Lehman Brothers caused a 
decline in asset prices and global credit freeze, signalling the realisation that the economy 
was in trouble. Thus, scholars and industry experts relying on neoclassical law and 
economic theory that supposes that markets regulate themselves led to the precondition 
for the financial crisis: deregulation (Driesen, 2014).      
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Since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, private equity has seen an increase in regulation 
led by the U.S. Governments in an attempt to control resource allocation, which in turn 
controls investment strategies and market efficiency. For example, government decisions 
on fiscal allocation can provide growth opportunities in the financial sector through 
promoting increased investment confidence in the market. There is concern over 
asymmetries between investor behaviour, managerial behaviour, political agenda, and 
influential policy reform. Since investors have little direct exposure to managers of 
private equity funds it is argued they rely on the SEC to provide an ethically acceptable 
link between themselves and managers to protect their interests. However, arguably 
markets themselves instill investor confidence and governments merely reinforce this 
confidence, providing a sense of security over these private resource allocations.  
 
Figure 4.1 The Complexity of Private Equity Regulation   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above diagram highlights the complexity of private equity regulation. Private equity market efficiency 
and reduction in systematic risk involves balancing the complexities of government perspective and 
political force, regulatory challenges such as behavioural predictions based on empirical modelling, and the 
subjective impact of investors and institutional transactions.  
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4.2.1  Crisis to Regulation 
 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis highlighted the vulnerability of investors at the hands 
of private equity firms in a complex market through the overleverage of assets during the 
economic downtown prevalent since 2007. It then followed that greater regulation could 
have prevented the severity of the crisis, protecting investors, owners and employees of 
at risk entities. Notably, the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) effective July 21 2010 has had a significant 
impact on the private equity sector, with private equity fund managers required to 
streamline their compliance operations to meet increased regulation, leading to increased 
time obligations and costs associated with the timeliness of reporting. Industry specialists 
and academics alike have considered the lasting impacts on private equity from the 
introduction of Dodd-Frank that sought to institutionalise the operation of private equity 
through high regulation (Bell and Glover, 2013). 
 
Figure 4.2 Timeline of Economic Downturns and Regulation  
  
 
 
After the Great Depression, regulatory structures were changed in the 1930s with the aim 
of preventing another economic downfall. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and, Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1989) discuss the complexities of regulation following the Great Depression. 
These studies show regulators relied on public concern for illegal insider trading as 
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political leverage for legislative reform on takeovers. Two key regulatory changes 
followed the Great Depression; the Glass-Steagall Act (Bank Act of 1933) and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These Acts increased penalties for insider trading as 
well as introduced a reward program for turning in insider trading, placing responsibility 
on market participants to regulate peer behaviour. However, the definition of insider 
trading was not clear, and still remains a contentious issue due to its subjectivity. It was 
initially interpreted strictly to include any disclosure of material information leading to a 
successful trade, with the only other option being to refrain from trading stocks where 
you were privy to non-public information. This removed the subjectivity in determining 
if a material disclosure was made.   
 
With great economic growth and a flourishing market, deregulatory legislation was 
passed in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and in 2000 with the Commodity 
Futures Modernisation Act. The deregulation of the financial market subsequently led to 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and 2010 saw the US enact the most significant piece 
of regulation in 80 years; the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (2010). Following greater regulation introduced in 2011, private equity firms 
overseeing assets greater than $150 million must register with the SEC (from March 30, 
2012) making them subject to its oversight and enforcement. These firms are also required 
to disclose financial details around asset value and investment tactics used. The 
effectiveness of increased regulation cannot be denied. In 2015 the SEC brought 
enforcement actions again 807 as opposed to 755 firms in 2014, an increase of 7%. 
Previous key players in private equity growth prior to 2007 came under greater scrutiny. 
Of note, the Blackstone Group, which became a household name on Wall Street through 
its role in the RJR Nabisco transaction in the 1980s, found itself facing enforcement 
actions for failing to fully inform investors as to benefits its advisors obtained from 
monitoring fees, including legal fee discounts. Rather than focusing on deregulation, the 
appropriate approach in light of the effectiveness of some provisions is to modify existing 
regulatory requirements in consultation with industry groups.  
 
Acharya et al. (2010) provides a two-fold argument as to whether more insiders increases 
the probability of informed trade (insider trading) or whether it reduces the probability of 
informed trade there is more internal regulation through peer review. Further, Berger et 
al. (1998) show different capital structures are optimal at different points in the business 
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cycle to maintain market efficiency, maximize investor returns, and promote financial 
growth. To apply stringent regulatory reform is to restrict financial growth during 
economic business cycles. Gary LaBrache, global president and chief executive of the 
Association for Corporate Growth, is quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying: “the 
culture of transparency and compliance is important and valued, and we recognise that is 
a set and settled area for the industry”. The industry attitude leans towards easing 
regulatory requirements while still maintaining the integrity of private equity.    
 
The more information private equity firms are willing to disclose on their strategies, the 
greater confidence is instilled in investors and the market, and the less likely they are to 
be subject to SEC investigation. However, the industry lashed back, claiming unintended 
consequences of greater regulation were going to harm the private equity market. Key 
industry players claimed cost, delays in reporting, and a relocation of resources would be 
needed to meet new SEC reforms. Mousavi and Shefrin (2010) propose a possible 
solution to the problem, using a bilateral negotiation dynamic to illustrate four outcomes 
of any proposal. Any regulatory reform affecting private equity investment should be in 
consultation with the industry, otherwise costly outcomes in the sense of additional 
regulatory reform or inefficient industry outcomes arise. The concept presented here 
comes back to misguided communication resulting in erroneous regulation focused on 
the wrong issues. Steve Judge, president and CEO of the Private Equity Growth Capital 
Council, noted in 2015 that the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act aimed to remove 
systematic risk, however it was broadly applied to markets without systematic risk, 
resulting in erroneous regulatory burdens. He argued the need for consideration of what 
has worked and analysis of what has not to provide a mechanism for future growth. It is 
through future growth that private equity can continue to encourage competition and a 
strong economy.      
 
One interesting question is the effect domestic regulation will have on international 
investment. Although prior literature (Augustin et al., 2016) shows a positive significant 
relationship between target and acquirer proximity, investors focus on wealth 
maximisation, and if distance through transaction friendly regulation leads to higher 
growth opportunities then it is likely investors will invest abroad. Augustin et al. (2016) 
identify that the SEC is more likely to investigate cases where the acquirer is 
headquartered outside the US in conjunction with being large and obtaining positive 
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abnormal returns around the announcement date. They also highlight the outside US 
trading phenomenon and how political changes globally, such as Brexit, will impact on 
the success of the private equity market in the US. The US paved the way for the United 
Kingdom to introduce the Walker Report, which provides classification for the disclosure 
and transparency of assets and business investments.   
 
By comparison, China is a highly regulated financial system. On May 8, 2006 the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued “The Administration of the Issuance 
of Securities by Listed Companies” to regulate private equity placements (PEPs). In 
response to this, private equity placements by Chinese firms have experienced rapid 
growth as a source of financing over its short history and despite its more stringent 
regulation requiring firms to meet approval criteria before making PEPs (Dong et al., 
2017). Despite the stringent regulatory system in China, there is recognition that the 
regulation of private placement still faces the same dilemma as its Western counterparts: 
balancing institutional interests, investor rights, and an enforcement system that 
encourages efficiency and low regulation costs, with a goal to reducing insider trading 
and market manipulation (Pistor and Xu, 2005). Lang and Lockhart (1990) argue that 
government regulations create external uncertainties for firms’ operations rather than 
creating a sense of certainty and security. Contrary to Western society, governments in 
China hold significant influence over firm logistics with regards to resource allocation 
and enforcement of regulatory schemes (Wu and Cheng, 2011). These restrictive 
practices do not appear to have restricted the growth of the private equity market in China.  
       
 
4.2.2  Government Control 
 
Political forces play a significant role in the determination of legal reform. As touched on 
before, events such as Brexit and the US election (with the inauguration of the Trump 
administration) are expected to impact legal reform concerning private equity in 2017. 
Although morale is high, with a large number of Americans indicating they believe 
private equity will experience growth in 2017, they do not believe the perceived problems 
caused by the Obama administration introducing Dodd-Frank will be experienced with 
the Trump administration. In fact, investors believe Trump will reduce regulatory levels, 
creating investment opportunities domestically for smaller firms. Faccio and Hsu (2017) 
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assess employment consequences of private equity buyouts, finding higher job creations 
have a positive effect on the economy. They show a connection between private equity 
and political affiliations, showing firms operated by targets of politically connected 
private equity firms, increase employment during election years and in states with high 
levels of corruption. This evidences a positive relationship between regulation and 
political connections in private equity. Investors will turn to private equity as a safe 
investment option, as there is greater certainty in an economic state of uncertainty from 
political outcomes. This does not imply regulation is inadequate leading to higher 
corruption, rather, certain States are pre-disposed to higher corruption, albeit from market 
changes or socio-economic factors.        
 
Governments do not have the required investment knowledge needed to facilitate 
resource allocation. By comparison, investors’ trade on information received in the 
market, making them the facilitators of efficient markets. Laws governing financial 
markets provide the framework one step removed from efficiency, and resource allocation 
through the subjective decision making of market participants. This ‘one step back’ is 
intended to mitigate systematic risk rather than govern the efficiency of financial markets, 
providing a long-term focus to risk alleviation over preventing immediate market 
collapses. Any law reform should focus on avoiding intentional actions inconsistent with 
market efficiency but avoid unintended consequences such as investment limitations. 
Regulating private equity involves evaluating the efficiency in the market via monetary 
growth and fair competition versus any costs to investors that may reduce investment in 
the alternative market. Nevertheless, any private equity regulation thus far has not 
impeded the resilient and robust nature of private equity investments.      
 
4.3  Or Not To Regulate. 
 
Private equity became a popular source of finance, particularly after the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008. If regulation is to increase in this secondary market it remains to be seen 
whether it will inhibit the flow of capital in this asset class, causing a decrease in 
investments. The rational economic argument is that private equity transactions possess 
perfect information in a rational trade setting. This underlying assumption leads to the 
conclusion that if regulations were introduced where costs outweigh the benefits, then the 
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rational investor would not continue with merger transactions, focusing on internal 
growth, prompting a decline in the efficiency of private equity transactions. Further, 
rational financial economic theory incorporating the efficient market hypothesis supports 
deregulation, for if perfect information exists, then market participants are able to self-
regulate against behaviour leading to economic downturns outside their interests. 
Cumming and Zambelli (2013) use data from Italy to analyse the effect of excessive 
regulation on private equity returns. They show extreme regulation reduces the supply 
and quality of private equity market capital, as well as the performance of initial public 
offering benefits. This view is supported by the SEC in regards to multiple proposed legal 
reforms increasing reporting requirements but decreasing stringent rules. 
 
Previous arguments for deregulation fail to account for market actors’ rationality and 
personal preconceptions. Rational investment behaviour theorem assumes market actors 
will ‘buy low and sell high’ thus exhibiting excitement and a willingness to invest where 
asset prices are expected to rise, and distress leading to irrational behaviour when they 
fall. Irrational investor behaviour is inconsistent with the efficiency theorem and therefore 
hard to predict the precise market impact. Private equity involves high information 
asymmetry and SEC regulation assumes investors want to be told what the issues are and 
what is important in private equity investments, when in truth investors are rational and 
care about profitability. Bharath and Dittmar (2010) draw on private equity and public 
market differences to highlight the importance of informational differences between 
takeover types. Private equity investments increased information sharing increases 
investor confidence, which increases stock prices as the takeover is perceived as positive 
by the market and private equity investors are often the private equity acquirer’s managers 
affirming target choice. Where such information asymmetries are unavailable due to 
increased regulatory scope, investments rely on predictions and inefficient bargains are 
likely to result, leading to financial market distress.  
 
This thesis argues that deregulation protects the integrity of private equity investments, 
which increases shareholder wealth. How are private equity firms to achieve high returns 
by adhering to onerous disclosure regulations that devolve their investment strategies? 
Since the private equity market itself is an alternative investment market, it should be 
argued that it requires an alternative regulation structure. Further, private equity firms 
place high reliance on portfolio management and success. The number of successful 
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private equity firms outweighs the number breaching their obligations to investors, 
suggesting information asymmetries are not of concern. Bankruptcy from the failure to 
meet payments motivates management to achieve efficiency. Acharya and Johnson 
(2010) highlight that if regulatory success is measured by detection rates then a higher 
number of insiders should result in a higher number of convictions due to illegal 
behaviour. However, insiders share information with other insiders to the point of 
dilution, such that the information is considered public and is absorbed into market prices. 
Explicit regulatory restraints at market levels are thereby limited in their usefulness, with 
self-regulation within the markets through peer-judgement being more effective.   
 
4.3.1  Does Empirical Research Provide Support for Regulation? 
 
Prior research (Bargeron et al., 2008; Achleitner et al., 2009; Boone and Mulherin, 2009; 
Chapple et al., 2010; Osborne et al., 2012; Fidrmuc et al., 2012) around information 
asymmetry in private equity transactions (and takeovers in general) show transactions 
contain uncertainties due to market particulars and a diverse range of variables influence 
observed outcomes. Although studies use linear predictions to evidence the influence of 
variables on observed outcomes, regulatory changes could have infinite outcomes and 
non-linear influence over dependant variables. For example, tax regulation or reporting 
requirements may impact accounting information, causing statistically significant 
conclusions to be drawn between tax and the dependant variable but no distinct link 
between the regulatory changes and dependant variable may be statistically significant in 
a linear regression.  Despite growth in the private equity sector, Harris et al. (2014) 
highlight how the quality of data available for research is limited and only periodically 
available to academics. In this respect, the usefulness of such research as forward 
predicting in regulatory reform is limited as critical elements may be omitted from 
analysis. Further, capital asset pricing models were used to encourage deregulation of 
alternative investment markets; however such evidence failed to account for the often 
simplifying nature of predictability models, leading to unsubstantiated conclusions that 
results of the past will be mirrored in the future (Wilmarth, 2002).   
 
This thesis argues that such models should be used as financial prediction tools and not 
regulation tools, as empirical modelling reflects past events and regulation is the 
prevention of uncertain future events. This is not to say that such models are impractical, 
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but rather efficiency of regulation cannot be determined with certainty, and a multi-level 
regulation system is required. In this respect, law decision-makers and regulatory decision 
making by governments should be founded on providing guidelines and a framework 
through which investors and institutions are able to act responsibility but which do not 
limit trading ability. Driesen (2014) uses the analogy of a Monte Carlo simulation where 
with repeated attempts the probability distribution is known, as outcomes are certain, 
concluding that arbitrary subjective outcomes are more common. Further, Charest (2002) 
argues Bayesian analysis methods provide more defined estimates for change probability 
estimates as knowledge changes in the market. Both these methods hinge off prior 
knowledge and do not account for market shocks leading to unpredictable behaviour. 
Certainly, generalisations can be made from financial modelling. Indeed many scholars 
and industry experts forecasted the financial crisis; however the extent and breadth of the 
financial crisis was largely underestimated.  
 
The complexity of private equity transactions makes predicating the efficiency of any 
single legal rule or regulatory act impossible. It may be possible to predict that a 
regulatory change will prevent the occurrence of a financial crisis, but the benefits in 
monetary terms of such regulation are hard to predict. In this respect the extent to which 
regulation is required is uncertain.  For example, regulatory choices are unlikely to 
directly produce efficient markets; however regulatory decisions influence the decisions 
of individual market players that in turn influences financial transactions, producing 
efficient markets. The cost and benefits of any regulation of the financial industry is 
therefore unpredictable due to the complexity of the transactions and information 
asymmetries. To illustrate the above argument, this chapter draws upon a dataset of 1,750 
private equity bids between the 1st January 1994 and 31st of December 2013.  
 
Using the methodology from Chapter Two, this study applies Heckman’s two-step 
regression (Heckman, 1979) to analyse information asymmetry surrounding the 
announcement date, accounting for unobservable factors not included within the 
regression analysis (lambda). The sample is split into three sub-samples to reflect 
economic periods of growth and downturn; 1994 to 1999, 2000 to 2007 and, 2008 to 
2014. The results presented in Table 4.1 show no indication of unobservable factors or 
asymmetric information surrounding the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Results show that 
the only significant coefficient for the study period is the 2000 to 2007 intercept (Panel  
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Table 4.1 Illustrative Regression of No Change in Asymmetric Information 
Between Periods of Economic Distress for Private Equity.  
This table presents the results for the following Hackman two-step regression results using the (0,1) Market 
Model to determine the impact on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of differences between financial 
and strategic target firms accounting for unobservables.   
 
CARi = 0 + 1DealValue + 2BidPrem+ 3Attitude + 4Success+ 5Cash+ 6%Shares+ 7HIH+ 
8Bidders + 9Size + 10Leverage + 11FCF + 12ROE + 13RND + 14M/B + x λi +vi 
 
Where CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date for financial and strategic 
target firms, IMR () corresponds to Heckman’s lambda, obtained from the Probit model of probability of 
being included in the financial (private equity) sample, PEDummy is a dichotomous variable set equal to 
PRIV=1 for financial (private equity bids) and PRIV=0 for strategic (tender/merger offer) firm 
observations, Deal Value is the value of the deal ($ millions), BidPrem is the percentage (%) 5 days before 
the announcement day being the price offered per target stock compared to target stock 5 days prior to the 
announcement day, Attitude is a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the bid is hostile, and zero otherwise, 
Success is a dichotomous variable set to1 if the bid is successful, and zero otherwise, Cash is a dichotomous 
variable set to 1 for cash-only offers, and zero otherwise,  % Shares is the percentage (%) of target firm 
shares sought in the deal, HIH is the Herfindahl Index for each 2-digit SIC code group, Bidders is the 
number of bidders competing with the acquirer for the same target, Size is the firm size measured as 
Ln(AT), Leverage is total debt/(total debt + market value of equity), FCF is operating activities net cash 
flow minus capital expenditures, ROE is net income divided by common/ordinary equity, RND is research 
and development expense as a proportion of sales and M/B is the market value of equity divided by 
common/ordinary equity.  
 
  Sample Size: 1 750   Sample Size: 1 750  
  Value Weighted   Equally Weighted   
Event 
windows 
Variable 
name  Coefficent 
Standard 
Error p Value   Coefficent 
Standard 
Error p Value  
Panel A – (0,1) Market Model (Years 1994-1999) N=691          
(0, +1) Intercept  0.0035 0.3267 0.991  -0.0175 0.3312 0.958  
 Lambda  0.1704 0.1433 0.234  0.1739 0.1455 0.232  
(-1, 0) Intercept  -0.2101 0.3118 0.501  -0.1788 0.3130 0.568  
 Lambda  0.1065 0.1313 0.418  0.0984 0.1311 0.453  
(-1, +1)  Intercept  0.1254 0.2998 0.676  0.1311 0.2985 0.660  
 Lambda  0.0883 0.1252 0.481  0.0894 0.1248 0.474  
(-5, +5)  Intercept  -0.0006 0.3754 0.999  0.1016 0.3829 0.791  
 Lambda  0.0869 0.1553 0.576  0.0960 0.1588 0.546  
(-10, +10)  Intercept  -0.0964 0.4096 0.814  -0.0592 0.4404 0.893  
 Lambda  0.0325 0.1672 0.846  0.1186 0.1832 0.517  
(-20, +20)  Intercept  0.0635 0.5178 0.902  0.1305 0.5213 0.802  
 Lambda  -0.0888 0.2128 0.676  0.0391 0.2127 0.854  
 
 
Panel B – (0,1) Market Model (Years 2000-2007) N=636          
(0, +1) Intercept  0.0351 0.3206 0.913  0.0173 0.3225 0.957  
 Lambda  0.1370 0.0953 0.150  0.1373 0.0958 0.152  
(-1, 0) Intercept  0.5224 0.3141 0.096 * 0.5115 0.3126 0.102  
 Lambda  -0.1041 0.0925 0.261  -0.1019 0.0921 0.268  
(-1, +1)  Intercept  0.1334 0.3191 0.676  0.1193 0.3208 0.710  
 Lambda  0.1348 0.0948 0.155  0.1354 0.0953 0.155  
(-5, +5)  Intercept  0.1057 0.3235 0.744  0.0733 0.3306 0.824  
 Lambda  0.0993 0.0951 0.296  0.1021 0.0972 0.293  
(-10, +10)  Intercept  0.3111 0.3412 0.362  0.2558 0.3531 0.469  
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 Lambda  0.0849 0.0999 0.396  0.0828 0.1033 0.423  
(-20, +20)  Intercept  0.2511 0.3563 0.481  0.2280 0.3619 0.529  
 Lambda  0.1520 0.1059 0.151  0.1317 0.1069 0.218  
  
Panel C – (0,1) Market Model (Years 2008-2014) N=423          
(0, +1) Intercept  0.1231 0.2942 0.676  0.1161 0.2937 0.693  
 Lambda  -0.0736 0.0776 0.343  -0.0748 0.0775 0.335  
(-1, 0) Intercept  -0.2729 0.2411 0.258  -0.2898 0.2395 0.226  
 Lambda  0.0107 0.0735 0.885  0.0120 0.0731 0.870  
(-1, +1)  Intercept  0.3103 0.2500 0.215  0.2935 0.2484 0.237  
 Lambda  -0.0691 0.0767 0.367  -0.0694 0.0762 0.362  
(-5, +5)  Intercept  0.0126 0.2080 0.952  -0.0042 0.2089 0.984  
 Lambda  -0.0283 0.0635 0.656  -0.0224 0.0638 0.725  
(-10, +10)  Intercept  0.1685 0.2350 0.473  0.1604 0.2336 0.492  
 Lambda  -0.0328 0.0718 0.648  -0.0307 0.0712 0.667  
(-20, +20)  Intercept  -0.0243 0.2740 0.929  -0.0705 0.2736 0.797  
 Lambda  -0.0093 0.0836 0.911  -0.0130 0.0835 0.876  
 
***, **, and * denote a statistically significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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B) for the 2-day window [-1, 0] which is positively significant at 10% (0.5224). Results 
for 1994 to 1999 (Panel A) show differences between the value weighted and equally 
weighted samples in regards to the coefficient for the intercept and lambda. For example, 
the intercept coefficient for [0, +1] intercept is positive for value weighted (0.0035) and 
negative for equally weighted (-0.0175). The absence of negative coefficients in the 
period 2000 to 2007 suggest increased investor confidence and a more open market to 
asymmetric information. However, the period 2008 to 2014 shows a change to more 
negative coefficients for lambda, indicting less certainty in the market and a negative 
impact on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the target firm. Further, no 
evidence of selection bias due to unobservables across economic periods is evidenced. 
This affirms prior neoclassical study’s conclusions that private equity investments are not 
directly impacted by economic changes, but indirectly through financing impacts.     
 
 
4.4  Conclusions 
The effect of industry technology, economic theory, and information asymmetries on 
legal reform in the private equity market remains a contentious issue. The credibility of 
increased regulation has raised a number of important questions, including whether 
regulations really dictate investor and institutional behaviour in private equity 
transactions. This chapter analyses previous market changes that have resulted in 
regulatory reform, concluding that it was a combination of factors that lead to the Great 
Depression and Global Financial Crisis rather than a failure of the regulatory system. 
Further, the resilience of private equity investment in light of economic downturns 
negates the argument for increased regulation that has the potential to restrict the flow of 
capital when it is needed most, causing inefficiency in the market. The political agenda 
is identified as a cause for legal reform rather than market interest, arguing that policy 
changes are premised on popularity votes by instilling fear and the need for reform into 
investors.     
 
Future considerations include whether US regulation will promote increased private 
equity investment or whether it will cause private equity to move overseas to alternative 
markets. Further, the interaction between state governments, international governments, 
and political affiliations is yet to be seen. The world looks to the United States and the 
SEC to indicate the need for regulation after the Global Financial Crisis, but the impact 
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of country specific regulation on an international market is yet to be determined. There is 
the potential for national and global restrictions on private equity markets to slow 
efficiency in these markets and increase systematic risk as multi-national firms find 
loopholes between private equity reforms. This raises the question: since private equity 
is a growing secondary market across developed nations, is an international private equity 
body warranted?  
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Chapter 5 : Conclusions 
 
Following long term success and an increase in institutional investment, the continuous 
growth and expansion of private equity has seen it become the center of capital markets. 
The past thirty years has seen private equity grow rapidly into a prominent asset class in 
the United States, providing an alternative to neoclassical investment strategies. Despite 
the number of private equity investments surpassing that of publicly financed 
investments, there still remains, by comparison, a lack of research on private equity 
acquisitions and a lack of understanding from a regulatory perspective. This study 
addresses the gap between neoclassical research, investment and regulation. The private 
equity market has experienced fluctuations of investment in line with economic and 
regulatory changes. Although prior literary work has acknowledged the contribution and 
importance of private equity to financial markets, there still exists limited understanding 
of key factors surrounding private equity transactions relative to other takeover vessels. 
This study contributes to the existing research into private equity investments by 
investigating information asymmetry surrounding the announcement date of acquisitions, 
informed trading between financial and strategic takeover deals, and the appropriateness 
of past, current and future private equity regulation including its impacts on market 
efficiency.   
 
Past theoretical framework and neoclassical perspective centers around the notion that 
information asymmetry, agency theory and financial market regulation determine private 
equity investments. New entrants to the market require assurance that their investments 
are going to generate a return. This study takes account of a systematic literature review 
and replicates the methodology used in prior studies, and suggests more appropriate 
methodology to correct for previous assumptions in earlier studies. This study draws on 
accounting, finance, information economics and regulatory studies to outline difference 
between strategic and financial targets, and the misconception about the effect of 
regulation on private equity investments. Earlier event studies analyse takeovers as one 
group, applying regulatory and market changes to determine impact on investment. 
However, strategic and financial bidders show valuation differences, with financial 
bidders being highly correlated with economic conditions due to effects on borrowing 
and credit markets, showing different target firms appeal to different acquirers reflective 
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of market conditions.  Inferences from earlier results do not control for acquisition type 
and self-selection bias providing biased results.  
 
The methodology incorporates variables from prior studies and corrects for sample 
selection bias from unobservable information using Heckman (1979). Results of this 
study show the relationship between takeover type, financial and strategic, on the 
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement day and support prior study’s 
findings that returns to financial targets are greater than for strategic targets (Hege et al., 
2012). Results indicate, once accounting for unobservable, no information asymmetry 
around the announcement date, however average abnormal returns reflect investor 
confidence in financial takeovers over strategic. This is likely due to their positive history 
in maximizing investor returns within a 3 to 5-year period. Results in this study support 
Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) that targets are valued higher by strategic bidders, albeit 
the higher level of work post-acquisition, strategic acquiers often make high impact 
changes which have a positive effect on stock prices.  
 
The second study expands on the first to determine if in the absence of information 
asymmetry, the probability of insider trading is higher for financial over strategic 
investors. Results show that the probability of informed trading decreases after the 
announcement date for private equity takeovers, indicating a decrease in information 
asymmetry and less investment risk.  The rationale for this is that private equity acquirers 
share information prior to the announcement date increasing the probability of an 
informed trade. Strategic takeovers by their nature are often hostile and public so there is 
less private information about the target unknown to the public. The ability of private 
equity investors to gain inside knowledge and to trade on such knowledge is a fine line. 
Arguably, as more investors attain information about the target, it dilutes the private 
nature of the information and it is incorporated into the stock price turning it from private 
to public in nature. This study furthers the question of adequate regulation of private 
equity markets which have unique characteristics and investment structures.  
 
The final study considers the perceived goals of private equity regulation and whether 
they are realistic in a market that is largely self-regulated. Although arguments are made 
for increased regulation to improve the transparency of private equity transactions the 
onerous changes that have resulted from past economic shocks have had the opposite 
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effect, at times adding burdens and restricting private equity transactions with banks. The 
ability of private equity to maintain market confidence in economic downturns furthers 
the argument for the market to self-regulate. This study considered the economic and 
systematic risk impacts of private equity regulation through generalized capital market 
reform, concluding that although increased regulation has resulted in increased 
convictions, this alone does not indicate that increased regulation is having a positive 
effect in reducing asymmetric information and the probability of informed trade around 
private equity acquisitions.   
 
This thesis has outlined the importance of financial acquisitions in a growing economy as 
an alternative class of investment. It shows that informational advantages are limited 
when such information is privately known amongst a large group of investors, and that 
the probability of informed trade is reduced post- announcement. Further, an analysis of 
the impacts of regulatory reform around private equity investments has shown that 
information should not be feared. Rather, information is essential to an efficient market 
and any regulatory reform should aim to reduce systematic risk which is often self-
evaluated and regulated through capital market peers. Although this study has provided 
evidence on a number of key concerns relating to private equity investments, the 
availability of transaction data and operationalization of hypotheses to neoclassical 
literature warrants further consideration. Bharath and Dittmar (2010) affirm the 
importance of information and liquidity considerations in reporting for public firms, and 
also note this difference between private equity and public takeovers results in limitations 
for empirical studies due to data not being readily available on private equity takeovers. 
This study focussed on public to private transactions due to data availability.   
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